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ABSTRACT  
 
Adam Layton Long: Income Inequality and Religion: Beliefs, Disagreements, and Politics   
(Under the Direction of Ted Mouw) 
 
This dissertation presents three papers addressing the intersection of income inequality 
and religion, focusing on beliefs, disagreements, and politics.  
The first paper addresses how religion influences beliefs about income inequality around 
the world. The literature on stratification beliefs predicts a negative relationship between religion 
and the desire for governmental redistribution. A common explanation for this relationship 
portrays the church and state as substitute goods: religious involvement provides insurance 
against adverse events, making government programs and spending less necessary and desired. 
However, focusing solely on redistribution leaves unanswered the question of how religion 
influences beliefs about income inequality itself. If being highly religious or belonging to a 
particular religious group associates with support for an increase in income disparity—and not 
simply for an decrease in redistribution—then there is more to the theoretical story. This paper 
expands the conversation on religion and inequality by digging beneath the concept of 
“substitute goods” to address the specific question, “How does religion influence beliefs about 
income inequality around the world?” It presents multilevel mixed-effects linear regression 
models based on the World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS) demonstrating 
that support for income inequality correlates with being highly religious and with the interaction 
of being highly religious and identifying with a religious tradition whose core teaching addresses 
stratification. 
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The second paper addresses the effect of religiosity on the amount of disagreement over 
income inequality within religious traditions around the world. Expectations that religion in the 
modern world would recede into private spheres of personal concern have not come to pass. 
Rather, contemporary religion continues to fuel disagreement over issues of major concern in the 
public realm. Prior research indicates that disagreement about public issues such as inequality 
intensifies within highly religious groups in the U.S. This paper presents heteroskedastic ordered 
probit regression models based on the World Values Survey/European Values Survey 
(WVS/EVS) to address the question, “What is the effect of religiosity on the amount of 
disagreement over income inequality within religious traditions around the world?” Including 
controls for nonreligious factors known to shape beliefs about this topic, the models provide 
evidence for the hypothesis that disagreement about income inequality intensifies within highly 
religious groups around the world. This empirical finding prompts the following theoretical 
insight: Far from producing consensus, high religiosity intensifies variation in beliefs about 
income inequality, pushing people toward divergent perspectives on this public issue. This is true 
for all religious groups around the world, but especially for Catholics, Protestants, and those who 
claim no religious affiliation. This helps to explain why identification with specific religious 
traditions does not produce uniform beliefs about economic stratification. 
The third paper addresses the effects of income and religiosity on support for involving 
religion in politics. Deprivation theory, which views religion mainly as a compensator for 
resources and opportunities, predicts higher religiosity among poorer people. Conversely, 
relative power theory, which views religion mainly as a mechanism of power, predicts higher 
religiosity among richer people. Recent research advocating the latter approach demonstrates 
correlations between higher economic status and religiosity—but fails to provide evidence that 
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religion in these cases acts as a mechanism of power. To discover if religion provides a 
mechanism of power for the wealthy, this paper adopts the definition of secularization as 
declining religious authority in realms such as politics. It addresses the question, “What are the 
effects of income and religiosity on support for involving religion in politics?” Its ordered 
logistic regression models based on the World Values Survey/European Values Survey 
(WVS/EVS) provide solid evidence for the hypothesis that having a higher income correlates 
with less support for involving religion in politics and minimal evidence for the hypothesis that 
having a higher income and being highly religious correlates with more support for involving 
religion in politics. In the main, deprivation theory provides more accurate predictions of the 
relationship between income and support for involving religion in politics when defining 
secularization as declining religious authority. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON WORLDWIDE INCOME INEQUALITY BELIEFS 
 
Introduction   
Over the past two centuries, average incomes around the world have risen dramatically 
due to industrialization. However, this growth has occurred unevenly, with some nations 
benefitting much more than others (Firebaugh 2003). Inequality has been on the rise both within 
nations and—removing China from the calculations—between nations as well (Sala-i-Martin 
2002, Firebaugh 2003, Mahler and McKeever 2009). While attempts to explain these upward 
trends often focus on globalization and growth (see Appendix 1.A), the conversation about 
income inequality encompasses more than pure economics. Social norms play a “crucial role” in 
both legitimating and challenging inequality levels (Kluegel and Smith 1981, Fong 2001, 
Kruguman 2002, Piketty and Saez 2003. Bullock 2005:2).  Because of this, a comprehensive 
approach to economic inequality will address how the income distribution among world citizens 
reflects the influence of social norms (Benabou and Tirole 2006, McCall and Percheski 2010). 
Studying these social norms requires discovering perceptions and judgments of income 
inequality, economic opportunity, and governmental redistribution (Aalberg 2003, McCall 
2013). What do people around the world think about rising income inequality?  
Prior research indicates that understanding beliefs about income inequality involves 
addressing six major factors. The literature review below explores the ways that inequality 
beliefs reflect 1) normative judgments, 2) stratification systems, 3) political orders, 4) economic 
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conditions, 5) social norms, and 6) religious traditions. Much of the research on this final factor 
predicts a negative relationship between stratification beliefs and religion. Importantly, this body 
of work usually focuses on opinions about governmental redistribution (Gill and Lundsgaarde 
2004, Chen and Lind 2005, Hungerman 2005, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Scheve and Stasavage 
2006, Chen and Lind 2007, Gruber and Hungerman 2007, Akkoyunlu, Neustadt, and Zweifel 
2008, Pepinsky and Welborne 2010, Guillaud 2011, Stegmueller et al. 2011). This approach 
often conceptualizes church and state—religion and redistribution—as “substitute goods” and 
attempts to explain the influence of religion on preferences for redistribution through this 
specific causal mechanism. Because religious involvement provides insurance against adverse 
life events, people of faith often view governmental redistribution and programs as less 
necessary and desired (Chen and Lind 2005, Scheve and Stasavage 2006, Chen and Lind 2007, 
Pepinsky and Welborne 2010, Guillaud 2011, Stegmueller et al. 2011). As the “substitute good” 
of religiosity increases, so the demand for redistribution decreases. However, focusing solely on 
redistribution leaves unanswered the question of how religion influences beliefs about income 
inequality itself—an issue that is separable from redistribution (McCall 2013). If being highly 
religious or belonging to a particular religious group is associated with desire for an increase in 
income disparity—and not simply for an decrease in redistribution—then there is more to the 
theoretical story than the church and state acting as substitute goods.  
This project expands the conversation on religion and inequality by digging beneath the 
concept of “substitute goods” to address the specific question, “How does religion influence 
beliefs about income inequality around the world?” A review of the literature on the relationship 
between religion and beliefs about income inequality suggests the following three hypotheses: 
Support for income inequality correlates with 1) being in a religious majority, 2) being highly 
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religious, and 3) identifying with religious traditions whose core teachings address stratification. 
This paper tests these three hypotheses as well as a novel proposal derived from the methods 
section that follows: 4) Support for income inequality correlates with the interaction between 
religious intensity and religious identity. To test these hypotheses, this paper presents multilevel 
mixed-effects linear regression models using the World Values Survey/European Values Survey 
(WVS/EVS), the only ongoing research project designed to capture the values and beliefs of a 
majority of the world’s population (Inglehart 2008). Also included are Gini indexes from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), measures of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and Government Expenditures (as percentage of GDP) from the World Bank International 
Comparison Program, and information about countries’ religious composition from The Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life. Including controls for nonreligious factors known to shape 
beliefs about income inequality, the models provide evidence for the hypotheses that support for 
income inequality correlates with being highly religious and with the interaction of being highly 
religious and identifying with a religious tradition whose core teaching addresses stratification.  
 
Theory 
Prior research indicates that beliefs about income inequality reflect normative judgments, 
stratification systems, political orders, economic conditions, social norms, religious 
commitments, and religious traditions. The discussion below describes these six factors and 
presents hypotheses that follow from them.   
1) Inequality beliefs reflect normative judgments. 
When studying people’s beliefs about income inequality, it can be helpful to specify how 
one defines beliefs and how one describes inequality. When it comes to beliefs, Aalberg (2003) 
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differentiates between perceptions, ideals, attitudes. Perceptions about income inequality contain 
no normative judgment; they simply register how much income inequality people perceive in 
society. On the other hand, ideals represent the amount of income inequality that people think 
society should have, and attitudes represent judgments about the best policies to achieve those 
ideals. Whereas ideals evolve slowly, both perceptions and attitudes change more rapidly. In the 
main, people’s perceptions of income inequality prove quite accurate and have been shown to 
influence their ideals (Aalberg 2003). The beliefs discussed in this paper reflect the category of 
ideals: how much income inequality people think society ought to have.  
People’s beliefs about the widening distribution can either challenge current social 
arrangements (Kluegel and Smith 1981, McCall 2013) or legitimate them (Lerner 1980, Kluegel 
and Smith 1986, Bobo 1987, Fleishman 1988, Svallfors 1993, Krugman 2002, Piketty and Saez 
2003, Bullock 2005, Malahy, Rubinlicht, and Kaiser 2009, Seider 2010, Kocer and van de 
Werfhorst 2012). McCall (2013) encourages viewing such beliefs as being interdependent with 
beliefs about economic opportunity and governmental redistribution. Following her lead, this 
paper discusses beliefs about inequality, opportunity, and distribution together, noting 
differences when appropriate. In this vein, it is vital to identify the methodological issues 
involved in capturing inequality beliefs: “[T]he way in which we measure the desire to reduce 
inequality produces different patterns of response across the surveys” (Bjoklund and Freeman 
2010). Recognizing that slightly different questions can produce vastly different answers—
especially on this topic—reinforces the importance of running a tight methodological ship.  
2) Inequality beliefs reflect stratification systems.    
In the main, beliefs about economic inequality are highly correlated with one’s position 
in the stratification system (Svallfors 1993). Indeed, a major strand of research identifies self-
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interest as a the major determinant of beliefs about income inequality (Arikan 2013). Those who 
benefit least from unequal economic arrangements are the most likely to support egalitarian 
principles. For example, women, the elderly, the unemployed, and the poor—those who typically 
occupy more fragile positions in the stratification system—report more concern about income 
inequality and more support for redistribution than do men, younger people, the employed, and 
the affluent (Ravallion and Lokshin 2000, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2001 Aalberg 2003, Arikan 
2013).  
Because one’s position in the income distribution is highly correlated with education 
level, it might be expected that those with advanced learning express less concern about income 
inequality. Indeed some researchers find that achieving higher educational status promotes a 
more favorable opinion of large wage and wealth disparities (Kocer and van de Werfhorst 2012). 
The exception to this trend involves those who experience multiple forms of oppression 
simultaneously, such as African American women (but not men) in the United States (Kane and 
Kyyro 2001). On the other hand, higher education might be expected to unmask the social 
mechanisms that cause poverty and reproduce inequality (Aalberg 2003) thereby cultivating 
“tolerant” values and sensitizing learners to the call for more redistribution (Kocer and van de 
Werfhorst 2012). While this may be true in some cases, educational “interventions” designed to 
sensitize privileged groups to poverty and homelessness can increase knowledge while failing to 
alter the legitimizing frames used to justify economic disparity (Seider 2010). Furthermore, 
educational attainment does not uniformly translate into economic mobility: “Growing up in a 
state with widespread economic inequality increases educational attainment for high income 
children and lowers it for low income children” (Mayer 2001:1).   
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Given the high correlation between the current stratification system and beliefs about 
income inequality, it might be expected that those who have most to gain from generous 
redistributive policies would form political coalitions to achieve more egalitarian societies. As it 
turns out, researchers find very little evidence of this strategy in action (Lind 2005). The 
Prospect of Upward Mobility (POUM) thesis explains that “the poor do not support high levels 
of redistribution because they hope that they, or their offspring, will make it up the income 
ladder” (Benabou and Ok 2001:447). In this view, self-interest is still the dominant force shaping 
beliefs about inequality. However, adding the concept of mobility projects self-interest into the 
future (Hirschman and Rothchild 1973, Ravallion and Lokshin 2000). Indeed, the perception of 
an even playing field with fair opportunities for advancement dampens concern about income 
inequality (Alesina and La Ferrara 2001, Clark 2003, Senik 2005), an outlook often reproduced 
from generation to generation (Piketty 1995).  
To address how inequality beliefs reflect stratification systems, the models in this paper 
control for sex, age, marital status, education, and income. The expectation is that being female, 
older, single, less educated, and poorer will dampen support for income inequality. 
3) Inequality beliefs reflect political orders.  
In addition to reflecting current and projected stratification systems, beliefs about income 
inequality also reflect governmental regime types (Alesina and Fuchs-Schendeln 2007). At the 
broadest level, the “nature of the social contract shapes people’s beliefs” and vice versa 
(Benabou and Tirole 2006:702). Indeed, “There is a strong correlation between these beliefs and 
actual levels of redistribution (ibid). Much of the research into this trend compares and contrasts 
Europe’s more extensive welfare states with the relatively laissez-faire public policy of the US 
(ibid). In the main, people in the West “have a strong preference for equality and are concerned 
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about the worst off in society,” with the overall trend moving toward egalitarianism (Aalberg 
2003:196). Differences in ideals, however, arise from public perceptions of income inequality: 
“On average, the public perceives approximately the same level of inequality as the official 
figures stated was present in their country. There was a very strong positive relationship between 
how people perceive occupational differences and what they believe would be the ideal 
difference” (ibid.: 198). This pattern produces a continuum from English-speaking democracies, 
which tolerate higher levels of inequality, to Scandinavian and formerly communist nations, 
which promote stronger levels of egalitarianism, with the remainder of Western Europe falling in 
between (Aalberg 2003, Jaeger 2009).  
As one might expect, some evidence complicates this rudimentary understanding. For 
example, the basic picture of the US portrays a society accepting large economic disparity 
tracing back to the nation’s British institutional origins, strong religious diversity, historic 
immigration patterns, distaste for government intervention, and the ideals of equality and 
meritocracy (Glazer 2003). However, Klugel and Smith (1986:6) report “inconsistency, 
fluctuation, and seeming contradiction in the attitudes towards inequality and related policy 
found in the American public,” a situation created by a failure to integrate a dominant ideology 
justifying income inequality with growing cultural liberalism. And a more recent study by Mcall 
(2013:137) reports that “Americans are not satisfied with existing levels of income inequality, 
and their concerns have intensified since the 1980s” due to concerns with restricted economic 
opportunities. In another English-speaking democracy, Great Britain’s history of strong class 
boundaries can actually sensitize people to economic inequality—even if they identify as 
economically conservative (Evans 1997).  
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Evidence complicating the basic picture of post-Communist states must also be 
acknowledged. This basic picture portrays the egalitarian influence of Soviet control as quite 
durable (Suhrcke 2001, Alesina and Fuchs-Schendeln 2007). However, Eastern European 
societies exhibit “considerable ideological inconsistency,” supporting minimum and maximum 
income policies while simultaneously demonstrating an increased desire for social stratification 
and inequality (Alwin, Gorney, and Khakhulina 1995). Such inconsistency becomes observable 
within other European nations, such as Russian and Estonia (Ravallion and Lokshin 2000, 
Stephenson 2000), and between nations outside of Europe, such as Kazkhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
(Junisbai 2010). Thus, while the overall pattern ranging from inegalitarian English-speaking 
democracies to egalitarian Scandinavian and post-Communist nations remains accurate, it is 
important to acknowledge deviations from the dominant trend.  
To address how inequality beliefs reflect political orders, the models in this paper control 
for government expenses. The expectation is that living in a nation with low government 
spending will dampen support for income inequality. 
4) Inequality beliefs reflect economic conditions.  
In the past, social transfers of wealth and income were rare with the exception of modest 
“poor relief.” “Today, all democratic countries have well-developed welfare states albeit of 
different sizes” (Lind 2005:2).  Around the world, the desire for redistribution decreases as the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—a measure of prosperity—increases (Dallinger 2010). 
Conversely, nations with low economic development show strong support for redistribution—
even among citizens with higher incomes (Dion and Birchfield 2010). While the prosperity of a 
nation shapes beliefs about income inequality, the amount of economic inequality within the 
nation also matters. In Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
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countries during the 1980s and 1990s, market inequality grew, but so did redistribution 
(Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005).  
The median-voter model, an early account of the relationship between redistribution and 
inequality, suggests that redistribution in nations with higher income inequality “is a function of 
the distance between the income of the median voter and the average income of all voters” 
(Meltzer and Richard 1981, Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005:456). As with most models, the 
evidence for this approach is mixed. For example, positive evidence found in Europe (Fineraas 
2009) and Latin America (Cramer and Kauffman 2010) meets with arguments that little 
empirical support exists among OECD countries (Kenworthy and McCall 2008). An alternative 
approach explains higher redistribution in nations with higher income inequality with recourse to 
social movement mobilization by unions and leftist political parties (Bradley et al. 2003, 
Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005).  
The basic picture that nations with higher income inequality have higher levels of 
demand for redistribution comes with some caveats. For example, within country inequality 
influences opinions about redistribution more in Europe than in the US, where personal income 
level is more of a factor (Pittau, Massari, and Zelli 2013). Indeed, the rise in economic 
divergence in the United States has intensified the desire for less income inequality (McCall 
2013). However, such opinions about income inequality do not translate directly into the desire 
for more governmental redistribution. Proposals among US citizens for achieving economic 
equity without redistribution include injecting more democracy directly into work environments, 
expanding educational opportunities, and reducing market inequality (Wright 2010, Wolff  2012, 
McCall 2013). Overall, the amount of economic inequality in a society has informational values 
for its citizens, which can prompt social limits to redistribution (Corneo and Gruner 2000). 
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To address how inequality beliefs reflect economic conditions, the models in this paper 
control for income inequality and economic development. The expectation is that living in a 
nation with high income inequality and low economic development will dampen support for 
income inequality. 
5) Inequality beliefs reflect social norms.  
Beyond concrete economic indicators such as GDP, Gini coefficients, and government 
spending, social norms also influence beliefs about income inequality. Acknowledging that 
people tend to be reciprocal beings who hold “strong principles of equity” makes it difficult to 
explain inequality beliefs entirely in terms of stratification position and self-interest (Fong 
2001:242). Importantly, the influence of social norms on inequality beliefs moves in both 
directions. On one hand, “beliefs about economic… disparity, upward mobility, and achievement 
play a crucial role in legitimizing inequality” (Bullock 2005:2). But beliefs can also challenge 
economic arrangements, motivating the desire for social change and advocating specific 
strategies of action (Kluegel and Smith 1981). In the US, social norms played a major role in the 
maintenance of egalitarian arrangements achieved during and after World War II (Krguman 
2002, Piketty and Saez 2003) as well as the recent surge in incomes at the very top of the 
distribution (McCall and Percheski 2010).  
In general, “left and right political outlooks are consistent and strong predictors of 
support for social policies” involving redistribution (Arikan 2013). Being moderate, inclusive, 
risk averse, and altruistic associate with a dislike of economic disparity (Alesina and La Ferrara 
2001, Suhrcke 2001, Biancotti and D’Alessio 2007) while racism (in the US) and xenophobia (in 
Europe) decreases the likelihood redistribution (Lee, Roemer, and Straeten 2006). At the same 
time, the relationship between social norms and inequality beliefs becomes complicated by the 
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fact that few people hold highly developed accounts of economic inequality and strategies for 
addressing it. Instead, most people rely on core ideological commitments to justify disparate 
distributions of income and wealth (Kluegel and Smith 1986, Bobo 1987, Fleishman 1988). For 
example, a belief in “individualism” can promote the ideas “that opportunity for economic 
advancement is widely available, that economic outcomes are determined by individual efforts 
and talents (or their lack), and that in general economic inequality is fair” (Kluegel and Smith 
1986:37).  
A major legitimizing frame, Just World Beliefs, consists of the “notion that people get 
what they deserve and deserve what they get” (Malahy, Rubinlicht, and Kaiser 2009:370, Lerner 
1980). Greater acceptance of Just World Beliefs aligns with greater perceptions of inequality as 
“fair, inevitable, and immutable” (Smith 1985). As one’s income increases over time, so do the 
odds of holding Just World Beliefs (Malahy, Rubinlicht, and Kaiser 2009). At the same time, a 
number of factors provide counterpressure to Just World Beliefs. Indeed, the relationship 
between income and Just World Beliefs is not entirely static. Having a sense of political 
efficacy—the notion that one’s collective participation in the political process can influence 
outcomes—weakens the link between Just World Beliefs and the legitimation of income 
inequality (Beierlein et al. 2011). In addition, such core ideological commitments often face 
challenges from social movements, providing counterpressure to the majority view. This push 
and pull between competing approaches can lead researchers to find views on economic 
inequality to be ambivalent and inconsistent over time (McCall and Kenworthy 2009, McCall 
2013).  
6) Inequality beliefs reflect religious traditions.  
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As argued above, the construction and maintenance of income distributions around the 
world involves more than pure economics. Social norms play an important role in creating these 
unequal social arrangements. An important source of norms that motivate and justify social 
action is culture in general—and religion in specific (Smith 2003, Vaisey 2009). While much 
religion focuses on interaction with divine entities (Stark and Finke 2000) or conjecture about 
superempirical realities (Smith 2003), many faith expressions emphasize concrete, tangible 
events and situations (Casanova 1994). Indeed religious faith directly influences the differential 
distribution of resources—both cultural and material—between different groups of people 
(Keister 2003, 2008, 2011). “Religion affects economic outcomes mainly by fostering religious 
beliefs that influence individual traits such as honesty, work ethic, thrift, and openness to 
strangers” (McCleary and Barro 2006:771). A major way that religion influences economic 
distributions is through its effect on inequality beliefs. Internationally, different forms of religion 
shape different preferences for redistribution—which in turn shape actual levels of redistribution 
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003).  
When attempting to discern the influence of religion on beliefs about inequality around 
the world, it is important to recognize that one faith often predominates within each nation, 
making every citizen either a religious majority or minority. Indeed religious inequity sits at the 
intersection of faith and self-interest, two issues that are theoretically central to this study. Prior 
research demonstrates support for the “underdog thesis,” that minority groups with lower 
socioeconomic status support more egalitarian principles than their majority counterparts 
(Robinson and Bell 1978). Using data collected in the United States, Hunt (2002) argues that this 
same egalitarian impulse based on self-interest also applies to religious minorities. Being in a 
religious minority predicts resistance to dominant ideologies that promote individualistic 
  13 
explanations of poverty and income inequality. Thus accounting for religious majority/minority 
inequity addresses the possibility that the relationship between religion and inequality beliefs 
may depend as much on a religious group’s numerical strength within a society as the identity of 
that religious group across societies.   
Hypothesis 1: Support for income inequality correlates with being in a religious majority. 
Further evidence suggests that religion can intensify conflicts over issues of equality, 
driving people on both sides of the debate further apart (Emerson and Smith 2001). Indeed the 
literature on the relationship between religion and stratification beliefs demonstrates that 
religious intensity and identity correlate with conflicting outcomes. For example, religion can be 
shown to have no influence on attitudes about economic justice (Curry, Koch, and Chalfant 
2010), increase the willingness to pay for income redistribution (Neustadt 2011), or increase 
opposition to redistribution (Chen and Lind 2005, Lind 2005). Furthermore different aspects of 
religion can have different impacts on inequality beliefs. For example, religious beliefs can drive 
support for governmental responsibility in achieving social welfare while religious behaviors, 
such as attendance, dampen such concern (Arikan 2013, Pittau, Massari, and Zelli 2013). Of 
course, it is not simply beliefs and behaviors that matters for views on income inequality but also 
the intensity of a person’s engagement with religion. For example, Perkins (1983:206) argues 
that “social conformity may be a common element of religious identification that lowers concern 
for social equality, while the actual faith, if highly internalized, reverses this relationship in part.” 
In spite of these conflicting results, a major strand of empirical research suggests that 
religion can uniformly dampen concern for equality, whether the issue is race, gender, sexual 
orientation, or economics (Feagin 1975, Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink 1999, Hinojosa and Park 
2004, Edgell and Tranby 2007, Andersen and Fetner 2008, Eitle and Steffens 2009, Seguino 
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2011, Taylor and Merino 2011). Indeed, three different but related approaches predict “a 
negative relationship between religiousness and income redistribution” (Akkoyunlu, Neustadt, 
and Zweifel 2008:24). First, collective cultural beliefs—such as doctrines about rewards in the 
afterlife—can encourage individual industriousness and dampen desire for government 
intervention (Benabou and Tirole 2006). Second, expanding governmental welfare spending 
crowds out church-based charity, which can make religion seem less necessary (Gill and 
Lundsgaarde 2004, Hungerman 2005, Gruber and Hungerman 2007). Third, religious 
involvement provides insurance against adverse life events, making governmental programs less 
necessary and desired (Scheve and Stasavage 2006, Guillaud 2011, Stegmueller et al. 2011). 
From this “new political economy of religion” perspective, people of faith tend to view 
redistribution negatively because their religious beliefs, behaviors, and belonging provide 
psychological and material insurance against adverse life events, such as rapid drops in income 
(Chen and Lind 2005, Chen and Lind 2007, Pepinsky and Welborne 2010). Even though such 
believers might embrace religious teachings endorsing personal acts of charity, they do not desire 
the government to get involved in this process.  
In these theories, church and state—religion and redistribution—are conceptualized as 
“substitute goods.” Thus, the explanation for the negative association between religion and 
egalitarianism necessarily focuses on redistribution. However, by measuring only attitudes about 
redistribution—and not addressing beliefs income inequality—the rest of the story may be going 
untold. Perhaps the negative association between religion and egalitarianism is not simply a 
function of material tradeoffs. Perhaps religion shapes moral judgments about income inequality 
itself. If religion negatively associates with beliefs about income inequality—and not just 
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governmental redistribution—then there may be more to the story than the state and the church 
(or mosque or synagogue or temple) acting as “substitute goods.”  
 Given that a preponderance of research predicts a negative relationship between 
religious intensity and the desire for governmental redistribution, this paper anticipates a similar 
relationship between religious intensity and beliefs about income inequality. The following 
hypothesis intends to demonstrate that beliefs about redistribution are similar to but separable 
from beliefs about income inequality.  
Hypothesis 2: Support for income inequality correlates with being highly religious.  
Different religious traditions promote different teachings and utilize different frames, and 
this is certainly true in how they address economic norms. Investigating how religion influences 
inequality beliefs includes reviewing the basic teachings of the major traditions and how each 
addresses poverty and income inequality. The following section reviews the major religious 
traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam (Smith 1991). Of course, the “lived 
religion” (Hall 1997) of the masses do not map neatly onto the teachings of gurus, bishops, and 
imams, and there exists as much diversity within religious groups as between them. For example, 
modernist believers in European and Israel are more economically individualistic than their 
religiously orthodox counterparts, believing that “individuals are responsible for their own 
success or failure and that the solution to poverty and unemployment is greater effort by the poor 
and jobless themselves, not government aid or private charity” (Davis and Robinson 1999, 
2001:23). Nonetheless, it can be helpful to frame the basic contours of the world’s major 
religious traditions, linking major doctrines and practices to ideas about income inequality. As 
will be evident in what follows, researchers concerned with the influence of religion on 
inequality beliefs have focused more attention on Muslims and Christians than on believers from 
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other religious traditions. In almost every case, the influence of religious identity on beliefs about 
income inequality proves contradictory. 
Hinduism invites people to seek liberation (moksha) from human finitude and achieve 
union of the self (Atman) with the Godhead (Brahman). Individuals souls (jivas) migrate through 
a sequence of bodies through a process of reincarnation (samsara) based on the moral law of 
cause and effect (karma). Indeed karma shapes society’s hereditary stratification system (caste), 
sorting people into five groups: priests and scholars (Brahmins), rulers and soldiers (Kshatriyas), 
professionals and merchants (Vaisyas), laborers and servants (Sudras), and the outcastes or 
untouchables (Harijans). Throughout Hindu history, many groups have observed strict 
separation of the castes while others have advocated for equal treatment and interaction across 
lines of stratification. Evidence of this divergence appears in the research on Hindu stratification 
practices and beliefs. In a study of college students, over half of respondents rated the caste 
system as intolerable; but upper-caste Brahmins showed the greatest toleration (Kuppuswamy 
1956). Indeed, the argument can be made that “religious bonding” among Hindus is based more 
strongly on caste than income level (Stroope 2012:499). Conversely, another study demonstrates 
that Brahmins exhibited less rigidity and more support than other groups for reforming the caste 
system (Rath 1960). Such egalitarian impulses have been documented within Hindu temples 
themselves, which have historically “served redistributive and developmental functions that 
seem coextensive with those of the political system” (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1976). 
Despite this conflicting evidence, the caste system of Hinduism still demonstrates the strongest 
connections between religious dogma and social stratification in all the major world religions.   
Originating in a Hindu context, Buddhism teaches Four Noble Truths: 1) that life is 
suffering (dukkha), 2) which is caused by desire (tanha), 3) and can be cured by being released 
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from desire, 4) through the Eightfold Path: right views, right intent, right speech, right conduct, 
right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. Over the course of 
multiple, reincarnated lifetimes shaped by the law of karma, this path can lead to nirvana, life’s 
goal of extinguishing the bounded self and the the subsequent suffering caused by desire. In 
terms of social stratification, Buddhism does not observe the caste system of Hinduism. On one 
hand Buddhism recommends compassion towards everyone trapped in the illusion of suffering 
caused by personal desire (Armstrong 2010). On the other hand, Buddhism teaches that all of 
life’s suffering—including the suffering caused by unequal economic arrangements—is merely 
an illusion stemming from the perception of individuated selves. Clearly, concerns with 
stratification prove less central to Buddhism than to Hinduism.   
Originating in a Jewish context, Christianity identifies Jesus of Nazareth as the anointed 
one (Messiah or Christ) who establishes God’s kingdom by saving people from sin through his 
crucifixion and resurrection. The three broad branches of Christianity originated in disputes over 
authority, with a split between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism occurring in 1054 
c.e., and a split between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism beginning in 1517 c.e. One 
sociological theory links the rapid rise of Christianity in the ancient, pagan world to the 
boundary-crossing behavior of Christians involving stratification, especially regarding gender 
and slavery (Stark 1997). Another links rising economic disparities between Catholics and 
Protestants in modernizing Europe to the capitalist-friendly ethic of Protestantism (Weber 2002).  
Both Catholics and Protestants express high levels of resistance to governmental 
redistribution (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003) especially when contrasted with secular 
individuals (Stegmueller et al. 2011). While some researchers identify Protestants as the more 
resistant group (Benabou and Tirole 2006), others portray Catholics as more resistant (Guillaud 
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2011). Of course, introducing additional factors into the analysis complicates this picture. For 
example, being Catholic “reduces the propensity towards redistribution of the leftists whereas it 
increases the propensity of the right wing” (Pittau, Massari, and Zelli 2013: 575). While some 
argue that “Christian traditions, as understood by ordinary Americans, work in favor of 
aspirations for equality and community in the economic realm, at least as much as against them” 
(Hart 1996:vii), others see a different picture. One portrayal of this ambivalent relationship 
situates religious groups along a continuum from those who contribute to economic inequality to 
those who promote economic equality (Davidson and Pyle 1999). In this view, the majority of 
religiously engaged people fall toward the side that contributes to economic inequality, leaving a 
minority to promote economic equality. 
Also from the Abrahamic tradition, Islam, meaning submission or surrender, endorses 
Five Pillars: 1) Shahadah: the confession that there is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is 
His Prophet; 2) Salah: prayers said at five times throughout the day, 3) Zakat: charity or 
almsgiving to those in need, 4) Sawm: the observance of the month of Ramadan with fasting; and 
5) Hajj: at least one pilgrimage to Mecca, the holy city of Islam. Islamic law (shariah), 
originating with its holy book (Quran) and a collection of Muhammad’s sayings and traditions 
(hadith), teaches that “a society’s health requires that material goods be widely and appropriately 
distributed” and calls for the breaking of “the barriers of economic caste” in order to reduce 
enormously “the injustices of special interest groups” (Smith 1991: 249-250).  
All around the world, “socioeconomic inequality is lower in societies with proportionally 
larger Muslim populations” (Fish 2011: 256). One possible explanation for this situation is Moral 
Cosmology Theory, which suggests that Muslims who adhere more closely to Islamic orthodoxy 
are “disposed towards economic communitarianism, whereby the state should provide for the 
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poor, reduce inequality, and meet community needs via economic intervention (Davis and 
Robinson 2006:167). A study of the divergent economic trajectories of two post-Communist, 
majority-Muslim states—growing Kazakhstan and stagnating Kyrgyzstan—provides further 
evidence for the argument that more egalitarian attitudes associate with higher levels of Islamic 
orthodoxy (Junisbai 2010). However, the Islamic Redistribution Thesis is not without its 
detractors. Pepinsky and Welborne (2010: 491) reject the idea that “piety has a systematic impact 
on the redistributive preferences among Muslims,” arguing conversely that “higher levels of 
religiosity correspond to lower support for government efforts to minimize income inequality.” 
According to these critics, the choice by Davis and Robinson to define piety as support for the 
implementation of Islamic law required dropping half of the Muslims in their sample because 
they were not asked the question on shariah. Pepinsky and Welborne conclude that “These 
findings provide little evidence to suggest that either scriptural or organizational factors unique 
to Islam create distinct economic policy preferences among pious Muslims, demonstrating that 
arguments derived from Christians in advanced industrial economies are largely appropriate in 
the Muslim world” (Pepinksy and Welborne 2010: 491).  
Whereas previous research has often focused on the relationship between stratification 
beliefs and individual religious traditions (e.g., Islam) or similar religious denominations (e.g., 
Catholics vs. Protestants), this study addresses the world’s major traditions side by side. In 
summary, dogmas related to stratification from the world’s four major religious traditions form a 
continuum from essential and specific to peripheral and general. First, Hindu teaching presents 
the most explicit explanation for social stratification: inequality arises from the karmic results of 
past actions. The caste system is a core feature of Hindu society. Second, Islamic teaching 
presents a specific response to income inequality: one of its Five Pillars requires almsgiving to 
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those in need. While the Muslim world eoncompasses widely divergent interpretations of this 
instruction, the centrality of the topic remains salient for this study. Third, Buddhist teaching 
generally recommends compassion but also teaches that all suffering–including the suffering that 
results from one’s position in the stratification system—is illusory. While many forms of 
Buddhism teach that the law of karma governs the process of reincarnation, the Buddha 
explicitly rejected the caste system. Finally, Christian scriptures endorse caring for the poor; 
however, such injunctions have never been identified by either ecumenical councils or 
widespread consensus as essential doctrines. Furthermore, Jesus of Nazareth reportedly claimed 
that his followers would always have poor people with them (Mark 14:7, Matthew 26:11). It is 
expected that support for income inequality will decrease along this continuum of centrality and 
specificity—from Hindus to Muslims to Buddhists to Christians. Further theoretical discussion 
of this basic approach appears in the Findings section below. 
Hypothesis 3: Support for income inequality correlates with identifying with religious 
traditions whose core teachings address stratification.  
Hypotheses  
In summary, beliefs about income inequality reflect six major factors: normative 
judgments, stratification systems, political orders, economic conditions, social norms, and 
religious traditions. In order to isolate the relationship between inequality beliefs and religion, it 
is important to control for both individual and structural factors known to influence inequality 
beliefs. It is expected that one’s position in the stratification system will influence beliefs about 
income inequality. For example, being female, older, single, less educated, and poorer will 
dampen support for income inequality. Structural factors that might dampen support for income 
inequality include living in a nation with high income inequality, low economic development, 
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and low government spending. Once these factors are addressed, three basic hypotheses emerge 
from the literature review: Support for income inequality correlates with 1) being in a religious 
majority, 2) being highly religious, and 3) identifying with religious traditions whose core 
teachings address stratification. This paper tests these three hypotheses as well as a novel 
proposal derived from the findings section that follows: 4) Support for income inequality 
correlates with the interaction between religious intensity and religious identity. 
 
Methods 
Data 
In order to test these hypotheses, this study utilizes the the World Values 
Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS), the only ongoing research project designed to 
capture the values and beliefs of a majority of the world’s population (Inglehart 2008). Collected 
on all six continents by leading social scientists from each of the 97 societies studied, the 
WVS/EVS includes representational national samples of at least 1,000 people from each society, 
reflecting the opinions of 88 percent of the globe’s inhabitants. Using random probability 
samples (where possible), local field organizations conduct face-to-face interviews through 
standardized questionnaires translated into the local language under the supervision of academic 
researchers and a principal investigator at the behest of the Stockholm-based non-profit World 
Values Survey Association (WVSA). In total, the five waves of the WVS/EVS constitutes 
334,000 unique respondents (25,000 from 20 countries during Wave 1 in 1981-1984; 61,000 
from 42 countries during Wave 2 in 1989-1993; 75,000 from 52 countries during Wave 3 in 
1994-1998; 96,000 from 67 countries during Wave 4 in 1999-2004; and 77,000 from 54 
countries during Wave 5 in 2005-2008). This paper employs the last three waves of the 
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combined WVS/EVS, as these waves include measures of the dependent variable and other 
theoretically important factors. 
In addition to the WVS/EVS dataset, this study utilizes three additional sources of 
information. First, the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) provides Gini 
indexes compiled using a custom missing-data algorithm to standardize the U.N. University 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID) with reference to the Luxembourg Income Study. 
The SWIID “provides comparable Gini indices of gross and net income inequality for 153 
countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the present, along with estimates of 
uncertainty in these statistics” (Solt 2009). Second, the World Bank International Comparison 
Program Database (WBICPD) database provides measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2013 international dollars calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates based on data 
files from the World Bank National Accounts and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) National Accounts. The World Bank International Comparison Program 
also provides measures of Government Expenses as a Percentage of GDP based on information 
from International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, World Bank 
estimates, and OECD estimates. Third, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life provides 
“comprehensive demographic estimates of the size and distribution of eight major religious 
groups in the 232 countries and territories for which the United Nations Population Division 
provides general population estimates as of 2010” based on the analysis of 2,500 data sources, 
“including censuses, demographic surveys, general population surveys and other studies” 
(Hackett and Grim 2012:51).    
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Measures 
The dependent variable for this study is an indicator of beliefs about income inequality 
measured on a ten-point scale. The WVS/EVS survey question reads: “Now I’d like you to tell 
me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you 
agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number 
in between. Sentences: Incomes should be made more equal (1) vs. We need larger income 
differences as incentives (10).” This indicator serves as an appropriate dependent variable for 
this study because it captures beliefs about income inequality and not just government 
redistribution. Strictly speaking, this indicator is a categorical measure. However, having a broad 
ten-point scale makes it possible to treat this dependent variable as continuous, as in the models 
below.  
The independent variables for this study include three religious indicators: inequity, 
intensity, and identity. The first independent variable based on data from the Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life indicates whether or not each respondent is in a religious majority. This 
dichotomous variable, which is based on the six religious groups employed in this study, signals 
that respondents DO identify with the majority religious groups in their societies. Second, the 
WVS/EVS measure of religiosity derives from asking respondents to rate the importance of 
religion in their life using the following categorical scale: very important, rather important, not 
very important, and not at all important. In this study, religious intensity appears as a 
dichotomous measure, contrasting those from the “very important” category with all other 
respondents from the three remaining categories (reference). Using a dichotomous religiosity 
variable produces a more manageable number of groups when creating interaction terms with the 
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third religious indicator: religious group. The WVS/EVS indicator for religious identity includes 
the nominal categories of Catholic, Protestant (reference), Orthodox, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, 
Other Religious Group, and No Religious Group.  
The control variables for this study include both personal and structural factors that have 
been identified in the literature as influencing beliefs about inequality. First, control variables 
from the WVS/EVS that reflect personal position in the stratification system include 1) sex, a 
dichotomous variable measured as female and male (reference); 2) age, a continuous variable 
measured in years; 3) marital status, a nominal variable treated dichotomously with the 
categories of always single or ever married (i.e., married, divorced, and widowed) (reference); 4) 
education, a categorical variable measured on an an eight-point scale (including incomplete and 
complete training at the elementary, technical/vocational, university preparatory and university 
levels), which is treated as continuous in the following models; and 5) income, a categorical 
variable reflecting the wage gradient within nations measured on a ten-point scale from lowest to 
highest, which is treated as continuous in the following model. Second, control variables 
reflecting structural factors that can influence beliefs about inequality include 1) income 
inequality, a continuous variable from the SWIID measured by a Gini index ranging from 0 
(complete equality) to 100 (complete inequality); 2) economic development, a continuous 
variable from the WBIPCD measured by GDP per capita PPP (purchasing power parity) in 
thousands of current international dollars; and 3) government expenses, a continuous variable 
from the WBIPCD measuring regime spending as a percentage of GDP. These three structural 
control variables were assigned to respondents by country in the year nearest to each wave of the 
WVS/EVS.  
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Analysis  
To address the relationship between religion and beliefs about income inequality, this 
paper presents four multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models derived using the xtmixed 
command in Stata. Utilizing multilevel models accounts for the possibility that being nested in a 
particular milieu might influence the outcome of the model. The effects are “mixed” because the 
intercept is allowed to vary (or be random) across groups, in this case country. The random 
effects parameters include the constant (i.e., the sample mean of the independent variable), the 
standard deviation of the residual (i.e., the average deviation from that constant in the sample), 
and the standard deviation of the constant (i.e., the average deviation from the constant at the 
country level). Allowing the constant to vary by country accounts for the possibility that the 
average deviation from the sample mean might be different from one country to the next.  
The theoretical assumption behind this choice of model acknowledges the importance of 
accounting for regional, cultural, and/or political differences in how people express inequality 
beliefs. Such beliefs might show the influence of different values and situations in Indonesia or 
Pakistan or the United Kingdom. The Likelihood Ratio tests that accompany each model suggest 
that the differences between the mixed effects models and regular linear regression models prove 
significant. As an additional test of the model assumptions, similar findings result from ordered 
logistic regressions that include dummy variables from the sample’s eighty-two countries. Using 
the mixed effects model allows for theoretically important variation across countries without the 
unwieldiness of such a large number of the dummy variables. Furthermore, obtaining similar 
results from ordered logistic regressions and mixed effects regressions confirmed the decision to 
treat the ten-point ordinal independent variable as continuous.  
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Findings  
Sample  
This study’s sample of 180,817 respondents from 82 countries derives from the third, 
fourth and fifth waves of the WVS/EVS (see Appendix 1.B). As it turns out, the first wave 
contains no measures of this study’s dependent variable, and the second wave does not 
adequately cover measures of income, a theoretically important variable for this project. Once 
variables from the SWIID, WBICPD, and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life were 
added to the three remaining waves of the WVS/EVS, it was possible to use listwise deletion to 
remove cases with missing data. Ten percent of the sample with missing data on the dependent 
variable was removed, and additional 21 percent was removed due to missing data on all other 
items. As listwise deletion has been shown to be methodologically sound (Allison 2001), using 
this process to select a sample with 79 percent of respondents having the required dependent 
variable was deemed suitable.  
TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE 
Descriptives 
Table 1.1 presents simple descriptive statistics for this study’s dependent, independent, 
and control variables. It is helpful to conceptualize the dependent variable as support for greater 
income inequality. Thus, higher scores on the ten-point scale—and positive coefficients in the 
regression models—indicates the call for widening income distributions. The mean of 5.87 on 
this ten-point scale suggests that on average people would rather use income inequality as an 
incentive than make wages more equal. The actual distribution of the dependent variable appears 
in Figure 1.1, showing peaks at the extremes and middle of the scale. Importantly, the mode of 
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15.48 percent of respondents selected ten—the highest possible indication of the desire for using 
income inequality as an incentive—and the next largest category of 13.31 percent selected eight.    
FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE 
The independent variables measure three religious factors: 1) inequity, 2) intensity, and 
3) identity. First, when it comes to numerical inequity, about a three quarters of the sample are 
religious majorities who observe the majority faith in their countries. As demonstrated in Table 
1.2, 92 percent of Christians, 87 percent of Muslims, and 75 percent of Hindus share their faith 
with a majority of their countries’ populations, while 57 percent of Buddhists, and 77 percent of 
religious “nones,” and 100 percent of other religious groups represent religious minorities.  
Second, the measure of religious intensity indicates that 45 percent of respondents rate 
religion as very important, 25 percent as rather important, 18 percent as not very important, and 
12 percent as not at all important. Having such a large “Very Important” category anchoring a 
highly skewed distribution of religiosity makes it possible to use the other three categories as a 
single reference group in the regressions that follow. Third, the sample divides into six religious 
traditions. While slightly more than half of respondents identify as Christians, a fifth are 
Muslims, and another fifth are religious “nones.” Hindus, Buddhists, and people of other 
religions each represent between two and three percent of the sample.  
Lastly, the list of control variables demonstrates that a little over half the sample is 
female, the average age is 41 (with a range of 15 to 99), and about a quarter of respondents have 
never been married. Combining those who have incomplete and complete training at each of the 
eight educational levels divides the sample roughly into quarters: 1) elementary, 2) vocational, 3) 
university prep, and 4) university training. The ten-point income scale, which has a mean of 4.63 
and a standard deviation of 2.43, reflects a standardized scale of incomes as measured in local 
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currencies. Finally, three indicators reveal widely differing levels of income inequality, 
economic development, and regime spending around the world: 1) Gini Indexes ranging from 
21.88 to 64.80 with a mean of 37.32; 2) GDP per capita PPP (purchasing power parity) in 
thousands of current international dollars ranging from .72 to 55.81 with a mean of 12.13; and 
government expenses as a percentage of GDP ranging from 5.30 to 98.00 with a mean of 24.79.  
Before investigating the regression models below, it proves instructive to explore the 
relationships between the religious independent variables. Table 1.2 presents the cross tabulation 
of religious groups by religious status. In this worldwide sample, a clear preponderance of 
Christians (92 percent), Muslims (75 percent), and Hindus (75 percent) live as religious 
majorities within their countries. Alternatively, all those practicing “other” religions (100 
percent) and a preponderance of religious “nones” (77 percent) and Buddhists (57 percent) live 
as religious minorities.   
TABLE 1.2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 1.3 presents the cross tabulation of religious identity by religious intensity, with 
cells containing the frequencies and percentages of respondents falling into each category. 
Reading the table from top to bottom, a pattern emerges in the way that Christians, Muslims, 
Hindus, and “other” religions rate the importance of religion. In the main, all four groups have 
majorities rating religion as very important, with decreasing percentages in each of the lower 
categories. Muslims stand out for having 79 percent of respondents rating religion as very 
important. The trend among Buddhists is similar, with the caveat that the majority of Buddhists 
rate religion as somewhat—rather than very—important. As expected, the pattern among 
religious “nones” reverses the overall trend: most religious “nones” rate religion as not at all 
important, with decreasing percentages in each of the higher categories.  
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TABLE 1.3 ABOUT HERE  
Table 1.3 also presents means and standard deviations for beliefs about income inequality 
within each cross tabulated group. Reading the table once again from top to bottom, a similar 
pattern emerges among religious groups. Just as in the main, increasing percentages of 
Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists rated religion as having increasingly higher 
importance, so increasing percentages of these groups have increasingly higher mean values on 
the dependent variable. These increasing means indicate rising support for using income 
inequality as an economic incentive. Within these religious groups, it is increasingly likely to 
rate religion as very important AND to demonstrate greater support for using income inequality 
as an incentive. Again, the trend among religious “others” demonstrates more fluctuation, and 
the pattern among religious “nones” reverses the main trend—with the caveat that those who rate 
religion as not at all important have the lowest mean score within this group. Reading Table 1.3 
from left to right among those who rate religion as very important reveals mean scores that 
increase along the following trajectory: Hindus (5.28), religious “nones” (5.50), religious 
“others” (5.65), Christians (6.03), Muslims (6.16), and Buddhists (6.77). The basic trends in this 
table suggest that the relationship between religious intensity and religious identity should prove 
helpful in explaining the relationship between religion and beliefs about income inequality. Thus 
interaction terms between religiosity and religious tradition appear in the models below.  
Models  
Table 1.4 presents four multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models predicting 
support for using income inequality as an economic incentive. Each model reports a constant 
term of approximately six with standard deviations of slightly less than one. The random effects 
parameters for the standard deviations of the residuals indicate that distances from the constant 
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term at the country level (N=82) have a mean of approximately 2.8 in each model. Once again, 
the Likelihood Ratio Tests confirm the significance of using mixed-effects models as contrasted 
with regular linear regression analyses.  
TABLE 1.4 ABOUT HERE 
In the first column, Model 1 with only three religious independent variables demonstrates 
few significant relationships at the p < .01 level. Only Catholics, the Orthodox, and Muslims 
express less support for incentivizing income inequality than do Protestants. Adding the controls 
in Model 2 alters this situation. In this model—and in the full model—the controls operate as 
expected, with the caveat that income inequality, as measured by the Gini Index, presents no 
significant relationship. Expressing less support for incentivizing income inequality associates 
with being female, older, single, less educated, and poorer as well as living in nations with higher 
development and with higher government spending relative to GDP.  
The major finding in Model 2 is that religious inequity and intensity demonstrate a 
significant relationship with income inequality beliefs at the p <.01 or .001 levels. Being a 
religious majority associates with an increase of .064 on the ten-point scale of support for 
incentivizing income inequality. And rating religion as very important as compared with 
rather/not very/not at all important associates with an increase of .084 on the same scale. Thus, in 
this model, being a religious majority and being highly religious associate with lower concern for 
income equality. These findings constitute statistically significant evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 
2, that support for income inequality correlates with being in a religious majority and being 
highly religious. Concerning religious identity, only Catholics, the Orthodox, and religious 
“nones” express less support for incentivizing income inequality than do Protestants. 
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Adding interaction terms between religious intensity and religious identity in Models 3 
and 4 somewhat alters this basic picture. It is vital to recognize how the addition of interaction 
terms in Models 3 and 4 alters the interpretation of intensity and identity variables from Models 
1 and 2. As before, the reference category remains Protestants. However, the religious intensity 
variable in Models 3 and 4 now describes only Protestants who are highly religious as compared 
with Protestants who are not highly religious. And each religious identity variable now describes 
only those who are not highly religious as compared to Protestants who are not highly religious. 
The newly added interaction terms describe the association of being highly religious in each 
tradition as compared to those who are not highly religious in the same tradition. To make 
interpretation simpler, Table 1.5 reports for each religious tradition the combined interaction 
terms for those who are highly religious. These combined coefficients for highly religious 
adherents of each tradition make for comparisons with adherents of the same tradition who are 
not highly religious. They derive from adding the baseline intensity among the reference group, 
highly religious Protestants, with the interaction term for each religious tradition. For example, 
the first combined coefficient listed in Table 1.5 indicates a .095 decrease in incentivizing 
income inequality among Catholics who are highly religious as compared with Catholics who 
are not highly religious in the model without control variables. The statistical significance of 
each combined coefficient reported in Table 1.6 is calculated from an F-test using matrix algebra 
obtained from the lincom command in Stata. 
TABLE 1.5 ABOUT HERE 
On one hand, religious majority status demonstrates no significant relationship with 
income inequality beliefs in the final two models. Thus, the confirming evidence from Model 2 
for Hypothesis 1—that support for income inequality correlates with being a religious majority—
  32 
drops from Models 3 and 4 with the addition of the interaction terms. Likewise, the religious 
intensity variables in Models 3 and 4 demonstrate no significant relationship within the 
Protestant reference category between rating religion as very important and support for 
incentivizing income inequality. Thus these models report no significant difference in 
incentivizing income inequality between Protestants who are highly religious and Protestants 
who are not.  
None of the models presents unambiguous evidence for Hypothesis 3, that support for 
income inequality correlates with the centrality of a religion’s teaching about stratification. 
While Catholics, the Orthodox, and religious “nones” express less support for incentivizing 
income inequality than do Protestants in Model 1, it is Catholics, the Orthodox, and religious 
“nones” who do so in Model 2. With the addition of interaction terms in Model 3, Catholics, the 
Orthodox, Muslims, Hindus, and religious “others” who are not highly religious all express less 
support for incentivizing income inequality as compared with Protestants who are not highly 
religious. Interestingly, the results in this model for Muslims and Hindus who are not highly 
religious reverse the expectations of Hypothesis 3. The same finding holds true in Model 4, 
where the Orthodox, Muslims, and Hindus who are not highly religious express less support for 
incentivizing income inequality as compared with Protestants who are not highly religious. 
These results are generally inconsistent with Hypothesis 3 and do not constitute clear evidence 
that religious identity in and of itself influences beliefs about income inequality in the pattern 
expected. This finding presents the opportunity to deepen the investigation by addressing the 
interaction terms between religious identity and religious intensity.  
The major finding of this regression analysis appears in Table 1.5, involving the 
combined coefficients of the interaction between rating religion as very important and religious 
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tradition. Models 3 and 4 demonstrate evidence for the pattern expected in Hypothesis 3: that 
support for income inequality correlates with the centrality of a religion’s teaching about 
stratification—but only among the highly religious. Thus the evidence for Hypothesis 4 proceeds 
along the pattern expected in Hypothesis 3. Among those who are not highly religious in Models 
3 and 4, no significant difference at the .01 level can be detected when comparing Protestants 
with Catholics, Buddhists, or religious “nones” concerning support for income inequality. At 
only 2.1 percent of the sample, the number of Buddhists may be too small to demonstrate a 
significant difference from being Protestant. Furthermore, the category of religious “other” most 
likely contains too much diversity to be analytically useful in this specific situation. Given these 
caveats, the relationships that remain provide evidence for Hypothesis 4, that support for income 
inequality correlates with the interaction between religious intensity and religious identity. And 
this relationship proceeds along the pattern expected in Hypothesis 3: that support for income 
inequality correlates with the centrality of a religion’s teaching about stratification.  
The combined coefficients of the interaction terms in Model 3 are not radically altered by 
the addition of the control variables in Model 4. In the full model, support for incentivizing 
income inequality among highly religious Catholics and Orthodox do not differ significantly 
from Catholics and Orthodox who are not highly religious. However, on the ten-point scale of 
support for incentivizing income inequality, being a highly religious Muslim associates with an 
increase of .273, being a highly religious Hindu associates with an increase of .573, and being 
highly religious but claiming no religious tradition associates with a decrease of -.144. This 
pattern of decreasing support for incentivizing income inequality among the highly religious—
from Hindus to Muslims to Christians to religious “nones”—constitutes empirical support for the 
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pattern anticipated by Hypothesis 3 with the inclusion of the interaction terms proposed in 
Hypothesis 4.   
Discussion 
Evidence for the first hypothesis, that being a religious majority correlates with increased 
support for income inequality, appears only in Model 2. The explanatory power of the interaction 
terms in Models 3 and 4 renders religious majority status of no consequence in these models. 
Importantly the paucity of support does not constitute proof that no relationship exists between 
religious status and beliefs about inequality (Hunt 2002). Rather, this particular variable shows 
no significant relationships in the models constructed for this study.  
The second hypothesis, that high religiosity can intensify support for income inequality, 
receives confirmation in Model 2 and partial confirmation in Models 3 and 4. This central 
empirical finding prompts the following theoretical insight: There is more to the story linking 
religion with stratification beliefs than the church and state—religion and redistribution—acting 
as “substitute goods” (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004, Chen and Lind 2005, Hungerman 2005, 
Benabou and Tirole 2006, Scheve and Stasavage 2006, Chen and Lind 2007, Gruber and 
Hungerman 2007, Pepinsky and Welborne 2010, Guillaud 2011, Stegmueller et al. 2011). By 
focusing on beliefs about income inequality—and not just redistribution—this paper 
demonstrates that any dampening effect of religion on egalitarian impulses may derive not just 
from a distaste for government spending, but from the perceived value of income inequality 
itself. 
The third hypothesis, that support for income inequality correlates with the centrality of a 
religion’s teaching about stratification, receives mixed support in the models above. Model 1 
demonstrates no confirmation for this relationship, and Model 2 demonstrates only minimal 
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confirmation. Among those who are not highly religious, the anticipated direction of the 
relationship changes directions on the coefficients that remain significant in Models 3 and 4. As 
mentioned above, the pattern expected in Hypothesis 3 does indeed appear, but only when the 
interaction terms are included in the models. Why might that be? Why does being highly 
religious influence the association of religious tradition with support for income inequality?     
The most striking support for income inequality appears among highly religious Hindus. 
Being in this category correlates with an increase of .526 on the ten-point scale measuring 
support for income inequality as compared with highly religious Protestants. While Hinduism 
represents an immense diversity of spiritual beliefs and cultural practices, the caste system 
constitutes the strongest integration of religion and stratification in any of the world’s major 
religions. Of course many Hindus work tirelessly to improve the lot of lower caste people and 
reform the caste system itself. Indeed the political shifts toward liberal democracy in 
postcolonial India that have taken aim at the social rigidity of the caste system may be 
influencing Hindu stratification beliefs in a more egalitarian direction (Nussbaum 2007). That 
being said, the historic thrust of Hinduism centers on the transmigration of souls based on the 
law of cause-and-effect, which determines the stratification system. And those Hindus who 
report the highest levels of personal investment in this religious tradition also report the highest 
levels of support for income inequality.  
After highly religious Hindus, the next highest level of support for income inequality 
occurs among highly religious Muslims. What might account for greater increase in support for 
income inequality among highly religious Muslims as compared with their less religious 
counterparts than among the next category—highly religious Christians as compared to their less 
religious counterparts? In comparing and contrasting majority Muslim societies with other 
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societies around the world, Steven Fish (2011) speculates that majority Muslim societies contain 
lower levels of class inequality because Islamic scriptures provide much more specific directives 
for assisting the poor than do other religions, especially Christianity (2011:221). In this view, the 
specificity of the Islamic command to donate 2.5 percent of one’s income as an act of almsgiving 
produces more egalitarianism than the more abstract New Testament teaching to “give up all one 
has for the poor” (ibid.). Thus the impulse towards universal compassion is translated into 
concrete action. While admittedly speculative, this method of considering the content and 
centrality of religious teachings appears to illuminate the pattern of opinions about income 
inequality arising in this study. Being both highly religious and identified with a particular 
religious tradition is likely to be associated with prioritizing the core teachings of one’s faith.  
Given Fish’s finding that majority Muslim societies exhibit lower levels of class 
inequality than do majority Christian societies, it might seem surprising that highly religious 
Christians express similarly egalitarian opinions about income inequality as compared with their 
less religious counterparts than highly religious Muslims express as compared to their less 
religious counterparts. However, it must be remembered that this study controls for majority 
religious status. Furthermore, charity and equality are not synonymous. An instruction to help the 
poor is not the same as an instruction to change the basic structures of society that cause 
particular groups to be impoverished.  The ability to separate personal charity from structural 
equality aligns with the above mentioned finding by Pepinsky and Welborne (2010: 491) 
concerning Muslims: “higher levels of religiosity correspond to lower support for government 
efforts to minimize income inequality.” Thus highly religious Muslims may be quite comfortable 
agreeing that income inequality should be used as an economic incentive all the while 
anticipating that they themselves will be contributing to charitable causes. 
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Even though focusing on the content and centrality of religious teaching appears to offer 
one explanation for the pattern of beliefs about income inequality among the different religious 
traditions, this study does not claim airtight empirical evidence for this relationship. Once again, 
the world’s major religious traditions contain immense diversity within them. Differences 
abound between Shaiva, Vaishnava, and Shakti Hindus; Mayayana, Theravada, and Vajrayana 
Buddhists; Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant Christians; and Sunni and Shia Muslims. Such 
diversity invites a warning about religious speculation:  
 “In sum, we cannot say with certainty whether there is something about Islam itself that 
explains the relatively low level of class inequality found in the Muslim world. It is possible that 
Muslims place an unusually high premium on avoiding gross inequalities in wealth and income. 
Whether or not social practices are rooted in scriptural traditions is difficult to determine, but our 
discussion provides some speculative ideas that connect the two” (Fish 2011:227, emphasis 
added).  
This study speaks directly to the the possibility that Muslims place an unusually high premium 
on avoiding gross inequalities in wealth and income. The findings above suggest that they do 
not. But that does not mean that the importance of charitable giving in Islamic teaching has no 
influence on attitudes about income inequality.  
The survey question for the dependent variable in this study invites respondents to rate 
their agreement between the contrasting statements that “Incomes should be made more equal” 
and “We need larger income differences as incentives.” It might seem logical that highly 
religious Muslims who ostensibly value Islamic teachings on zakat or almsgiving would desire 
incomes to be made more equal. However, it might also be that almsigiving among highly 
religious Muslims associates with the values of economic growth and incentive. Indeed, “zakat 
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in Arabic carries the connotation of ‘a payment on property in order to purify it and, hence, cause 
for it to be blessed and multiply.’” (Bonner 2003:18). In explaining why highly religious 
Muslims demonstrate stronger support for incentivizing income inequality than all other groups 
besides highly religious Hindus, it can be helpful to recall that the very term for almsgiving in 
Arabic involves the concepts of purified, multiplied property. This observation does not imply 
that Muslims give to charity for selfish reasons with no concern for those in need. Rather, 
understanding the possible connections between the survey’s use of the term “incentive” and a 
notion of zakat that involves purified, multiplied property can prove illuminating.  
Beyond the first two religious traditions, highly religious Buddhists fall in the sequence 
predicted by Hypothesis 3: lower support for income inequality than among Muslims but higher 
support than among Christians. Stratification plays a more central role in the core teachings of 
Buddhism than in Christianity. For example, the first Noble Truth—that life is suffering—arose 
directly from the Buddha’s observation of poverty, as well as sickness and death. To be clear, 
this is not to say that the Christian scriptures and church pronouncements neglect poverty and 
inequality. Rather, it is simply to observe that such teachings never prompted a First Noble Truth 
or defined a Third Pillar or appeared in a creedal statement. No specific beliefs or practices 
concerning stratification have ever been defined as core tenets of Christian faith by ecumenical 
councils (in the case of Roman Catholics and the Eastern Orthodox) or in universally accepted 
interpretations of the Christian Bible (among Protestants). In Table 1.5, the full model’s 
combined coefficients for Catholics and the Orthodox do not differ significantly from the 
combined coefficient for Protestants. Thus, there is no significant difference in support for 
incentivizing income inequality between those who are highly religious and those who are not 
highly religious in each of the three Christian traditions.  
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Finally, highly religious “others” express more support for income inequality than their 
less religious counterparts, and highly religious “nones” express much less support than their less 
religious counterparts. The “other” category most likely contains too much religious diversity to 
be analytically useful in this situation. However, more than one in ten religious “nones” consider 
religion to be very important. Claiming no religion drastically lowers the probability that this 
group shares any central teachings about stratification. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, this group 
expresses the least comparative support for income inequality among the highly religious.  
In summary, the final hypothesis, that the interaction between religious intensity and 
religious identity increases support for income inequality, receives solid support in Models 3 and 
4. And both models confirm the pattern predicted in the third hypothesis, that support for income 
inequality correlates with the centrality of a religion’s teaching about stratification. 
 
Conclusion 
Review   
Prior research indicates that beliefs about income inequality reflect normative judgments, 
stratification systems, political orders, economic conditions, social norms, and religious 
traditions. This paper presents multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models based on the 
World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS) to address the question, “How does 
religion influence beliefs about income inequality?” Including controls for nonreligious factors 
known to shape beliefs about income inequality, the models provide evidence for the hypotheses 
that support for income inequality correlates with being highly religious and with the interaction 
of being highly religious and identifying with a religious tradition whose core teaching addresses 
stratification. These empirical findings prompt the following theoretical insight: There is more to 
  40 
the story linking religion with stratification beliefs than the church and state—religion and 
redistribution—acting as “substitute goods” (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004, Chen and Lind 2005, 
Hungerman 2005, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Scheve and Stasavage 2006, Chen and Lind 2007, 
Gruber and Hungerman 2007, Pepinsky and Welborne 2010, Guillaud 2011, Stegmueller et al. 
2011). By focusing on beliefs about income inequality—and not just redistribution—this paper 
demonstrates that any dampening effect of religion on egalitarian impulses may derive not just 
from a distaste for government spending, but from the perceived value of income inequality 
itself. And the perceived value of income inequality appears to reflect the core teachings of 
religious traditions, especially among their most ardent adherents.  
Limitations 
The main limitation of this study is that is utilizes cross-sectional data. Thus it becomes 
difficult to claim that the three religious independent variables “cause” people to hold particular 
beliefs about income inequality. It is possible that holding such economic opinions causes people 
to live in nations where they are religious minorities, rate their faiths as very important, and 
identify with specific religious groups. It could be that the causal pathway is reciprocal, flowing 
from religion to beliefs about income inequality and from such beliefs back to religion. It could 
also be that a third, unknown factor influences both peoples’ religious faith and beliefs about 
income inequality. That being said, a strong argument can be made that because 1) most 
religious people are socialized into their faiths from the earliest childhood (Smith and Denton 
2005), and 2) religions often present moral teachings on economic issues (Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales 2003, McCleary and Barro 2006), it is completely in the realm of possibility that the 
primary causal direction extends from religion to beliefs about income inequality. Such a 
relationship would fit nicely with the evidence presented in this study.   
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Recommendations  
Future research on the relationship between religion and beliefs about income inequality 
could address the issue of causality by utilizing panel data and experimental design. In so doing, 
it would be important to remember the theoretical distinction between studying opinions about 
governmental redistribution—often through the lens of the church and state acting as “substitute 
goods”—and investigating beliefs about income inequality. Researchers should also consider the 
interaction of religiosity and religious identity when studying beliefs about income inequality 
and other aspects of stratification. It is possible that the influence of religion on these beliefs may 
not become apparent until researchers account for the interaction of religious intensity and 
religious identity. Finally, more research is needed on the divergence between the influence of 
religious identity and the influence of religious identity interacted with religious intensity. Why 
is it that the pattern expected among religious traditions appears only among those who are 
highly religious? One promising avenue of research would investigate not just mean scores on 
items measuring beliefs about income inequality—as in this paper—but also on the variance in 
such observations. 
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables (N = 180,817) 
  Freq. Mean/Prop. SD Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable       
Income Inequality Beliefs  180,817 5.87 2.99 1 10 
Independent Variables       
Religious Status  180,817 .26 .44 0 1 
Majority (Ref.)  134,240 74.2%    
Minority  46,577 25.8%    
Religious Importance  180,817 1.96 1.05 1 4 
Very Important  81,795 45.2%    
Rather Important (Ref.) 44,946 24.9%    
Not Very Important (Ref.) 33,211 18.4%    
Not at All Important (Ref.) 20,865 11.5%    
Religious Group  180,817 3.70 2.51 1 8 
Catholic (Ref.) 46,700 25.8%    
Protestant 26,957 14.9%    
Orthodox   23,432 13.0%    
Muslim  36,407 20.1%    
Hindu  4,506 2.5%    
Buddhist  3,873 2.1%    
Other  4,551 2.5%    
None  33,550 18.6%    
Control Variables       
Sex  180,817 1.51 .500 1 2 
Male (Ref.)  88,156 48.8%    
Female 92,661 51.3%    
Age  180,817 41.17 16.04 15 99 
Marital Status  180,817 1.88 .59 1 3 
Single  43,399 24.0%    
Married (Ref.)  115,847 64.1%    
Separated/Divorced/Widowed (Ref.)  21,571 11.9%    
Education  180,817 4.49 2.29 1 8 
Incomplete Elementary  21,832 12.1%    
Complete Elementary  26,001 14.4%    
Incomplete Vocational  14,483 8.0%    
Complete Vocational  32,554 18.0%    
Incomplete University Prep 16,177 9.0%    
Complete University Prep  30,581 16.9%    
Incomplete University  12,717 7.0%    
Complete University  26,472 14.6%    
(continued) 
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Table 1.1. (continued)  
  Freq. Mean/Prop. SD Min. Max. 
Income  180,817 4.63 2.43 1 10 
Lower Step  17,847 9.9%    
Second Step 22,822 12.6%    
Third Step  25,099 13.9%    
Fourth Step 26,475 14.6%    
Fifth Step  26,578 14.7%    
Sixth Step  19,978 11.1%    
Seventh Step  16,401 9.1%    
Eighth Step  11,839 6.6%    
Ninths Step  7,242 4.0%    
Tenths Step  6,536 3.6%    
GINI Index  180,817 37.32 9.61 21.88 64.80 
GDP (in Thousands) 180,817 12.13 11.38 .72 55.81 
Government Expenses (% of GDP) 180,817 24.79 10.60 5.30 98.00 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 
2005-2008); Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); World Bank International Comparison 
Program Database (WBICPD); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life  
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Figure 1.1. Histogram of Income Inequality Beliefs Ranging from (1) “Incomes should be made more 
equal,” to (10) “We need larger income differences as incentives.”   
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Table 1.2. Cross Tabulation of Religious Groups by Religious Status (N = 180,817) 
 
 Majority Status Minority Status Total 
    
 Freq. Per. Freq. Per. Freq. Per. 
Catholic 43,828 93.85 2,872 6.15 46,700 100.00 
Protestant 23,097 85.68 3,860 14.32 26,957 100.00 
Orthodox 22,672 96.76 760 3.24 23,432 100.00 
Muslim 31,609 86.82 4,798 13.18 36,407 100.00 
Hindu 3,358 74.52 1,148 25.48 4,506 100.00 
Buddhist 1,660 42.86 2,213 57.14 3,873 100.00 
Other 445 8.25 4,947 91.75 5,392 100.00 
None 7,571 22.57 25,979 77.43 33,550 100.00 
All 134,240 74.24 46,577 25.76 180,817 100.00 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, Wave 4: 1999- 2004,  
Wave 5: 2005-2008); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life 
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Table 1.4. Coefficients from Multilevel Mixed-Effects Linear Regression Predicting Support for Incentivising 
Income Inequality with Religious and Control Variables (N = 180,817) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Religious Variables      
Inequity: Majority vs. Minority (Ref.) .050* .064** .041 .055* 
 (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) 
Intensity: Very vs. Rather/Not Very/Not at All (Ref.)  -.020 .084*** -.012 .047 
 (.017) (.017) (.039) (.039) 
Identity: Protestant (Ref.)  
Catholic  -.062** -.070*** -.027 -.060* 
 (.027) (.027) (.036) (.036) 
Orthodox  -.183*** -.126*** -.162*** -.140*** 
 (.038) (.038) (.046) (.046) 
Muslim  -.087** .011 -.216*** -.151*** 
 (.039) (.039) (.053) (.053) 
Hindu  -.035 -.012 -.371*** -.360*** 
 (.070) (.069) (.092) (.092) 
Buddhist  -.055 .011 -.055 .002 
 (.071) (.070) (.078) (.077) 
Other  -.071 -.017 -.168** -.142* 
 (.048) (.048) (.075) (.074) 
None -.033 -.074** -.003 -.071* 
 (.033) (.032) (.039) (.038) 
Interactions: Very Important x Protestant (Ref.)     
Very Important x Catholic    -.083* -.037 
   (.047) (.046) 
Very Important x Orthodox   -.061 .010 
   (.056) (.056) 
Very Important x Muslim   .171*** .226*** 
   (.055) (.055) 
Very Important x Hindu   .501*** .526*** 
   (.095) (.094) 
Very Important x Buddhist   .036 .005 
   (.111) (.110) 
Very Important x Other   .131 .182** 
   (.090) (.089) 
Very Important x None   -.262*** -.191*** 
   (.064) (.063) 
Control Variables      
Female vs. Male (Ref.)   -.158***  -.156*** 
  (.013)  (.013) 
Age (in Years)   -.004***  -.004*** 
  (.001)  (.001) 
Single vs. Ever Married (Ref.)  -.085***  -.082*** 
  (.018)  (.018) 
Education (8 Pt. Scale)   .107***  .107*** 
  (.003)  (.003) 
Income (10 Pt. Scale)   .105***  .105*** 
  (.003)  (.003) 
(continued) 
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Table 1.4. (continued)     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
GINI Index (100 Pt. Scale)  .010  .010* 
  (.005)  (.005) 
GDP (in Thousands)  -.010***  -.010*** 
  (.002)  (.002) 
Government Expenses (% of GDP)  -.025***  -.025*** 
  (.003)  (.003) 
Constant 5.956*** 5.717*** 5.821*** 5.548*** 
 (.105) (.250) (.108) (.252) 
Random-Effects Parameters      
Country (N = 82)     
Standard Deviation of Constant .910 .827 .907 .822 
Standard Deviation of Residual  2.842 2.812 2.841 2.811 
Likelihood Ratio Test vs. Linear Regression Chi2(01) = 
16404.00 
Prob >= 
Chi2 = .000 
Chi2(01) = 
14517.27P
rob >= 
Chi2 = .000 
Chi2(01) = 
16022.75 
Prob >= 
Chi2 = .000 
Chi2(01) = 
14074.14 
Prob >= 
Chi2 = .000 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 2005-
2008); Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); World Bank International Comparison Program 
Database (WBICPD); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   * p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 1.5. Combined Coefficients from Multilevel Mixed-Effects Linear Regression Predicting 
Support for Incentivising Income Inequality for the Very Religious (N = 180,817) 
 Baseline Intensity + 
Intensity x 
Tradition = 
Combined  
Coefficient 
Model 3: Without Controls      
Catholic -.012 + -.083* = -.095** 
Protestant -.012 +       — = -.012 
Orthodox  -.012 + -.061 = -.073 
Muslim -.012 + .171*** = .159*** 
Hindu -.012 + .501*** = .489*** 
Buddhist -.012 + .036 = .024 
Other -.012 + .131 = .119 
None  -.012 + -.262*** = -.274*** 
Model 4: With Controls      
Catholic .047 + -.037 = .010 
Protestant .047 +         — = .047 
Orthodox  .047 + .010 = .057 
Muslim .047 + .226*** = .273*** 
Hindu .047 + .526*** = .573*** 
Buddhist .047 + .005 = .052 
Other .047 + .182** = .229** 
None  .047 + -.191*** = -.144** 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 
2005-2008); Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); World Bank International Comparison 
Program Database (WBICPD); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   * p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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APPENDIX 1.A 
Measuring Economic Inequality   
Before discussing how religion influences beliefs about income inequality, it is important 
to have a firm grasp on the empirical situation about which people are offering their opinions. 
The following section discusses the methodological issues involved in accurately assessing the 
trends in income inequality and describes the current contours of such inequality around the 
world.   
Discerning trends in the geography of income inequality depends greatly on how it is 
measured (Milanovic 2007). Researchers must decide 1) how to quantify differences and 2) 
which units of analysis to compare. Common methods for estimating economic inequality 
include 1) income shares (“e.g., the percentage of total income held by the top quartile of the 
income distribution”), 2) percentile ratios (“e.g. the ratio of income at the ninetieth percentile to 
that at the tenth percentile, the 90/10 ratio”), and 3) summary statistics (“e.g. the Gini, Theil, 
Atkinson, and Robin Hood indexes, the coefficient of variation, Shorrock’s coefficient”) (McCall 
and Percheski 2010). While it is possible to calculate summary statistics that account for both 
poverty and inequality (Atkinson and Brandolini 2010), much of the literature relies on well 
known indicators, such as the Gini index. Using these measures, researchers track inequality 
levels within countries, between countries, and around the world.  
A methodological concern when calculating levels of inequality between nations involves 
the ways that different measures produce different outcomes. One common method for 
calculating between-country inequality, whether weighted by population or not, measures the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the market value of a country’s goods and services during a 
specific time period, in purchasing power parity (PPP), a single currency calculation that 
  51 
 
captures the ability to purchase the same goods and services in different countries. An alternative 
method contrasts estimates of national incomes using current rates of currency exchange. This 
approach routinely produces higher estimates of economic inequality than those based on PPP 
(Sutcliffe 2002, Dorwick and Akmal 2005), which may thus be underestimating the extent of the 
situation. 
Before the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century, poverty was mainly a function 
of production. Today, vast disparities in income around the globe are a function not of 
production but of distribution (Firebaugh 2003). Whereas economic inequality used to be 
predominantly a matter of class, it is now mainly determined by location: up to eighty percent of 
current global income inequality can be attributed to differences between countries (Schultz 
1998, Goesling 2001, Milanovic 2002, Firebaugh 2003, Milanovic 2011). 
Between-country inequality can be compared using both population-unweighted and 
population-weighted measures (Clark 2001, Sutcliffe 2004, Milanovic 2007). When unweighted 
average incomes between countries are compared, the upward trend in inequality charted since 
the early nineteenth century continues to rise (Milanovic 2007). Average incomes in rich nations 
continue to outpace average incomes in poorer nations. However, accounting for differences in 
population size reveals a different trend. When country income averages are weighted by 
population, the upward trend in global income inequality which worsened at the beginning of the 
19th century began to decline beginning after World War II (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002). 
This reversal and its subsequent stabilization continue largely due to the rapid industrialization 
and economic growth in China and India, two Asian nations with large and growing populations 
(Milanovic 2002, Sala-i-Martin 2002). Importantly, when China is removed from the calculation, 
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the trend in population-weighted between-country inequality continues to rise (Schultz 1998, 
Wade 2004).   
While entire countries can be contrasted, so individuals can be compared with others 
living within their own countries or with everyone around the world. The current level of global 
inequality among world citizens is about 0.65 as measured by the Gini index (a summary statistic 
of inequality ranging from 0 when everyone has the same income to 1 when only one person has 
all the income) (Sutcliffe 2003, 2004). This measure combines the effects of within-country and 
between-country inequality, providing a snapshot of the global situation (Choitikapanich, 
Valenzuela, and Rao 1997, Clark 2001, Milanovic 2007). If current trends continue, this 
indicator will increase as those at the extremes of wealth and poverty grow farther apart while 
those in the middle converge (Sutcliffe 2003).  
The rise in both population-unweighted between-country inequality and population-
weighted between-country inequality (calculated without China) has been accompanied by 
another trend: the overall rise of inequality within nations (Sala-i-Martin 2002, Firebaugh 2003, 
Mahler and McKeever 2009). Broadly speaking, economic inequality is 1) higher in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, 2) intermediate in the Middle East, North Africa, 
South Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific, and 3) lower in the developed countries and the former 
Soviet bloc nations (Mahler and McKeever 2009).  
In the 2000s, within-country inequality did decline somewhat in OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) nations known for their higher levels, including 
Chile, Mexico, Greece, Turkey, and Hungary (OECD 2011). Forces that countervail the upward 
trend of within-country economic inequality include unionization, centralization of wage 
bargaining, public-sector employment, affirmative action, and marginal taxation (Pontusson, 
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Reuda, and Way 2002). However, within-country inequality rose in other nations which already 
had high income inequality, such as Israel and the United States, rising even faster in nations 
usually regarded as having low income inequality, such as Germany, Denmark, and Sweden 
(OECD 2011). In terms of overall inequality levels, the modest declines within some nations 
have not been sufficient to balance the rises in many others: “The conclusion is that world 
inequality measured in plausible ways is probably rising, despite China’s and India’s fast 
growth” (Wade 2004).   
Acknowledging Globalization and Growth  
Between the steps of 1) charting the overall trends in global income inequality above and 
2) discussing the role of social norms in legitimating this situation below, it is helpful to 
acknowledge the material dynamics that influence the world’s current economic distribution. 
Surveying the literature on globalization and growth—two major factors in the debate over 
income inequality trends around the world—thwarts the temptation to focus on either pure 
economics or social norms, but not both. Avoiding the false dichotomy between base and 
superstructure provides a fuller picture of the sociological realities of global income inequality. 
Furthermore, the extent of globalization and economic development in societies may be related 
to social norms concerning income inequality.  
As defined by economists, globalization “encompasses declining barriers to trade, 
migration, capital flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), and technological transfers (O’Rourke 
2001). Some see the process of globalization as reducing both absolute poverty and income 
inequality around the world (Bhalla 2002, Sala-i-Martin 2002, Dollar and Kraay 2004, Firebaugh 
and Goesling 2004, Bussmann, de Soya, Oneal 2005, Dollar 2005). In line with this view, 
globalization has acted as the prime mover in reducing the number of extremely poor people in 
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the world by 375 million people and “reversing the 200-year trend toward higher inequality” 
(Dollar 2005:145).  
Others, however, dispute the idea that globalization has reduced levels of economic 
inequality. From one perspective, the theoretical difficulty in defining globalization makes it 
impossible to render any judgment on the connections between globalization and economic 
inequality (Sutcliffe 2004). Because the definition is elusive, the relationship—either positive or 
negative—cannot be demonstrated with any methodological certainty. A more direct claim is 
that the arguments made by neoliberal proponents of globalization do not align with current 
evidence on economic inequality: “Clearly the proposition”—that “the allegedly positive trends 
in poverty and inequality have been driven by rising integration of poorer countries into the 
world economy”—“is not well supported at the world level if we agree that globalization has 
been rising while poverty and income inequality have not been falling (Wade 2004). In this view, 
globalization can be defined but not directly linked to increasingly egalitarian economic 
arrangements.  
A third step beyond 1) questioning the ability to determine a relationship between 
globalization and economic inequality and 2) disputing the evidence that globalization reduces 
economic inequality is 3) claiming that globalization actually increases economic inequality. 
Rather than make blanket claims about this proposed increase, researchers carefully emphasize 
how trends change over time and how the type of inequality matters. During the 19th century, 
globalization increased economic inequality in the rich New World while decreasing it the less 
rich Old World (O’Rourke 2001). Now it appears that “globalization is not strongly related in 
either direction to income inequality in the developed world but fairly strongly related to a more 
inegalitarian distribution in the developing world (Mahler and McKeever 2009). A more direct 
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argument suggests that while between-country inequality has begun to converge due to late 
industrialization patterns, globalization has actually exacerbated within-country inequality (Clark 
2011).  
Much of the globalization discussion centers on the role that inequality plays in 
promoting economic growth. Kuznets (1955) portrayed the relationship between industrial 
development and economic inequality as an inverted U-shape, in which increasing economic 
development causes inequality to expand initially, but then peak, level off, and finally drop. New 
industrial jobs initially provide a much higher level of income for a portion of the population; but 
eventually development expands widely enough that fewer and fewer are left behind. Critics of 
this model note that its mechanistic relationship fails to account for those factors that influence 
growth and inequality independently (Lundberg and Squire 2003). From this perspective, it is 
theoretically possible to increase economic growth without increasing inequality.  
In attempting to clarify the relationship between economic growth and economic 
inequality, researchers routinely question the causal direction. Does increasing economic growth 
spur economic inequality? Or does increasing economic inequality spur economic growth? In 
general, inequality influences economic growth through causal mechanisms that are both direct 
(i.e., savings) and indirect (i.e., income redistribution, social conflict, political instability, and 
democracy) (Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002). Several studies focus mainly on what happens 
at the upper end of the income distribution. In times of high economic growth, inequality 
increases mainly at the very top, widening the distance between the very rich and the rest of the 
top decile (Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom 2009). Such economic inequality at the very top 
has in turn been linked with subsequent economic growth (Voitchovsky 2005, Andrews, Jencks, 
and Leigh 2010). According to Martin Feldstein, increasing incomes at the top of a distribution 
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proves desirable because it satisfies the Pareto principle: “a change is good if it makes someone 
better off without making anyone else worse off” (Feldstein 1999:34). In this approach, 
additional income at the top of the distribution is good as long as it takes nothing from those at 
the bottom.  
Others take issue with this common sense view (Milanovic 2007), arguing that within-
nation income inequality can itself slow economic growth (Alesina and Perotti 1994; Keefer and 
Knack 2002). Widening economic inequality at the bottom signals the approach of decreasing 
economic growth (Voitchovsky 2005). Furthermore, a study of 12 developed nations estimates 
that the modest growth that follows widening economic inequality at the top takes 13 years to 
trickle down, that is 13 years for “the benefits of increased GDP growth [to] outweigh [the] cost 
of getting a smaller share of the economic output” among the bottom nine deciles (Andrews, 
Jencks, and Leigh 2010). When all factors are considered, the fiscal and political instability that 
results from increasing economic inequality impedes economic growth; but the redistribution of 
wealth may actually spur economic growth by easing social tensions and fostering a more 
conducive sociopolitical climate (Alesina and Perotti 1994).  
Research indicates that economic inequality is “Janus-faced” in that it “creates incentives 
for people to move from lower-rewarding activities to higher-rewarding activities” while 
simultaneously producing “differences in living standards that can lead some into poverty and 
social exclusion (Bjoklund and Freeman 2010). Christopher Jencks (2002:64) concludes that “the 
social consequences of economic inequality are sometimes negative, sometimes neutral, but 
seldom—as far as I can discover—positive. The case for inequality seems to rest entirely on the 
claim that it promotes efficiency, and the evidence for that claim is thin.”  
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APPENDIX 1.B  
Country-Years: Albania (1998), Albania (2002), Argentina (1995), Argentina (1999), 
Armenia (1997), Australia (1995), Australia (2005), Austria (1999), Azerbaijan (1997), 
Bangladesh (1996), Bangladesh (2002), Belarus (1996), Belarus (2000), Belgium (1999), Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (1998), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001), Brazil (1997), Brazil (2006), Bulgaria 
(1997), Bulgaria (1999), Bulgaria (2006), Burkina Faso (2007), Canada (2000), Canada (2006), 
Chile (1996), Chile (2000), Chile (2006), China (2001), China (2007), Colombia (1998), Croatia 
(1999), Cyprus (2006), Czech Republic (1998), Czech Republic (1999), Dominican Republic 
(1996), Egypt (2000), Egypt (2008), El Salvador (1999), Estonia (1996), Estonia (1999), 
Ethiopia (2007), Finland (1996), Finland (2000), Finland (2005), France (1999), France (2006), 
Georgia (1996), Georgia (2009), Germany (1997), Germany (2006), Ghana (2007), Guatemala 
(2004), Hong Kong (2005), Iceland (1999),  India (1995), India (2001), India (2006),  Indonesia 
(2001), Indonesia (2006), Iran (2000), Iran (2007), Ireland (1999),  Italy (1999), Italy (2005), 
Japan (2000),  Japan (2005), Jordan (2001), Kyrgyzstan (2003), Latvia (1996),  Lithuania (1997), 
Lithuania (1999), Luxembourg (1999), Macedonia (1998), Macedonia (2001), Malaysia (2006), 
Mali (2007), Mexico (1996), Mexico (2000), Mexico (2005),  Moldova (1996), Moldova (2002), 
Moldova (2006), Morocco (2001), Morocco (2007), Netherlands (1999), Netherlands (2006), 
New Zealand (1998), New Zealand (2004), Nigeria (1995), Nigeria (2000), Northern Ireland 
(1999), Norway (1996), Norway (2007), Pakistan (1997), Pakistan (2001), Peru (1996), Peru 
(2001), Peru (2006), Philippines (2001), Poland (1997), Poland (1999), Poland (2005), Romania 
(1998), Romania (1999), Romania (2005),  Russian Federation (1995), Russian Federation 
(1999), Russian Federation (2006), Rwanda (2007), Serbia and Montenegro (1996), Serbia and 
Montenegro (2001), Serbia (2006), Singapore (2002), Slovakia (1998), Slovenia (1999), 
  58 
 
Slovenia (2005), South Africa (1996), South Africa (2001), South Africa (2006), South Korea 
(1996), South Korea (2001), South Korea (2005), Spain (1995), Spain (2000), Spain (2007), 
Sweden (1996), Sweden (2006), Switzerland (1996), Switzerland (2007), Thailand (2007), 
Trinidad and Tobago (2006), Turkey (1996), Turkey (2001), Turkey (2007), Uganda (2001), 
Ukraine (1996), Ukraine (1999), Ukraine (2006), United Kingdom (1999), United Kingdom 
(2005), United States (1995), United States (1999), United States (2006), Uruguay (1996), 
Uruguay (2006), Venezuela (1996), Venezuela (2000), Zambia (2007).    
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CHAPTER 2  
RELIGIOSITY AND DISAGREEMENT ABOUT INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
Introduction 
 In attempting to understand the role of religion in the modern world, sociologists often 
highlight how religion becomes “privatized” or placed “in a compartmentalized sphere” that 
provides personal support but no longer challenges “the dominance of [the] values in society at 
large” (Bellah et al. 1985:224). Such privatization relegates religion to being “a haven in a 
heartless world” that does more to care for the world’s “casualties than to challenge its 
assumptions” (ibid.). While classical theories of secularization predict the comprehensive 
privatization of religion (Berger 1969, Martin 1978, Bell 1996), religious belief and practice 
have not receded from the public sphere as expected (Casanova 1994, Regnerus and Smith 1998, 
Wood 2002). To employ a distinction made by Mills (1959), religion exceeds its privatized role 
as merely an antidote for “personal troubles” to become a deprivatized means for addressing 
“public issues.”  
 Far from producing consensus on such issues, deprivatized religion fuels disagreement 
over dominant social norms and practices. A major arena of this contention involves the public 
issue of social inequality—especially in the areas of race and ethnicity, gender, and economics. 
For example, religion serves as a motivator and resource for African-Americans participating in 
the U.S. Civil Rights movement (Harris 1994, Andrews 2004), Hispanic Protestants fighting the 
disenfranchisement of Spanish-origin populations (Hunt 2001), Brazilian Catholics advocating 
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for agrarian reform (Adriance 1994), and both Vodoun practitioners (Bourguignon 1985) and 
Rastafarians (Simpson 1985) resisting the ongoing effects of colonialism in the Caribbean. In the 
case of gender inequality, women who utilize religious resources and motivation to resist 
patriarchal beliefs (Ozark 1996) and sustain involvement in social reform activism (Faver 2000) 
include the U.S. Catholic nuns who organize more effectively than their priestly counterparts 
(Stalp and Winders 2000) and Indonesian Muslim women who form small groups for political 
activism (Rinaldo 2008). At times, these examples of deprivatized resistance to inequality 
involve disagreement between religious activists and secular authorities. At other times, the 
division exists within the religious groups themselves. This division within religious groups 
becomes especially apparent when the debate turns to economic inequality.  
 Examples of the disagreement within religious groups over income inequality include 
debates among U.S. Christians about the criteria for deserving charity (Robinson 2009), the 
relative importance of wealth disparity (Lindsay 2007), and the reasons for and solutions to 
poverty (Gay 1991, Hart 1996, Wuthnow 1998). Also in the U.S. context, Emerson and Smith 
(2001) investigate how religion influences the ways that people account for the economic 
disparities between whites and African Americans using either individualistic accounts (focused 
on personal ability and motivation) or structural accounts (focused on education and 
discrimination). They find that whites are more likely than African Americans to hold 
individualistic accounts, but white conservative Protestants are more likely than other whites to 
do so. In contrast, African Americans are more likely to hold structural accounts, but African 
American conservative Protestants are more likely than other African Americans to do so. Thus, 
disagreement within religious groups over income inequality can intensify the debate already 
occurring in the larger public sphere. That religion sparks disagreement over economic 
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inequality in particular proves interesting given the classic Marxian conceptualization of religion 
as an opiate designed to quell economic concern among workers, not fuel polarization (Marx 
1978).  
 Understanding how religion spurs this unexpected disagreement begins with asking what 
is known about religion and beliefs about income inequality. As discussed in Paper 1 of this 
dissertation, beliefs about income inequality reflect the influence of stratification systems, 
political orders, economic conditions, social norms, and religious traditions. In the main, support 
for income inequality weakens among those occupying vulnerable positions in the stratification 
system (e.g., female, older, single, less educated, and poorer) and living in nations with high 
income inequality, low economic development, and low government spending. When it comes to 
religion, the models in Paper 1 provide evidence that religiosity correlates with increased support 
for income inequality among Muslims and Hindus, but not necessarily other groups. While it is 
important to understand how religious intensity and identity associate with specific beliefs about 
income inequality, it is also instructive to address the amount of variation and disagreement 
about income inequality within different religious groups. Focusing only on mean scores 
documenting the support of income inequality can mask the high levels of disagreement within 
different religious communities. Among highly religious groups, there may be evidence for 
either strong consensus or strong disagreement on the issue of income inequality.  
This paper addresses these possibilities by asking, “What is the effect of religiosity on the 
amount of disagreement over income inequality within religious traditions around the world?” 
Knowing the answer to this question can elucidate the debate over income inequality on at least 
two levels. At the broadest level, it is vital to understand what shapes the widespread 
disagreement in society at large over the public issue of income inequality. What factors fuel the 
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ongoing contention over the stratification systems around the world? Omitting religion from the 
explanation ignores a factor that influences the majority of the world’s population. Religion can 
certainly bind groups together, working as a social adhesive to produce community and even 
uniformity. At other times, religion can fuel contention with secular authorities and within the 
different traditions themselves. At the level of those traditions, it would be helpful to know how 
much disagreement exists within religious groups and what might account for that. Without this 
knowledge, any analysis of the influence of religion on beliefs about income inequality would 
remain incomplete at best and misleading at worst. Ignoring the variation within religious groups 
can mask the deep rifts, schisms, and fault lines that divide religious people over this highly 
contentious public issue. Being able to demonstrate that religiosity intensifies disagreement 
within religious groups over income inequality becomes an argument for including religion as a 
factor in any explanation of how this issue divides people in society at large.  
As it turns out, the literature contains little research addressing the influence of religion 
on the amount of disagreement in the debate over income inequality. Most of the sources 
addressing religion and beliefs about income inequality correlate specific religious factors such 
as attendance or denomination with particular opinions about income inequality. While this 
research documents the differences in average opinion levels across groups, it does not explain 
how much divergence on the public issue of income inequality arises due to religious factors. A 
notable exception to this trend is a paper by Davidson and Pyle (1999) that includes the extra 
step of theorizing the amount of within-group polarization in this debate. According to Davidson 
and Pyle, polarization over income inequality within religious groups forms a continuum from 
those who support inequality to those who support equality. In their approach, support ranges 
from taking direct action to affirming basic opinions, such as the notion that larger income 
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differences are needed as incentives. They predict that the majority of religious people support 
income inequality by endorsing political agendas, aligning with movements, and taking actions 
that directly or indirectly widen income gaps. On the other side of their continuum, a minority of 
religious people support income equality through activities such as political action, community 
organizing, and financial investment that lessens income gaps. According to this hypothesis, the 
distribution peaks toward the first side, indicating that the bulk of religious groups support 
inequality, and has a long tail toward the other side, indicating that a tapering minority of 
religious groups support equality.  
The logic behind their argument is that the amount and pattern of divergence in the 
debate over income inequality results from the influence of both nonreligious and religious 
factors. Specifically, Davidson and Pyle argue that their distribution results from 1) the self-
interest of clergy and laity who benefit from income inequality and 2) the widespread attraction 
of “good fortune” theology that links godliness with material wellbeing. They argue that material 
self-interest is necessary but not sufficient to explain the distribution because a majority of 
clerics and lay people do not benefit from the stratification system. While self-interest cannot be 
excluded from the explanation, something more is required to explain the proposed pattern of 
disagreement over income inequality among religious people. Davidson and Pyle propose that 
this “something more” is specifically religious, namely “good fortune” theology. This teaching 
suggests that material success indicates a special relationship with God. While admitting that 
nonreligious people can be rich, “good fortune” teachers assert or imply that devout adherents 
should expect material wealth as a sign of God’s sovereign choice or their own faithfulness. 
Maintaining large and visible differences between rich and poor provides a tangible mechanism 
for rating one’s relative closeness to the divine, which is by definition superempirical (Smith 
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2003). Such doctrine intentionally or unintentionally dampens widespread support for income 
equality because it requires wealth differentials to distinguish the godly from ungodly. 
According to Davidson and Pyle, the alternative to “good fortune” theology is “social justice” 
theology,” which characterizes the poor as innocent victims of corporate greed and wealth 
disparity. In their view, such teaching remains popular among only a minority of religious people 
because it shifts the focus from securing personal benefits to prioritizing the oppressed. 
 As a specific prediction for the pattern of religiously fueled divergence in support for 
income inequality, the approach taken by Davidson and Pyle provides a helpful sensitizing 
concept for the discussion that follows. This proposal suggests a testable approach to 
understanding the influence of religion on the amount and pattern of disagreement over income 
inequality. At the same time, the Davidson and Pyle article has three major limitations. First, 
their discussion provides a strictly theoretical approach to this issue without empirical validation. 
However, it is possible to demonstrate their basic approach using regression analysis with 
comprehensive data, such as the World Values Survey/European Values Survey. Second, their 
discussion focuses only on U.S Christianity without reference to religion in the global context. 
Widening the scope of investigation to include religious populations around the world would 
help clarify the applicability of theories developed for U.S. Christianity to other locations and 
religions. Third their reliance on “good fortune” theology to explain the pattern of disagreement 
over income inequality may be accurate but limited. Perhaps other religious factors contribute to 
the proposed pattern of disagreement over income inequality within religious communities. For 
example, some religious groups may desire greater income differentials not as a sign of their 
spiritual status but as a means for following religious commands to assist the needy. From this 
perspective, religiously inspired almsgiving requires the existence of poor people to be the 
  75 
 
recipients of charity. In this scenario, the issue is not spiritual status but ritual observance. 
Because “good fortune” theology may not be the only religious factor at work, it may be more 
helpful simply to account for how seriously people take their religion—regardless of their 
theology. Accounting for religiosity itself then becomes be the central task—regardless of the 
intervening theological mechanisms. Even if Davidson and Pyle are correct about “good fortune” 
and “social justice” theologies, the major question remains, “Just how seriously do religious 
people take these spiritual values?” Higher religiosity on either side of the debate would result in 
even more variation in beliefs about income inequality, intensifying the polarization. Putting 
these insights together raises the following questions: “Is it possible to verify empirically the 
pattern of beliefs supporting income inequality among religious people suggested by Davidson 
and Pyle? And if so, does this pattern extend beyond the context in which it was developed, 
namely the United States? Furthermore, what religious factors account for the proposed 
divergence in support for income inequality?”  
In order to address these questions, this paper first frames the issue with a literature 
review on the following theme: Disagreement about public issues such as income inequality 
intensifies within highly religious groups in the U.S. Evidence for this argument builds in five 
steps, with each new section adding a piece to the overall picture. Once the theoretical 
groundwork has been laid, this paper presents three heteroskedastic ordered probit models based 
on the World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS), the only ongoing research 
project designed to capture the values and beliefs of a majority of the world’s population 
(Inglehart 2008), with additional data from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID) and the World Bank International Comparison Program. Including controls for 
nonreligious factors known to shape beliefs about income inequality, the models provide 
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evidence for the hypothesis that disagreement about income inequality intensifies within highly 
religious groups around the world. The international scope of the data evaluated in these models 
makes it possible to test theories developed to explain trends in U.S. religion in a much wider 
context. These empirical findings prompt the following theoretical insight: Far from producing 
consensus, high religiosity intensifies variation in beliefs about income inequality, pushing 
people toward divergent perspectives on this public issue. This is true for all religious groups 
around the world, but especially for Catholics, Protestants, and religious “nones,” which happen 
to be the most prevalent religious traditions in the U.S. This helps to explain why identification 
with specific religious traditions does not produce uniform beliefs about economic stratification.  
 
Theory 
 This paper addresses the question, “What is the effect of religiosity on the amount of 
disagreement over income inequality within religious traditions around the world?” It attempts to 
determine if the basic picture is one of consensus or dissensus, convergence or divergence, 
agreement or disagreement. The literature review that follows frames this topic with the 
following statement: Disagreement about public issues such as income inequality intensifies 
within highly religious groups in the U.S. Evidence for this argument builds in five steps, with 
each new section adding a piece to the overall picture. Once the theoretical groundwork has been 
laid, findings from Paper 1 relevant to this discussion are reviewed. Finally a testable hypothesis 
appears at the end of this section, inviting reflection on how the findings from Paper 1 influence 
the application of the argument built throughout the literature review.  
1. Disagreement about public issues intensifies within religious groups. 
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In one of the enduring metaphors in the sociology of religion, Karl Marx (1978:54) 
characterizes religion as a sedative narcotic: “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the 
sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.” 
In this vision, people who are alienated by their inability to escape the the historical churn of 
class struggle dull the pain of existence through recourse to supernatural stories and ritualistic 
behaviors. Rather than sparking outrage over unjust economic arrangements, religion in this 
formulation acts as a private compensator for public inequality. Rather than polarizing public 
opinion, religion sedates the faithful. Indeed, understanding religion as a social phenomenon in 
the contemporary world often requires discerning the differences between private troubles and 
public issues.  
The classic statement on these differences between private troubles and public issues 
appears in the work of C. Wright Mills (1959:8):   
Perhaps the most fruitful distinction with which the sociological imagination works is 
between ‘the personal troubles of milieu’ and ‘the public issues of social structure’…. 
Troubles occur within the character of the individual and within the range of his 
immediate relations with others; they have to do with his self and with those limited areas 
of social life of which he is directly and personally aware…. Issues have to do with 
matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his 
inner life. They have to do with the organization of many such milieux into the 
institutions of an historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various milieux 
overlap and interpenetrate to form the larger structure of social and historical life. An 
issue is a public matter…. 
 
Applying this conceptual framework to the topic of religion enables one to distinguish between 
privatized and deprivatized religion. The former is faith that addresses mainly personal troubles, 
as in Marx’s formulation referenced above. Privatized religion need not be solipsistic and may be 
shared within congregations or other forms of spiritual community. Nonetheless, the content of 
privatized religion remains confined to the sphere of personal troubles, such as one’s ritual purity 
or mystical experience. Alternatively, deprivatized religion is faith that addresses public issues. It 
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evaluates and at times influences institutions, structures, and other matters that range beyond 
personal belief, behavior, and belonging.  
Though classical theories of secularization often predict the increasing privatization of 
religion (Berger 1969, Martin 1978, Bell 1996), such theories have not garnered empirical 
validation. In the U.S. context, “a significant minority of Americans resist individual-level 
privatization. They want religious to speak to political and social issues, and act accordingly” 
(Regnerus and Smith 1998:1347). Of course, this trend is not limited to the United States. 
Casanova (1994:5) argues that “we are witnessing the ‘deprivatization’ of religion in the modern 
world…. [R]eligious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and 
privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for 
them.” Instead, deprivatized religion becomes a means of either endorsing or resisting dominant 
social norms and behavioral trends.  
Religious adherents who swim against the tide of such norms and trends widen the range 
possible reactions to dominant cultural patterns. Religiously fueled alternatives diversify the 
range of possible reactions to public issues. This swimming against the tide of cultural norms can 
happen within religious groups themselves. For example, the basic unit of religious gathering in 
the U.S.—Christian congregations—focus mainly on worship, religious training, and artistic 
expression rather than political activism, social service, or charitable volunteering (Chaves 
2004). Although the majority of U.S. congregations have adopted an institutional division of 
labor that removes them from the front lines of political action, it is important to recognize that 
this arrangement is not inherent in religious organizations: “[R]eligious culture in general does 
not necessarily enable or inhibit democratic political organizing. Rather, certain forms of 
religious culture—like certain forms of any culture—enable such participation, and other forms 
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of religious culture constrain it” (Wood 2002:161). Congregations whose members exhibit high 
religious salience and strong concern for progressive political agendas such as economic justice 
do exist, but they are “institutionally fragile and difficult to sustain” because members often 
eschew methods of proselytism practiced by more conservative but growing groups (Wellman 
2002:184). Coming from a more progressive religious perspective, these “Liberal religionists are 
challenged to sustain themselves in a context that foregoes metaphysical certainties” (ibid: 197). 
The same skepticism they aim at dominant social norms involving inequality and injustice can 
also mute the unencumbered embrace of the beliefs and practices of their own faith traditions.  
The institutional fragility of such congregations opens the opportunity for alternative 
forms of organizing, such as social movements. While the religion practiced within 
congregations may not often focus on deprivatized resistance that diversifies beliefs about public 
issues, religious social movements often do just that: “Religion can help to keep everything in its 
place. But it can also turn the world upside-down… [and] mobilize, promote, and abet social 
movements—organized efforts of challenger groups to promote or resist social change through 
disruptive means” (Smith 1996b:1). These religious social movements can provide cultural tools 
such as transcendent motivation, organizational resources, shared identity, social and geographic 
positioning, privileged legitimacy, and institutional self-interest to activists desiring to effect 
social change beyond their own cultural enclaves (ibid.). Recognizing that moral commitments 
derived from religious sources—and not simply rational calculations about movement 
outcomes—animate such activism helps one detect the entrance of religion into the public sphere 
(Smith 1996a).  
2. Disagreement about public issues SUCH AS INEQUALITY intensifies within religious groups. 
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When religion does enter the public sphere, general consensus within highly religious 
populations might be expected. For example, it would be logical to anticipate general consensus 
among highly religious Muslims on the merits of zakat, one of the Five Pillars of Islam which 
commands adherents to donate 2.5 percent of their income to those in need. At the same time, the 
deprivatization of religion can widen the range of beliefs about dominant cultural norms and 
practices. And when dominant cultural norms and practices involve public issues such as race, 
ethnicity, and gender, religion-fueled resistance often provides alternative approaches to the 
issue of inequality. For example, during the Civil Rights movement in the U.S., both leaders and 
participants accessed organizational and psychological resources from religious faith in 
combating the dominant racial ideology (Harris 1994, Andrews 2004). Likewise the growing 
number of Hispanic Protestants in the United States “represents a revival of popular religion, a 
longstanding form of cultural resistance among disenfranchised Spanish-origin populations 
throughout the Americas” (Hunt 2001:139). Beyond the borders of the United States and the 
boundaries of Protestantism, deprivatized religious resistance appears in Brazilian Catholic base 
ecclesial communities advocating for agrarian reform (Adriance 1994), Haitian practices of 
Vodoun providing “covert forms of aggression in a society in which overt forms are relatively 
rare” (Bourguignon 1985:294), and Caribbean Rastafarianism offering “the acquisition of status 
for blacks in colonial societies” (Simpson 1985). Developing such personal religious agency 
involves activities that can be brought to bear on the larger world: “gaining voice, negotiating 
place and space, and flexible alignment” (Leming 2007:73). 
The same levels of disagreement found within religious groups concerning racial and 
ethnic inequality can also be found within them concerning gender inequality. While women do 
not engage in religious participation at higher rates than men, they do report higher levels of 
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spiritual piety (Sullins 2006). While some propose that this gendered difference results from 
women’s preferences for taking fewer risks, others have demonstrated that this is not the case 
(Miller 2000, Freese 2004, Roth and Kroll 2007). Recognizing that women’s religious piety is 
not based on risk aversion can help clarify how women call upon religious resources to resist 
dominant cultural norms. For example, women have been shown to resist the patriarchal beliefs 
and practices pervading many faiths through a process of cognitive restructuring (Ozark 1996). 
At the lay level, such strategies of action enable women to sustain involvement in social service 
and social reform activism (Faver 2000). At the institutional level, much of the attention focuses 
on the activism of male clergy, such as the social justice work of Roman Catholic bishops (Burns 
1992). However, Catholic nuns are able to foster greater levels of activism than Catholic priests 
because they face less resistance from ecclesial authorities (Stalp and Winders 2000). Beyond the 
context of U.S. Christianity, Indonesian women form Muslim groups that become “incubators 
for [their] diverse political activism” (Rinaldo 2008). In these international examples, religion 
provides women with more than personal practice and individual meaning; it animates their 
public resistance to patriarchalism and other perceived injustices.  
3. Disagreement about public issues such as INCOME inequality intensifies within religious 
groups. 
 At times the disagreement within religious groups concerning racial, ethnic, and gender 
inequality also extends to the topic of income inequality. As “God and mammon” are often 
portrayed as opposite realms—one private and one public, one sacred and one secular—income 
inequality becomes a particularly rich arena for demonstrating the influence of deprivatized 
religion. For example, Emerson and Smith (2001) find that in the case of economic attitudes 
among U.S. conservative Protestants, religious salience produces an intensifying effect on 
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commonly held opinions. At issue is how people account for the economic disparities between 
whites and African Americans using either individualistic accounts (focused on personal ability 
and motivation) or structural accounts (focused on education and discrimination). Whites are 
more likely than African Americans to hold individualistic accounts of racial economic 
inequality. However, white conservative Protestants are more likely than other whites to hold 
such accounts. In contrast, African Americans are more likely to hold structural accounts of 
racial economic inequality. However, African American conservative Protestants are more likely 
than other African Americans to hold such accounts. This specific case of racial attitudes 
illustrates how religion can intensify the divergence of opinions about economic inequality. At 
the same time the opinions studied by Emerson and Smith focus on explanations for income 
inequality, whether individual or structural. The question being asked is, “What accounts for the 
disparity in incomes?” A further step would be to study opinions about the levels of—not simply 
the explanations for—income inequality. How fair is the current state of affairs? Do respondents 
think that society needs more or less equality? And does sharing a religious faith make it more or 
less likely to find common ground on these issues?   
In describing the differences between conservatives and liberals, Hall (1997:41) claims 
that “in order to understand how Christian activists end up with different social and political 
ideologies, one should pay close attention to differences in their religious orientations.” Such 
differences in religious orientation can profoundly shape the debates around poverty and 
economic inequality. In the U.S. context, arguments about the causes of poverty reveal a 
conservative-liberal continuum that differentiates between the undeserving poor and the 
deserving poor (Robinson 2009). In a study of elite Evangelicals, many of the interviewees 
justified their wealth with explanations of their own generosity, but few talked about income 
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inequality itself (Lindsay 2007). In a parallel finding, many Catholics and Mainline Christians 
reported a personal connection between church involvement and volunteering to address 
community problems while many conservative Protestants discouraged such “this-wordly” 
activity (Wilson and Janoski 1995). These findings suggest that many people operate with strong 
consistency between their theological and economic ideologies.   
However, the left/right divide that often distinguishes religious denominations is known 
to cut right through them (Wuthnow 1989). For example, the same debates concerning biblical 
inerrancy that once divided freer thinking mainline Protestants from more literal minded 
conservative Protestants in the U.S. can now be found within these groups. However, such 
divergences are not limited to religious issues. Indeed, the divergence between theological 
conservatism and liberalism does not always map neatly onto the divergence between economic 
conservatism and liberalism (Pyle 1993). For example, religious conservatives think about the 
poor more often than do liberals, but they expect the church and not the government to address 
the issue (Wuthnow 1998). At the same time, debates over capitalism within U.S. 
Evangelicalism sort this group into the left, which focuses on structural powers, and the right, 
which advocates for a limited welfare state (Gay 1991). It is possible for this divergence to arise 
because it is possible for people to hold conservative theological beliefs and promote a left-
leaning economic agenda (Hart 1996). This finding warns against the assumption that particular 
forms of religion necessarily produce consensus on public issues involving economics. This is 
because “Economic and cultural politics run on separate tracks, and the relationship of each to 
religion needs to be understood separately” (ibid.: xv). Among Christians in the U.S., Hart found 
that “religious traditionalism does not lead to economic conservatism” and that “no religious 
variables except denominational group predict economic views” (ibid.: xix). According to this 
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study, Catholics and religious “nones” are the most economically liberal, followed by African-
American Protestants and White Protestants, with mainline denominations being the most 
conservative (ibid.:156). Such findings suggest that research on economic opinions should 
account for the influence of denomination. At the same time, looking at denomination in 
isolation from its interaction with other religious factors—such as salience—may tell only part of 
the story.  
In summary, the deprivatization of religion occurs as people utilize the toolkit (Swidler 
1986) of religious faith to address matters of public importance, such as income inequality. At 
times, people operate with consistent ideologies, approaching both religion and economics from 
either a liberal or a conservative perspective. At other times, people may be liberal in one arena 
and conservative in the other. This phenomenon can become an engine for producing dissensus 
rather than consensus among religious groups. Beyond discussions of the liberal/conservative 
continuum among religious believers, researchers are keen to demonstrate the differences 
between different religious denominations and sects. Participating in a particular religious 
subculture can profoundly shape one’s strategies of action for addressing public issues (Smith 
1998), such as economics. At the same time, differences in outlook and action can arise not only 
between religious subcultures but within them. This raises the question of what other religious 
factors fuel complexity and instigate contentiousness within religious groups.  
4. Disagreement about public issues such as income inequality intensifies within HIGHLY 
religious groups. 
Paper 1 of this dissertation investigates the relationship between beliefs about income 
inequality and a number of religious factors, including inequity, intensity, and identity. That 
paper presents arguments and evidence for including the independent variables of being in a 
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religious majority, having high religiosity, and identifying with specific religious traditions. For 
example, the “underdog thesis”—that minority groups with lower socioeconomic status support 
more egalitarian principles than their majority counterparts (Robinson and Bell 1978)—has been 
shown to apply to religious minorities (Hunt 2002). This paper argues that these same 
independent variables can be applied not only to beliefs about inequality but also to the variation 
in those beliefs. What is the rationale for this assertion? Is it possible to demonstrate that the 
religious variables applied to beliefs about income inequality also apply to other issues of 
economic stratification? One answer involves showing how these religious factors associate with 
levels of financial generosity within different traditions, denominations, and movements. While 
one must not conflate charitable giving with stratification beliefs, the following conversation 
furthers the rationale for including the specified religious factors by demonstrating that they can 
indeed be helpful in explaining differences in how religious groups address income inequality. 
Much of the research on charitable giving originates in the U.S., and findings vary greatly 
depending on how the groups are classified and compared. In terms of giving directly to those in 
need, Catholics demonstrate more generosity toward poor families than do Jews and Liberal 
Protestants, who both give more than all other Protestants (Will and Cochran 1995). However, in 
terms of giving indirectly to poverty-related organizations, being in a group other than Christian 
predicts the highest levels of support (Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink 1998). In a similar finding, 
Jews make larger donations and give more frequently to organizations that help people in need 
than do Christians and people claiming no religion (Ottoni-Wilhelm 2010). Among Christians, 
those who participate in theologically conservative subcultures give slightly more to such relief 
organizations than do liberal Protestants and practicing Catholics (Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink 
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1998, Brooks 2006). Thus, different religious traditions can associate with different deprivatized 
responses to the public issue income inequality.  
In addition to charting differences in economic opinions and practices by participation in 
religious subcultures, it is important to account for the salience of religion itself. Vaidyanathan, 
Hill, and Smith (2011:450) contradict the literature that identifies “a significant relationship 
between political conservatism and greater financial giving to charitable causes.” Instead they 
find that “it is less the effect of ideology than of active participation in religious, political, and 
community organizations that explains Americans’ financial giving to religious and nonreligious 
organizations” (ibid.). However, it may not be the case that higher religious salience universally 
inspires greater participation in building and funding the public good. For example, in the U.S. 
context, increasing religious salience appears to increase contributions to public goods among 
Protestants but decrease such contributions among Catholics, who also expect others to 
contribute less (Benjamin, Choi and Fisher 2010). Thus it is possible to demonstrate that the 
religious factors identified as independent variables in Paper 1 apply to a number of issues 
involving economic stratification. When it comes specifically to disagreements about the public 
issue of income inequality within religious groups, it is appropriate to consider the influence of 
religious identity, intensity, and inequity.  
5. Disagreement about public issues such as income inequality intensifies within highly religious 
groups IN THE U.S. 
In theorizing the influence of religion on beliefs about income inequality, it could be 
imagined that such beliefs form an even distribution across the spectrum of possibilities, with 
each option reflecting equal representation. However, at least one approach to the topic suggests 
that this is not the case. An attempt by U.S. sociologists to chart the contours of the relationship 
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between deprivatized religion and beliefs about income inequality situates religious adherents 
along a continuum from those who support economic inequality on one side to those who 
support economic equality on the other (Davidson and Pyle 1999).  
This approach conceptualizes support for economic inequality very broadly to include 
endorsement of political agendas, (e.g., wealth-producing tax cuts), alignment with movements 
(e.g., the right-leaning Christian Coalition), and the taking of direct action (e.g., opposing 
grassroots organizations that represent the interests of working people). Support for the specific 
belief addressed in this paper—that larger income differences are needed as incentives—
certainly falls into this definition. At times, such support for economic inequality may find either 
indirect or direct backing from theological sources. For example, some Christians may favor tax 
arrangements that benefit the wealthy at the expense of state welfare spending because they 
emphasize Bible passages endorsing hard work, personal responsibility, and voluntary charity. 
Such Christians may not directly advocate for increasing income inequality, but their political 
action may work to increase it nonetheless. Alternatively, other Christians who embrace 
prosperity gospel teachings may view wealth as a sign of God’s favor and therefore call for 
greater income differentials as a way of identifying the blessed. Such Christians would actively 
seek ways to increase the economic distance between themselves and those who do not embrace 
prosperity gospel teachings. In this way, income inequality is framed as a necessary metric, an 
arena of evidence for supporting religious dogma.  
On the other side of the continuum lie those who support economic equality through such 
means as political action (e.g., calling for economic justice), community organizing (e.g., 
sponsoring social concerns programs), and financial investment (e.g., hiring full-time staff for 
social ministry). As before, such support for economic equality may find either indirect or direct 
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backing from theological sources. For example, some Christians may favor increased welfare 
state spending at the expense of tax arrangements that benefit the wealthy because they 
emphasize Bible passages encouraging communities to support vulnerable populations, such as 
widows and orphans. Such Christians may focus on helping the poor without addressing the 
larger issue of income inequality, but their political action may work to decrease it it nonetheless. 
Alternatively, other Christians who embrace biblical teachings on self-denial may view 
poverty—not riches—as a sign of God’s favor and therefore call for decreasing income 
differentials as a way of reshaping society to reflect God’s intentions. Such Christians would 
actively seek ways to decrease the economic distance between themselves and others by calling 
everyone to a life of economic austerity. In this way, income inequality is framed as a societal 
sin, an opportunity for repentance and change.  
According to Davidson and Pyle, most religious people in the U.S. fall between the 
extremes of either completely supporting inequality or completely supporting equality. 
According to their hypothesis, the distribution peaks toward the first side, indicating that the bulk 
of religious groups support and perpetuate inequality, and has a long tail toward the other side, 
indicating that a tapering minority of religious groups support and perpetuate equality. This 
skewed distribution purportedly results from a combination of interests and values among both 
clergy and laity. On one hand, material self-interest can hinder both ministers and parishioners 
from challenging inequitable economic arrangements. The many who benefit from income 
inequality have little reason to challenge social norms concerning economic stratification. On the 
other hand, the majority of both church leaders and churchgoers gravitate toward “good fortune” 
theology as opposed to “social justice” theology. This religious majority highly values a central 
tenet of American public religion: that godliness results in blessing, which often includes 
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material wellbeing. In this understanding, “good fortune” theology ranges from Calvinist 
interpretations of Christian scriptures, which emphasize God’s sovereignty, to the health and 
wealth gospel of prosperity teachers, which emphasizes human faith. This stands in contrast to 
the minority who espouse “social justice” theology by valorizing the poor as innocent victims of 
corporate greed and demonizing wealth disparity as the worst of societal sins. Once again, this 
illustrates how religious traditions using the same cultural resources, such as scriptures and 
liturgies, can nonetheless produce widely divergent approaches to the public issue of income 
inequality. Indeed, this theory addresses not simply the content of beliefs about income 
inequality, but also to the distribution of those beliefs in religious populations. Without empirical 
support, however, their thesis remains unverified. This raises the question, “Is it possible to 
empirically verify the pattern of beliefs about income inequality among religious people 
suggested by Davidson and Pyle?” Of course, investigating this question raises the issue of 
whether a theory designed to explain religion phenomena in the United States also applies in 
other contexts.  
Although a number of the studies discussed above report on deprivatized religion around 
the world (Bourguignon 1985, Simpson 1985, Adriance 1994, Cassanova 1994, Smith 1996a, 
Smith 1996b, Leming 2007, Rinaldo 2008), the main threads of this theoretical discussion tie 
directly to the United States. Indeed the pattern proposed by Davidson and Pyle refers 
specifically to the U.S. context. This raises the question of how applicable theories addressing 
U.S. Christianity are to other religious traditions around the world—especially as they relate to 
the diversity of beliefs about income inequality. As discussed in Paper 1, a particular example of 
this dilemma involves the low levels of income inequality within majority Muslim populations 
(Fish 2011). Specifically Pepinsky and Welborne (2010: 491) reject a proposal by Davis and 
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Robinson (2006) that “piety has a systematic impact on the redistributive preferences among 
Muslims.” Conversely they propose that “higher levels of religiosity correspond to lower support 
for government efforts to minimize income inequality” (ibid). According to these critics, Davis 
and Robinson’s faulty methodology produces dubious conclusions. The choice to define piety as 
support for the implementation of Islamic law required dropping half of the Muslims in the 
sample. Pepinsky and Welborne conclude that “These findings provide little evidence to suggest 
that either scriptural or organizational factors unique to Islam create distinct economic policy 
preferences among pious Muslims, demonstrating that arguments derived from Christians in 
advanced industrial economies are largely appropriate in the Muslim world” (Pepinksy and 
Welborne 2010: 491). 
 This evidence suggests that applying theories about variation in beliefs about income 
inequality within religious traditions in the U.S. to other parts of the world should not be 
dismissed out of hand. At the same time, methodological rigor requires investigating each 
empirical case to determine whether genuine religious differences—both between and within 
traditions—shape the ways that such theories play out in actuality. Thus the question raised 
above, “Is it possible to empirically verify the pattern of beliefs about income inequality among 
religious people suggested by Davidson and Pyle?” prompts a related inquiry: “If so, does this 
pattern extend beyond the context in which it was developed, namely the United States?” The 
next step in addressing these two items requires a discussion of hypotheses to be tested. 
Hypothesis  
As discussed in Paper 1 of this dissertation, beliefs about income inequality reflect the 
influence of a number of factors, such as stratification systems, political orders, economic 
conditions, social norms, and religious traditions. In the main, one’s position in the stratification 
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system influences beliefs about income inequality. For example, being female, older, single, less 
educated, and poorer will dampen support for income inequality. At the same time, structural 
factors, such as living in nations with high income inequality, low economic development, and 
low government spending, can also dampen support for income inequality. Accounting for these 
control factors, the models in Paper 1 provide evidence that support for income inequality 
correlates with the interaction of being highly religious and identifying with either Islam or 
Hinduism, traditions whose core teachings address stratification.  
 This paper expands the conversation on religion and beliefs about income inequality by 
addressing the variation in those beliefs. The literature review above provides evidence that 
disagreement about public issues such as income inequality intensifies within highly religious 
groups in the U.S. One theory intended to explain the variation in the relationship between 
religion and beliefs about income inequality in the United States situates religious adherents 
along a continuum from those who support economic inequality on one side to those who 
support economic equality on the other (Davidson and Pyle 1999). According to this approach, 
the distribution peaks toward the first side, indicating that the bulk of religious groups support 
and perpetuate inequality, and has a long tail toward the other side, indicating that a tapering 
minority of religious groups support and perpetuate equality. Employing this theory as a 
sensitizing concept, this paper investigates the question, “What is the effect of religiosity on the 
amount of disagreement over income inequality within religious traditions around the world?”  
The analysis that follows tests the empirical validity of the pattern expected by Davidson and 
Pyle and determines if it also appears outside of the U.S. It is important to explore the variation 
in beliefs about income inequality within religious groups because understanding this public 
issue might involve than equating certain religious factors with particular opinions. Perhaps 
  92 
 
disagreement over income inequality widens within groups, producing dissensus rather than 
consensus among highly religious people who share the same religious tradition.   
 In order to extend the conversation begun in Paper 1, the models presented below include 
the same control variables as well as the same measures of religious inequity, intensity, and 
identity to explore the variation in beliefs about income inequality among religious people. The 
proposal by Davidson and Pyle concerning the pattern of variation in beliefs about income 
inequality among religious people was developed within the U.S. context, where approximately 
95 percent of the population claims to be either Christian—mainly Catholic and Protestant—or 
religious “none” (Hackett and Grim 2012). This raises the question of whether the expected 
pattern in variation occurs within other religious traditions. Paper 1 demonstrates that theory 
derived mainly from studies of U.S. religion applied to the issue of income inequality benefits 
from the inclusion of interaction terms between religious intensity and religious identity. Thus it 
is expected that disagreement about income inequality intensifies within highly religious groups 
around the world. By testing this hypothesis using international data, it becomes possible to 
compare findings within religious traditions prevalent in the U.S. to those that are prevalent 
elsewhere in the world.  
 
Methods 
Data 
In order to test these hypotheses, this study utilizes the World Values Survey/European 
Values Survey (WVS/EVS), the only ongoing research project designed to capture the values 
and beliefs of a majority of the world’s population (Inglehart 2008). Collected on all six 
continents by leading social scientists from each of the 97 societies studied, the WVS/EVS 
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includes representational national samples of at least 1,000 people from each society, reflecting 
the opinions of 88 percent of the globe’s inhabitants. Using random probability samples (where 
possible), local field organizations conduct face-to-face interviews through standardized 
questionnaires translated into the local language under the supervision of academic researchers 
and a principal investigator at the behest of the Stockholm-based non-profit World Values 
Survey Association (WVSA). In total, the five waves of the WVS/EVS constitutes 334,000 
unique respondents (25,000 from 20 countries during Wave 1 in 1981-1984; 61,000 from 42 
countries during Wave 2 in 1989-1993; 75,000 from 52 countries during Wave 3 in 1994-1998; 
96,000 from 67 countries during Wave 4 in 1999-2004; and 77,000 from 54 countries during 
Wave 5 in 2005-2008). This paper employs the last three waves of the combined WVS/EVS, as 
these waves include measures of the dependent variable and other theoretically important factors. 
In addition to the WVS/EVS dataset, this study utilizes three additional sources of 
information. First, the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) provides Gini 
indexes compiled using a custom missing-data algorithm to standardize the U.N. University 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID) with reference to the Luxembourg Income Study. 
The SWIID “provides comparable Gini indices of gross and net income inequality for 153 
countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the present, along with estimates of 
uncertainty in these statistics” (Solt 2009). Second, the World Bank International Comparison 
Program Database (WBICPD) database provides measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2013 international dollars calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates based on data 
files from the World Bank National Accounts and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) National Accounts. The World Bank International Comparison Program 
also provides measures of Government Expenses as a Percentage of GDP based on information 
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from International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, World Bank 
estimates, and OECD estimates. Third, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life provides 
“comprehensive demographic estimates of the size and distribution of eight major religious 
groups in the 232 countries and territories for which the United Nations Population Division 
provides general population estimates as of 2010” based on the analysis of 2,500 data sources, 
“including censuses, demographic surveys, general population surveys and other studies” 
(Hackett and Grim 2012:51).    
Measures 
The dependent variable for this study is an indicator of beliefs about income inequality 
measured on a ten-point scale. The WVS/EVS survey question reads: “Now I’d like you to tell 
me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you 
agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number 
in between. Sentences: Incomes should be made more equal (1) vs. We need larger income 
differences as incentives (10).” This ordinal indicator serves as an appropriate dependent 
variable for this study because it captures beliefs about income inequality using a scale that 
works well with the analysis and models described below.  
The independent variables for this study include three religious indicators: inequity, 
intensity, and identity. The first independent variable based on data from the Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life indicates whether or not each respondent is in a religious majority. This 
dichotomous variable, which is based on the six religious groups employed in this study, signals 
that respondents DO identify with the majority religious groups in their societies. Second, the 
WVS/EVS measure of religiosity derives from asking respondents to rate the importance of 
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religion in their life using the following categorical scale: very important, rather important, not 
very important, and not at all important. In this study, religious intensity appears as a 
dichotomous measure, contrasting those from the “very important” category with all other 
respondents from the three remaining categories (reference). Using a dichotomous religiosity 
variable produces a more manageable number of groups when creating interaction terms with the 
third religious indicator: religious group. The WVS/EVS indicator for religious identity includes 
the nominal categories of Catholic, Protestant (reference), Orthodox, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, 
Other Religious Group, and No Religious Group.  
The control variables for this study include both personal and structural factors that have 
been identified in the literature as influencing beliefs about inequality. First, control variables 
from the WVS/EVS that reflect personal position in the stratification system include 1) sex, a 
dichotomous variable measured as female and male (reference); 2) age, a continuous variable 
measured in years; 3) marital status, a nominal variable treated dichotomously with the 
categories of always single or ever married (i.e., married, divorced, and widowed) (reference); 4) 
education, a categorical variable measured on an eight-point scale (including incomplete and 
complete training at the elementary, technical/vocational, university preparatory and university 
levels), which is treated as continuous in the following models; and 5) income, a categorical 
variable reflecting the wage gradient within nations measured on a ten-point scale from lowest to 
highest, which is treated as continuous in the following model. Second, control variables 
reflecting structural factors that can influence beliefs about inequality include 1) income 
inequality, a continuous variable from the SWIID measured by a Gini index ranging from 0 
(complete equality) to 100 (complete inequality); 2) economic development, a continuous 
variable from the WBIPCD measured by GDP per capita PPP (purchasing power parity) in 
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thousands of current international dollars; and 3) government expenses, a continuous variable 
from the WBIPCD measuring regime spending as a percentage of GDP. These three structural 
control variables were assigned to respondents by country in the year nearest to each wave of the 
WVS/EVS.  
Analysis  
To address the relationship between religion and the variation in beliefs about income 
inequality, this paper presents three heteroskedastic ordered probit regression models derived 
using the oglm command in Stata. Ordered probit models attempt to assess continuous latent 
variables—which cannot be measured directly—by observing ordinal variables that have been 
measured. In this case, the latent variable is belief about income inequality, and the observed 
variable is the response on the ten-point scale measuring support for incentivizing such 
inequality. The wording of the WVS/EVS question limits responses to ten categories, producing 
nine “cut points” that divide these categories. Employing ordered probit models usually requires 
the assumption that responses are distributed normally with the first cut point set to !1 and the 
variance set to 1. However, relaxing the assumption of a normal distribution by setting the first 
cut point to !1 and the second cut point to 0 without defining the variance allows the model to 
estimate the influence of theoretically important independent variables on both the mean and the 
variance of the dependent variable. Because the scale is arbitrary, fixing the size of one category 
does not affect the substantive results. The resulting heteroskedastic ordered probit model proves 
useful when the variance of the latent variable becomes substantively interesting (e.g., Mouw 
and Sobel 2001).  
The heteroskedastic ordered probit models in this paper present the variance as Ln Sigma, 
or the natural log of the variance. Exponentiating the variance allows the standard deviation of 
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the variance to remain positive (as it would be impossible for this value to be negative). It also 
allows the signs of Ln Sigma to report useful information to those reading the tables. A negative 
sign on the log variance of an independent variable indicates that this measure correlates with a 
decrease in the variance of the dependent variable. And a positive sign on the log variance of an 
independent variable indicates that this measure correlates with an increase in the variance of the 
dependent variable. Importantly, a positive sign signals that more respondents fall into the 
extreme categories of the dependent variable. In the case of this paper, a positive sign on the log 
variance of an independent variable indicates that this measure correlates with respondents 
choosing options closer to either 1 or 10 rather than the middle of the scale of support for 
incentivizing income inequality.   
 
Findings 
Sample  
This study’s sample of 180,817 respondents from 82 countries derives from the third, 
fourth and fifth waves of the WVS/EVS (see Appendix 2.A). As it turns out, the first wave 
contains no measures of this study’s dependent variable, and the second wave does not 
adequately cover measures of income, a theoretically important variable for this project. Once 
variables from the SWIID, WBICPD, and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life were 
added to the three remaining waves of the WVS/EVS, it was possible to use listwise deletion to 
remove cases with missing data. Ten percent of the sample with missing data on the dependent 
variable was removed, and additional 21 percent was removed due to missing data on all other 
items. As listwise deletion has been shown to be methodologically sound (Allison 2001), using 
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this process to select a sample with 79 percent of respondents having the required dependent 
variable was deemed suitable.  
TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE 
Descriptives 
Table 2.1 presents simple descriptive statistics for this study’s dependent, independent, 
and control variables. It is helpful to conceptualize the dependent variable as support for greater 
income inequality. Thus, higher scores on the ten-point scale—and positive coefficients in the 
regression models—indicate the call for widening income distributions. The mean of 5.87 on this 
ten-point scale suggests that on average people would rather use income inequality as an 
incentive than make wages more equal. The actual distribution of the dependent variable appears 
in Figure 2.1, showing peaks at the extremes and middle of the scale. Importantly, the mode of 
15.48 percent of respondents selected ten—the highest possible indication of the desire for using 
income inequality as an incentive—and the next largest category of 13.31 percent selected eight.  
Notably the distribution in Figure 2.1 does not reflect the distribution predicted by Davidson and 
Pyle. While the histogram does show peaks towards the right side, indicating support for income 
inequality, other peaks occur at both the opposite end and in the middle of the distribution. 
Though the Davidson and Pyle prediction does not accurately describe the entire sample, the 
possibility remains that it does describe the distribution of the dependent variable within 
different religious traditions.  
FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2.2 presents the same distribution of beliefs about income inequality by religious 
tradition. The flattest distribution—signaling the least amount of variation—occurs among 
religious “nones.” Interestingly, the Buddhist distribution most closely aligns with the prediction 
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made by Davidson and Pyle: a peak toward support for inequality with a long tail tapering 
toward more egalitarian beliefs. This basic pattern reverses among Hindus, with a mode of 1 on 
the ten-point scale in support for income inequality followed by a flat distribution leading toward 
a short peak of 10. The other five distributions, including Christians, Muslims, and Other 
religions, approximate the shape predicted by Davidson and Pyle of having a peak toward 
support for income inequality with a long tail toward more egalitarian beliefs—with one notable 
exception. At the end of the long tail toward egalitarian beliefs, there is another peak at the very 
end of the spectrum. Respondents in these religious traditions report beliefs at the extremes of 
the dependent variable. Comparing and contrasting these simple histograms highlight the 
importance of measuring how religious variables associate with variance in beliefs about income 
inequality. Once again, increases in variance indicate that more respondents fall toward the 
extremes of the distribution.  
FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE 
The independent variables measure three religious factors: 1) inequity, 2) intensity, and 
3) identity. First, when it comes to numerical inequity, about three quarters of the sample are 
religious majorities who observe the majority faith in their countries. As demonstrated in Table 
2.2, 92 percent of Christians, 87 percent of Muslims, and 75 percent of Hindus share their faith 
with a majority of their countries’ populations, while 57 percent of Buddhists, and 77 percent of 
religious “nones,” and 100 percent of other religious groups represent religious minorities.  
Second, the measure of religious intensity indicates that 45 percent of respondents rate 
religion as very important, 25 percent as rather important, 18 percent as not very important, and 
12 percent as not at all important. Having such a large “Very Important” category anchoring a 
highly skewed distribution of religiosity makes it possible to use the other three categories as a 
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single reference group in the regressions that follow. Third, the sample divides into six religious 
traditions. While slightly more than half of respondents identify as Christians, a fifth are 
Muslims, and another fifth are religious “nones.” Hindus, Buddhists, and people of other 
religions each represent between two and three percent of the sample.  
Lastly, the list of control variables demonstrates that a little over half the sample is 
female, the average age is 41 (with a range of 15 to 99), and about a quarter of respondents have 
never been married. Combining those who have incomplete and complete training at each of the 
eight educational levels divides the sample roughly into quarters: 1) elementary, 2) vocational, 3) 
university prep, and 4) university training. The ten-point income scale, which has a mean of 4.63 
and a standard deviation of 2.43, reflects a standardized scale of incomes as measured in local 
currencies. Finally, three indicators reveal widely differing levels of income inequality, 
economic development, and regime spending around the world: 1) Gini Indexes ranging from 
21.88 to 64.80 with a mean of 37.32; 2) GDP per capita PPP (purchasing power parity) in 
thousands of current international dollars ranging from .72 to 55.81 with a mean of 12.13; and 
government expenses as a percentage of GDP ranging from 5.30 to 98.00 with a mean of 24.79.  
Before investigating the regression models below, it proves instructive to explore the 
relationships between the religious independent variables. Table 2.2 presents the cross tabulation 
of religious groups by religious status. In this worldwide sample, a clear preponderance of 
Christians (92 percent), Muslims (75 percent), and Hindus (75 percent) live as religious 
majorities within their countries. Alternatively, all those practicing “other” religions (100 
percent) and a preponderance of religious “nones” (77 percent) and Buddhists (57 percent) live 
as religious minorities.   
TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 2.3 presents the cross tabulation of religious identity by religious intensity, with 
cells containing the frequencies and percentages of respondents falling into each category. 
Reading the table from top to bottom, a pattern emerges in the way that Christians, Muslims, 
Hindus, and “other” religions rate the importance of religion. In the main, all four groups have 
majorities rating religion as very important, with decreasing percentages in each of the lower 
categories. Muslims stand out for having 79 percent of respondents rating religion as very 
important. The trend among Buddhists is similar, with the caveat that the majority of Buddhists 
rate religion as somewhat—rather than very—important. As expected, the pattern among 
religious “nones” reverses the overall trend: most religious “nones” rate religion as not at all 
important, with decreasing percentages in each of the higher categories.  
TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE  
Table 2.3 also presents means for beliefs about income inequality within each cross 
tabulated group. Reading the table once again from top to bottom, a similar pattern emerges 
among religious groups. Just as in the main, increasing percentages of Christians, Muslims, 
Hindus, and Buddhists rated religion as having increasingly higher importance, so increasing 
percentages of these groups have increasingly higher mean values on the dependent variable. 
These increasing means indicate rising support for using income inequality as an economic 
incentive. Within these religious groups, it is increasingly likely to rate religion as very important 
AND to demonstrate greater support for using income inequality as an incentive. Again, the 
trend among religious “others” demonstrates more fluctuation, and the pattern among religious 
“nones” reverses the main trend—with the caveat that those who rate religion as not at all 
important have the lowest mean score within this group. Reading Table 2.3 from left to right 
among those who rate religion as very important reveals mean scores that increase along the 
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following trajectory: Hindus (5.28), religious “nones” (5.50), religious “others” (5.65), Christians 
(6.03), Muslims (6.16), and Buddhists (6.77). The basic trends in this table suggest that the 
relationship between religious intensity and religious identity should prove helpful in explaining 
the relationship between religion and beliefs about income inequality. Thus interaction terms 
between religiosity and religious tradition appear in the models below.  
In addition to the means, Table 2.3 reports standard deviations for beliefs about income 
inequality within each cross tabulated group. These measures range from 3.62 for Hindus who 
rate religion as very important to 2.48 for Buddhists who rate religion as not at all important. The 
aggregate standard deviations for each religious tradition decrease along the along the following 
pattern: Hindu (3.56), Muslim (3.11), Other (3.03), Catholic (3.01), Orthodox (2.95), None 
(2.89), Protestant (2.84), and Buddhist (2.40). Reading the table from top to bottom in each 
column reveals trends in the standard deviation running from the most religious to the least 
religious within each tradition. In all but two traditions, the standard deviations decrease from the 
very religious to the rather religious to the not very religious before changing directions and 
increasing among the not at all religious. The two groups bucking this trend are Hindus (whose 
not very religious and not at all religious have the same standard deviation) and Buddhists (who 
exhibit a U-shaped pattern in standard deviation).  
Most importantly for the substantive interest of this paper, reading across the table among 
the very religious of each tradition reveals the following pattern in standard deviations: Hindu 
(3.62), None (3.17), Catholic (3.14), Muslim (3.13), Other (3.11), Orthodox (3.04), Protestant 
(3.00), Buddhist (2.38). This trend provides the context for the models discussed below. At the 
same time, simply modeling the standard deviation as continuous would be improper because the 
dependent variable for this analysis is an ordinal measure. For example, a slight change in the 
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wording of an ordinal survey question can greatly influence how respondents select the arbitrary 
categories of the scale. Thus, other methods are needed to address the variation in beliefs about 
income inequality within highly religious groups.   
Models  
Table 2.4 presents three heteroskedastic ordered probit models predicting support for 
using income inequality as an economic incentive. Before interpreting the specific coefficients in 
each model, the basic findings in this table can be compared with findings from two other 
approaches. First, the heteroskedastic models in Table 2.4 allow the variances to differ. For 
comparison, Table 2.5 (Appendix 2.B) presents the same set of models as regular ordered probit 
regressions without the assumption of heteroskedasticity. In the main, the two sets of models 
differ slightly from one another, with variations in the intensity—but no changes in the signs—of 
mean coefficients. The only other difference is that majority religious status proves significant in 
all three models in Table 2.5. A likelihood ratio test comparing the models in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 
reports zero probability of being greater than the Chi2 equal to 4552.40 with 16 degrees of 
freedom. This finding indicates that the heteroskedastic models obtain a better fit with the data 
than do the regular ordered probit models.  
The second comparison with the findings presented in Table 2.4 involves the multilevel 
models discussed in Paper 1 of this dissertation. Given that Stata 12 does not support multilevel 
modeling for heteroskedastic ordered probit regressions, the models for this paper do not allow 
the constant terms to vary across countries. This methodological departure results in Table 2.4 
reporting a different number of significant relationships compared with Paper 1. Religious 
inequity remains significant in a single model in Paper 1 but insignificant in any model in this 
study. Religious intensity remains significant in a single model in Paper 1 but significant in all 
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models in this study. Religious tradition remains significant in three or four cases in each model 
of Paper 1 but significant in four to six cases in each model of this study. The interaction of 
religious intensity and religious tradition remains significant in three cases of the final model in 
Paper 1 but significant in four cases in the final model of this study. Finally, the control variable 
of Gini Index remains insignificant in Paper 1 but significant in this study. As the substantive 
interest of this paper centers on the variance of the independent variables and not primarily on 
their means, these differences are apparent but not problematic. 
TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE 
As reported in Table 2.4, Model 1 contains only measures of religious inequity, intensity, 
and identity; Model 2 adds control variables; and Model 3 adds interaction terms between 
religious identity and religious intensity. In the final two models, the control variables operate as 
expected. Expressing less support for incentivizing income inequality associates with being 
female, older, single, less educated, and poorer as well as living in nations with greater economic 
inequality, higher development, and larger government spending relative to GDP. In all three of 
these models, the mean for religious inequity remains insignificant. Thus, being in a religious 
majority does not correlate with supporting income inequality in these models. When it comes to 
religious intensity, the mean of .158 in Model 1 dips to .125 with the addition of the control 
variables in Model 2, but both remain positive coefficients.  
The pattern of coefficients for the means of religious identity in Model 1 changes 
noticeably in Models 2 and 3, with some insignificant relationships becoming significant and 
several coefficients changing signs. However, the basic trend identified in Model 2 continues in 
Model 3 with some intensification. The basic pattern among different religious traditions in the 
full model involves all groups demonstrating greater support for incentivizing income inequality 
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as compared with Protestants—except for Hindus and Muslims, who report less support. As 
expected from the findings in Paper 1, this basic trend reverses among respondents in these 
groups who rate religion as very important. As compared with highly religious Protestants, the 
highly religious in other traditions demonstrate about the same or less support for incentivizing 
income inequality—except for Hindus and Muslims, who report more support.  
 Establishing that the means reflect the basic pattern predicted in Paper 1 moves the 
discussion toward the substantive interest of this paper: the log variances of the religious 
independent variables. As explained above, a negative sign on Ln Sigma denotes a narrowing of 
the variance on the ten-point scale measuring support for incentivizing income inequality, and a 
positive sign denotes a widening of the variance on this scale. When it comes to religion, the log 
variance decreases among religious majorities in all three models, narrowing the distribution 
around the mean. Conversely, the log variance increases among the highly religious in Models 1 
and 2, widening the distribution around the mean. Notably, the log variance for religious inequity 
is about  
-.050 in each model as compared with .181 for religious intensity. This suggests that, in the 
partial models, the widening effect of religiosity proves more powerful than the narrowing effect 
of religious majority status.  
Model 2 reports the log variances for religious traditions with control variables but 
without interaction terms. Compared with Protestants, the log variances on the ten-point scale of 
support for incentivizing income inequality increases among all but one religious tradition, 
Buddhism. The largest log variance in this model occurs among Hindus, signaling that this group 
falls toward the extremes of the ten-point scale of support for income inequality in this partial 
model. Compared to Protestants in this model, the distribution around the average reported 
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support for income inequality is much wider for Hindus, somewhat wider for Catholics, the 
Orthodox, and Muslims, and somewhat narrower for Buddhists.   
Introducing the interaction terms in the full model adds a level of complexity to the 
analysis. As before, a negative sign on Ln Sigma denotes a narrowing of the variance on the ten-
point scale measuring support for incentivizing income inequality, and a positive sign denotes a 
widening of the variance on this scale. At the same time, the interaction terms between religious 
intensity and religious identity require careful interpretation. In Model 3, the log variance for 
each religious tradition now reports the variation for adherents who are not highly religious in 
that tradition as compared with Protestants who are also not highly religious. The same basic 
pattern among religious traditions for the full population reported in Model 2 of Table 2.4 also 
appears among those who are not highly religious in Model 3. As before, the largest log variance 
occurs among Hindus who are not highly religious. The Ln Sigma of .770 for this group 
constitutes the largest log variance reported in any of the models. At the other extreme in this 
model, the log variance for Buddhists is -.107. Compared with Protestants who are not very 
religious, the log variances for the remaining not-very-religious groups decrease along the 
following lines: Muslims (.228), the Orthodox (.218), Catholics (.185), Other (.185), and None 
(.128). 
 Because Protestants occupy the reference category in Model 3, introducing the interaction 
term causes the variation among highly religious Protestants to appear as the log variance for 
religious intensity. And the variation among each highly religious non-Protestant group derives 
from adding the baseline log variance of intensity with the log variance reported in each 
corresponding interaction term. To make interpretation simpler, Table 2.6 reports for each 
religious tradition the combined log variances for those who are highly religious. These 
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combined log variances for very religious adherents of each tradition make for comparisons with 
adherents of the same tradition who are not very religious. For example, the log variance of .194 
for Catholics in Table 2.6 indicates the increase in variance among Catholics who are highly 
religious as compared with Catholics who are not highly religious. The statistical significance of 
each combined log variance reported in Table 2.6 is calculated from an F-test using matrix 
algebra obtained from the lincom command in Stata. 
TABLE 2.6 ABOUT HERE 
The main empirical finding of this paper appears in the final column of Table 2.6, which 
reports the log variances for the interaction between religious identity and high religious 
intensity. Without exception, the combined log variances among the highly religious within all 
religious traditions are positive. This signals that there is greater variation in beliefs about 
income inequality among the highly religious in all eight religious traditions. This serves as 
empirical evidence for the hypothesis that disagreement about income inequality intensifies 
within highly religious groups around the world. The highest log variances occur among highly 
religious Protestants (.262), religious “nones” (.241), and Catholics (.194), the three traditions 
that constitute approximately 95 percent of the U.S. population (Hackett and Grim 2012). 
Among highly religious adherents of Islam, Hinduism, and Other religions, the log variances are 
positive but not as large as the three groups that dominate the U.S. landscape.   
Discussion 
This paper investigates the question, “What is the effect of religiosity on the amount of 
disagreement over income inequality within religious traditions around the world?” Should one 
expect more or less variation in such economic opinions among people who are religious 
minorities, highly religious, or identified with specific religious traditions? This line of inquiry is 
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important because it addresses the deprivatization of religion, a phenomenon that continues to 
expand around the world (Casanova 1994). Understanding religion sociologically should include 
a thoroughgoing account of what happens when faith speaks not only to “personal troubles” but 
addresses “public issues” as well (Mills 1959). The substantive focus of this paper targets the 
variation found within religious groups—especially highly religious ones—in beliefs about the 
public issue of income inequality. It is one thing to demonstrate that religious factors correlate 
with specific beliefs about income inequality, as in Paper 1. It is an additional step to explore the 
ideological divergence within religious groups. Such findings help protect against the inaccurate 
assumption that religious faith necessarily produces socially monolithic populations.  
The literature review above presents evidence that disagreement about public issues such 
as income inequality intensifies within highly religious groups in the U.S. This paper makes a 
contribution to the research on deprivatized religion beyond the borders of the U.S. 
(Bourguignon 1985, Simpson 1985, Adriance 1994, Cassanova 1994, Smith 1996a, Smith 
1996b, Leming 2007, Rinaldo 2008) by testing the relationship of religion to the variation in 
beliefs about income inequality in the global context. Toward that goal, it takes as a starting 
point the prediction by Davidson and Pyle (1999) that situates religious adherents along a 
continuum from those who support economic inequality on one side to those who support 
economic equality on the other. According to their hypothesis, the distribution peaks toward the 
first side, indicating that the bulk of religious groups support inequality, and has a long tail 
toward the other side, indicating that a tapering minority of religious groups support equality.  
The histograms in Figure 2.2 demonstrate that this expected pattern appears only among 
Buddhists, and a basic reversal of this pattern occurs among Hindus. The vast majority of 
religious respondents, who fall into the other categories, approximate the pattern predicted by 
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Davidson and Pyle—with the added feature of a spike in respondents at the most egalitarian 
position on the scale. Thus the Davidson and Pyle approach correctly predicts the peak toward 
support for income inequality but fails to anticipate the slight uptick at the egalitarian end of the 
scale. While it might be assumed that this results from the tendency of all respondents to choose 
extreme responses to opinion questions, the peaked pattern among religious populations can be 
compared to the much flatter distribution among religions “nones.” Once again, it is important to 
remember that the dependent variable for this paper is ordinal, meaning that a slight change in 
the wording of the survey question could greatly influence how respondents select the arbitrary 
categories of the scale. This indicates a need for further investigation into the variation in beliefs 
about income inequality among religious groups provided by regression models.  
The heteroskedastic ordered probit models in Table 2.4 provide a methodologically 
sound means for testing the hypothesis that disagreement about income inequality intensifies 
within highly religious groups around the world. These models relax the assumption of a 
standard normal distribution for the variance of the dependent variable, producing a better fit 
with the data than the standard ordered probit models. The hypothesis arising from the literature 
review and discussion of Paper 1 of this dissertation address the variance of beliefs about income 
inequality within groups having a number of different religious attributes. 
When it comes to religious inequity, all three models presented in Table 2.4 support the 
idea that greater variation in beliefs about income inequality exist among groups that are 
religious minorities. To provide continuity between these models and the models in Paper 1, the 
variable for religious inequity measures the effect of being in a religious majority. Because the 
variable is dichotomous, one can calculate the effect of being in a religious minority by simply 
reversing the sign on the variance for being in a religious majority. Thus, higher variance in 
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beliefs about income inequality arises among religious minority groups. This finding aligns with 
the concept that deprivatized religion widens the range of options for resisting dominant public 
trends. As discussed in Paper 1, the “underdog thesis”—that minority groups with lower 
socioeconomic status support more egalitarian principles than their majority counterparts 
(Robinson and Bell 1978)—has been shown to apply to religious minorities (Hunt 2002). In the 
models for this paper, none of the mean coefficients for religious inequity prove significant. This 
suggests that being in a religious minority demonstrates a stronger association with the variation 
in beliefs about income inequality than with the specific beliefs themselves.  
When it comes to religious intensity, the first two partial models in Table 2.4 provide 
support for the notion that greater variation in beliefs about income inequality exists among 
groups that are highly religious. This finding corresponds with other research demonstrating that 
religious salience produces an intensifying effect on commonly held opinions, such as in the case 
of economic attitudes among U.S. conservative Protestants (Emerson and Smith 2001). Rather 
than producing ideological convergence, high religiosity increases the variation in beliefs about 
income inequality. The association between such variation and religious intensity is about three 
times stronger than with religious inequity. Thus being highly religious correlates with much 
more variation in beliefs about income inequality than does being in a religious minority. 
However, these partial models do not account for the interaction of religious intensity and 
identity. Thus a more accurate picture of the variation in beliefs about income inequality among 
highly religious groups requires further analysis.  
When it comes to religious identity, the same basic pattern among religious traditions in 
the full population also appears among those who are not highly religious. That is, only among 
Buddhists is the log variance of beliefs about income inequality less than for Protestants. The log 
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variances for the remaining traditions increase along the following pattern: religious “nones,” 
Catholics, religious “others,” the Orthodox, Muslims, and Hindus. Paper 1 reports only one 
significant relationship between religious identity and mean coefficients for beliefs about income 
inequality in the full model containing interaction terms between religious intensity and identity. 
In contrast the models presented in this paper report significant relationships for most of the 
means and all of the log variances for religious identity without interaction terms. This situation 
likely arises from the methodological differences between Paper 1 and this study. Perhaps the 
significant correlations reported in the heteroskedastic ordered probit models introduced above 
would drop from multilevel mixed-effects linear regressions with the assumption of 
heteroskedasticity. As it turns out, this procedure is not available in Stata 12. Be that as it may, 
the inclusion of interaction terms in the final hypothesis does produce findings comparable to 
Paper 1.  
 When it comes to the interaction between religious intensity and religious identity, the 
full model presented in Table 2.4 provides strong support for this paper’s central argument—that 
disagreement about income inequality intensifies within highly religious groups around the 
world. This finding is further clarified in Table 2.6, which reports the combined log variances for 
beliefs about income inequality among highly religious adherents of the eight religious traditions 
addressed in this paper. Catholics, Protestants, and religions “nones” constitute approximately 95 
percent of the U.S. population (Hackett and Grim 2012). The highly religious among these 
groups exhibit greater variation in beliefs about income inequality than among the highly 
religious in all other religious traditions. This includes the highly religious Orthodox, who 
represent a more eastern variety of Christian faith than that prevalent in the U.S. Importantly, this 
finding is not limited to the U.S. context. Catholics, Protestants, and religious “nones” all around 
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the world demonstrate this relationship. Such empirical evidence raises the possibility that 
sociological theories developed to explain religion in the U.S. context may indeed apply to other 
geographic areas.  
 
Conclusion 
Review   
Prior research indicates that disagreement about public issues such as income inequality 
intensifies within highly religious groups in the U.S. This paper presents heteroskedastic ordered 
probit regression models based on the World Values Survey/European Values Survey 
(WVS/EVS) to address the question, “What is the effect of religiosity on the amount of 
disagreement over income inequality within religious traditions around the world?” Including 
controls for nonreligious factors known to shape beliefs about income inequality, the models 
provide evidence for the hypothesis that disagreement about income inequality intensifies within 
highly religious groups around the world. This empirical finding prompts the following 
theoretical insight: Far from producing consensus, high religiosity intensifies variation in beliefs 
about income inequality, pushing people toward divergent perspectives on this public issue. This 
is true for all religious groups around the world, but especially for Catholics, Protestants, and 
religious “nones.” This helps to explain why identification with specific religious traditions does 
not produce uniform beliefs about economic stratification. 
Limitations 
The main limitation of this study is that is utilizes cross-sectional data. Thus it becomes 
difficult to claim that the religious independent variables “cause” increased variation in beliefs 
about income inequality. Though it seems unlikely, the reverse may be true. Perhaps 
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experiencing greater variation in such economic opinions causes people to become religious 
minorities, be highly religious, or identify with specific religious traditions. Perhaps the causal 
pathway is reciprocal, flowing from religion to variation in beliefs about income inequality and 
from such variation back to religion. Perhaps a third, unknown factor influences both peoples’ 
religious faith and the variation in beliefs about income inequality. That being said, a strong 
argument can be made that because 1) most religious people are socialized into their faiths from 
the earliest childhood (Smith and Denton 2005), and 2) religions often present moral teachings 
on economic issues (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003, McCleary and Barro 2006), it is 
completely in the realm of possibility that the primary causal direction extends from religion to 
variation in beliefs about income inequality. Furthermore, the literature reviewed above indicates 
that deprivatized religion fuels variation in people’s responses to public issues. The evidence 
does not suggest that variation in beliefs about income inequality incites a flurry of religious 
switching.   
Recommendations  
Future research on the relationship between religion and the variation in beliefs about 
income inequality could address the issue of causality by utilizing panel data and experimental 
design. In so doing, it would be important to remember that theories generated to explain 
religious phenomena in the U.S. need not to be dismissed out of hand. Rather they need to be 
evaluated empirically. In the case of this paper, a theory designed to address U.S. religion proved 
a helpful sensitizing concept. Accounting for the divergence from the expected results required 
introducing interaction terms into the models. Thus, researchers should also consider the 
interaction of religiosity and religious identity when studying variation in beliefs about income 
inequality and other aspects of stratification. It is possible that the influence of religion on such 
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variation may not become apparent until researchers account for the interaction of religious 
intensity and religious identity. Finally, those who are interested in framing income inequality as 
a social problem (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010) should remember that religion is not monolithic 
in its relationship with this topic. In spite of any dominant trends, it is possible to identify 
enclaves of religiously fueled resistance to the issue of income inequality. 
Davidson and Pyle suggest that a majority of religious adherents support income 
inequality due to the combined effect of 1) the self-interest on the part of clergy and laity who 
benefit from the stratification system and 2) the widespread attraction of “good fortune” 
theology, which links spiritual blessing with material wellbeing. While this paper demonstrates 
the polarization in beliefs about income inequality among the highly religious around the world, 
it cannot directly address why being high religiosity might cause this divergence. Perhaps the 
same dynamic proposed by Davidson and Pyle for U.S. Christianity also extends to other 
geographic and religious contexts. Future research could very well determine the validity of this 
claim. Perhaps the effects of self-interest and “good fortune” theology are not limited to U.S. 
Christianity.  
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables (N = 180,817) 
  Freq. Mean/Prop. SD Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable       
Income Inequality Beliefs  180,817 5.87 2.99 1 10 
Independent Variables       
Religious Status  180,817 .26 .44 0 1 
Majority (Ref.)  134,240 74.2%    
Minority  46,577 25.8%    
Religious Importance  180,817 1.96 1.05 1 4 
Very Important  81,795 45.2%    
Rather Important (Ref.) 44,946 24.9%    
Not Very Important (Ref.) 33,211 18.4%    
Not at All Important (Ref.) 20,865 11.5%    
Religious Group  180,817 3.70 2.51 1 8 
Catholic (Ref.) 46,700 25.8%    
Protestant 26,957 14.9%    
Orthodox   23,432 13.0%    
Muslim  36,407 20.1%    
Hindu  4,506 2.5%    
Buddhist  3,873 2.1%    
Other  4,551 2.5%    
None  33,550 18.6%    
Control Variables       
Sex  180,817 1.51 .500 1 2 
Male (Ref.)  88,156 48.8%    
Female 92,661 51.3%    
Age  180,817 41.17 16.04 15 99 
Marital Status  180,817 1.88 .59 1 3 
Single  43,399 24.0%    
Married (Ref.)  115,847 64.1%    
Separated/Divorced/Widowed (Ref.)  21,571 11.9%    
Education  180,817 4.49 2.29 1 8 
Incomplete Elementary  21,832 12.1%    
Complete Elementary  26,001 14.4%    
Incomplete Vocational  14,483 8.0%    
Complete Vocational  32,554 18.0%    
Incomplete University Prep 16,177 9.0%    
Complete University Prep  30,581 16.9%    
Incomplete University  12,717 7.0%    
Complete University  26,472 14.6%    
(continued) 
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Table 2.1. (continued)  
  Freq. Mean/Prop. SD Min. Max. 
Income  180,817 4.63 2.43 1 10 
Lower Step  17,847 9.9%    
Second Step 22,822 12.6%    
Third Step  25,099 13.9%    
Fourth Step 26,475 14.6%    
Fifth Step  26,578 14.7%    
Sixth Step  19,978 11.1%    
Seventh Step  16,401 9.1%    
Eighth Step  11,839 6.6%    
Ninths Step  7,242 4.0%    
Tenths Step  6,536 3.6%    
GINI Index  180,817 37.32 9.61 21.88 64.80 
GDP (in Thousands) 180,817 12.13 11.38 .72 55.81 
Government Expenses (% of GDP) 180,817 24.79 10.60 5.30 98.00 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 
2005-2008); Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); World Bank International Comparison 
Program Database (WBICPD); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life  
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Figure 2.1. Histogram of Income Inequality Beliefs Ranging from (1) “Incomes should be made more 
equal.” to (10) “We need larger income differences as incentives.”   
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Figure 2.2. Histograms of Income Inequality Beliefs Ranging from (1) “Incomes should be made more equal.” 
to (10) “We need larger income differences as incentives.” by Religious Tradition   
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Table 2.2. Cross Tabulation of Religious Groups by Religious Status (N = 180,817) 
 
 Majority Status Minority Status Total 
    
 Freq. Per. Freq. Per. Freq. Per. 
Catholic 43,828 93.85 2,872 6.15 46,700 100.00 
Protestant 23,097 85.68 3,860 14.32 26,957 100.00 
Orthodox 22,672 96.76 760 3.24 23,432 100.00 
Muslim 31,609 86.82 4,798 13.18 36,407 100.00 
Hindu 3,358 74.52 1,148 25.48 4,506 100.00 
Buddhist 1,660 42.86 2,213 57.14 3,873 100.00 
Other 445 8.25 4,947 91.75 5,392 100.00 
None 7,571 22.57 25,979 77.43 33,550 100.00 
All 134,240 74.24 46,577 25.76 180,817 100.00 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, Wave 4: 1999- 2004,  
Wave 5: 2005-2008); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life 
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Table 2.4. Coefficients and Log Variance from Heteroskedastic Ordered Probit Regression Predicting Support for 
Incentivizing Income Inequality with Religious and Control Variables (N = 180,817) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficient Ln Sigma Coefficient Ln Sigma Coefficient Ln Sigma 
Religious Variables        
Inequity: Majority vs.  
Minority (Ref.) -.006 -.045*** .015 -.057*** -.001 -.047*** 
 (.009) (.007) (.009) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Intensity: Very vs. Rather/ 
Not Very/Not at All (Ref.)  .158*** .181*** .125*** .181*** .109*** .262*** 
 (.007) (.005) (.007) (.005) (.015) (.011) 
Identity: Protestant (Ref.)        
Catholic  .067*** .147*** .032*** .154*** .033** .185*** 
 (.009) (.007) (.009) (.007) (.011) (.009) 
Orthodox  .168*** .151*** .027* .155*** .042** .218*** 
 (.010) (.008) (.011) (.008) (.014) (.010) 
Muslim  .071*** .159*** -.057*** .172*** -.254*** .228*** 
 (.010) (.007) (.011) (.007) (.017) (.012) 
Hindu  -.519*** .640*** -.727*** .678*** -1.020*** .770*** 
 (.034) (.019) (.035) (.019) (.055) (.029) 
Buddhist  .282*** -.199*** .220*** -.194*** .225*** -.107*** 
 (.016) (.015) (.016) (.015) (.021) (.018) 
Other  -.001 .099*** .004 .103*** -.014 .185*** 
 (.020) (.015) (.020) (.015) (.031) (.023) 
None .085*** .102*** .028* .093*** .028* .128*** 
 (.011) (.009) (.011) (.009) (.012) (.010) 
Interactions: Very Important x 
Protestant (Ref.)       
Very Important x Catholic      -.006 -.068*** 
     (.019) (.014) 
Very Important x Orthodox     -.078*** -.173*** 
     (.023) (.016) 
Very Important x Muslim     .273*** -.112*** 
     (.022) (.016) 
Very Important x Hindu     .520*** -.192*** 
     (.073) (.039) 
Very Important x Buddhist     -.031 -.228*** 
     (.035) (.030) 
Very Important x Other     .007 -.142*** 
     (.040) (.028) 
Very Important x None     -.267*** -.021 
     (.030) (.020) 
(continued) 
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Table 2.4. (continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficient Ln Sigma Coefficient Ln Sigma Coefficient Ln Sigma 
Control Variables        
Female vs. Male (Ref.)    -.061***  -.064***  
   (.006)  (.006)  
Age (in Years)   -.002***  -.002***  
   (.000)  (.000)  
Single vs. Ever Married (Ref.)   -.033***  -.031***  
   (.008)  (.008)  
Education (8 Pt. Scale)     .045***  .047***  
   (.001)  (.002)  
Income (10 Pt. Scale)     .038***  .040***  
   (.001)  (.001)  
GINI Index (100 Pt. Scale)   -.002***  -.002***  
   (.000)  (.000)  
GDP (in Thousands)   -.012***  -.013***  
   (.000)  (.000)  
Government Expenses (% of GDP)   -.006***  -.006***  
   (.000)  (.000)  
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 2005-2008); 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); World Bank International Comparison Program Database 
(WBICPD); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life  
Model 1 Cuts: 1 = -1.206*** (.015); 2 = -.935*** (.014); 3 = -.639*** (.012); 4 = -.406*** (.011); 5 = -.030** (.011);  
6 = .221*** (.011); 7 = .554*** (.011); 8 = 1.021*** (.013); 9 = 1.343*** (.015) 
Model 2 Cuts: 1= -1.397*** (.028); 2 = -1.124*** (.028); 3 = -.825*** (.027); 4 = -.587*** (.027);5 = -.205*** (.026);  
6 = .050 (.026); 7 = .388*** (.027); 8 = .862*** (.028); 9 = 1.188*** (.028) 
Model 3 Cuts: 1 = -1.478*** (.031); 2 = -1.193*** (.030); 3 = -.879*** (.029); 4 = -.631*** (.028); 5 = -.232*** (.028);  
6 = .034 (.028); 7 = .388*** (.028); 8 = .883*** (.029); 9 = 1.224*** (.031) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   * p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 2.6. Log Variances from Ordered Probit Regression Predicting Support 
for Incentivizing Income Inequality for the Very Religious (N = 180,817) 
 Baseline Intensity + 
Intensity x 
Tradition = 
Combined  
Ln Sigma 
Catholic .262*** + -.068*** = .194*** 
Protestant .262*** + — = .262*** 
Orthodox  .262*** + -.173*** = .089 
Muslim .262*** + -.112*** = .150*** 
Hindu .262*** + -.192*** = .070*** 
Buddhist .262*** + -.228*** = .034* 
Other .262*** + -.142*** = .120** 
None  .262*** + -.021 = .241*** 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, 
Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 2005-2008); Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID); World Bank International Comparison Program Database 
(WBICPD); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life  
Note: * p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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APPENDIX 2.A  
Country-Years: Albania (1998), Albania (2002), Argentina (1995), Argentina (1999), 
Armenia (1997), Australia (1995), Australia (2005), Austria (1999), Azerbaijan (1997), 
Bangladesh (1996), Bangladesh (2002), Belarus (1996), Belarus (2000), Belgium (1999), Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (1998), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001), Brazil (1997), Brazil (2006), Bulgaria 
(1997), Bulgaria (1999), Bulgaria (2006), Burkina Faso (2007), Canada (2000), Canada (2006), 
Chile (1996), Chile (2000), Chile (2006), China (2001), China (2007), Colombia (1998), Croatia 
(1999), Cyprus (2006), Czech Republic (1998), Czech Republic (1999), Dominican Republic 
(1996), Egypt (2000), Egypt (2008), El Salvador (1999), Estonia (1996), Estonia (1999), 
Ethiopia (2007), Finland (1996), Finland (2000), Finland (2005), France (1999), France (2006), 
Georgia (1996), Georgia (2009), Germany (1997), Germany (2006), Ghana (2007), Guatemala 
(2004), Hong Kong (2005), Iceland (1999),  India (1995), India (2001), India (2006),  Indonesia 
(2001), Indonesia (2006), Iran (2000), Iran (2007), Ireland (1999),  Italy (1999), Italy (2005), 
Japan (2000),  Japan (2005), Jordan (2001), Kyrgyzstan (2003), Latvia (1996),  Lithuania (1997), 
Lithuania (1999), Luxembourg (1999), Macedonia (1998), Macedonia (2001), Malaysia (2006), 
Mali (2007), Mexico (1996), Mexico (2000), Mexico (2005),  Moldova (1996), Moldova (2002), 
Moldova (2006), Morocco (2001), Morocco (2007), Netherlands (1999), Netherlands (2006), 
New Zealand (1998), New Zealand (2004), Nigeria (1995), Nigeria (2000), Northern Ireland 
(1999), Norway (1996), Norway (2007), Pakistan (1997), Pakistan (2001), Peru (1996), Peru 
(2001), Peru (2006), Philippines (2001), Poland (1997), Poland (1999), Poland (2005), Romania 
(1998), Romania (1999), Romania (2005),  Russian Federation (1995), Russian Federation 
(1999), Russian Federation (2006), Rwanda (2007), Serbia and Montenegro (1996), Serbia and 
Montenegro (2001), Serbia (2006), Singapore (2002), Slovakia (1998), Slovenia (1999), 
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Slovenia (2005), South Africa (1996), South Africa (2001), South Africa (2006), South Korea 
(1996), South Korea (2001), South Korea (2005), Spain (1995), Spain (2000), Spain (2007), 
Sweden (1996), Sweden (2006), Switzerland (1996), Switzerland (2007), Thailand (2007), 
Trinidad and Tobago (2006), Turkey (1996), Turkey (2001), Turkey (2007), Uganda (2001), 
Ukraine (1996), Ukraine (1999), Ukraine (2006), United Kingdom (1999), United Kingdom 
(2005), United States (1995), United States (1999), United States (2006), Uruguay (1996), 
Uruguay (2006), Venezuela (1996), Venezuela (2000), Zambia (2007).    
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APPENDIX 2.B 
Table 2.5. Coefficients from Ordered Probit Regression Predicting Support for Incentivizing 
Income Inequality with Religious and Control Variables (N = 180,817) 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Religious Variables     
Inequity: Majority vs. Minority (Ref.) -.032*** -.024** -.038*** 
 (.007) (.007) (.008) 
Intensity: Very vs. Rather/Not Very/Not at All 
(Ref.)  .124*** .104*** .087*** 
 (.005) (.006) (.013) 
Identity: Protestant (Ref.)     
Catholic  .049*** .030*** .033** 
 (.008) (.008) (.011) 
Orthodox  .127*** .026* .043*** 
 (.009) (.010) (.013) 
Muslim  .060*** -.032*** -.201*** 
 (.008) (.009) (.015) 
Hindu  -.316*** -.455*** -.649*** 
 (.017) (.018) (.027) 
Buddhist  .224*** .179*** .174*** 
 (.018) (.018) (.023) 
Other  -.034* -.026 -.039 
 (.016) (.017) (.026) 
None .039*** -.002 .005 
 (.010) (.010) (.012) 
Interactions: Very Important x Protestant (Ref.)    
Very Important x Catholic    -.009 
   (.016) 
Very Important x Orthodox   -.067*** 
   (.019) 
Very Important x Muslim   .217*** 
   (.019) 
Very Important x Hindu   .324*** 
   (.035) 
Very Important x Buddhist   -.010 
   (.037) 
Very Important x Other   .005 
   (.032) 
Very Important x None   -.222*** 
   (.022) 
(continued) 
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Table 2.5. (continued)     
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Control Variables     
Female vs. Male (Ref.)   -.048*** -.048*** 
  (.005) (.005) 
Age (in Years)   -.002*** -.001*** 
  (.000) (.000) 
Single vs. Ever Married (Ref.)  -.027*** -.024*** 
  (.007) (.007) 
Education (8 Pt. Scale)   .038*** .039*** 
  (.001) (.001) 
Income (10 Pt. Scale)   .033*** .032*** 
  (.001) (.001) 
GINI Index (100 Pt. Scale)  -.002*** -.002*** 
  (.000) (.000) 
GDP (in Thousands)  -.010*** -.010*** 
  (.000) (.000) 
Government Expenses (% of GDP)  -.004*** -.004*** 
  (.000) (.000) 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 2005-
2008); Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); World Bank International Comparison Program 
Database (WBICPD); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life  
Model 1 Cuts: 1 = -1.049*** (.010); 2 = -.825*** (.010); 3 = -.576*** (.010); 4 = -.379*** (.010); 5 = -.059*** 
(.010); 6 = .154*** (.010); 7 = .437*** (.010); 8 = .829*** (.010); 9 = 1.097*** (.010) 
Model 2 Cuts: 1 = -1.181*** (.023); 2 = -.954*** (.023); 3 = -.702*** (.023); 4 = -.500*** (.023); 5 = -.174*** 
(.023); 6 = .043 (.023); 7 = .331*** (.023); 8 = .730*** (.023); 9 = 1.002*** (.023)  
Model 3 Cuts: 1 = -1.209*** (.024); 2 = -.981*** (.023); 3 = -.728*** (.023); 4 = -0.526*** (.023); 5 = -.199*** 
(.023); 6 = .018 (.023); 7 = .306*** (.023); 8 = .706*** (.023); 9 = .978*** (.024) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   * p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION IN POLITICS  
 
Introduction  
Generations of sociologists have observed that religious traditions and institutions both 
reflect and reproduce the stratification system (Pope, Peterson, and Demerath 1942, Pope 1948, 
Weber 1958, Smith and Faris 2005, Keister 2003, 2008, 2011, Davidson and Pyle 2011). Given 
the durable connections between religion and stratification, one may wonder how levels of 
religiosity vary across the spectrum of socioeconomic status. Do the rich or the poor exhibit 
more religious belief, belonging, and behavior? Recent papers by Solt, Habel, and Grant (2011) 
and Ballarino and Vezzoni (2012) provide a framework for addressing this question. The 
prediction that poorer people will express higher religiosity derives from what Solt, Habel, and 
Grant call deprivation theory and what Ballarino and Vezzoni name opium of the people theory. 
In this approach, the higher religiosity of the lower classes acts as a spiritual compensator for 
material inequality. Alternatively, the prediction that wealthier people will express higher 
religiosity derives from what Solt, Habel, and Grant call relative power theory and what 
Ballarino and Vezzoni name instrumentum regni theory. This perspective anticipates higher 
religiosity among the wealthy, who use religion as a mechanism of social control. These two 
theories provide opposite predictions about the distribution of religiosity in the stratification 
system. Is one accurate and the other inaccurate? Could they both be helpful—but in different 
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ways? Answering these questions requires understanding the basic contours of these two 
opposing approaches.  
The main stream of sociological theory predicting higher religiosity among poorer people 
centers on the process of secularization (Berger 1969, Martin 1978, Bell 1996). In an updated 
version of this classic theory, Norris and Inglehart (2011:53) link secularization directly to 
national development and social stratification:  “[T]he erosion of religious values, beliefs, and 
practices is shaped by long-term changes in existential security, a process linked with human 
development and socioeconomic equality, and with each society’s cultural legacy and religious 
traditions… The modernization process reduces the threats to survival that are common in 
developing societies, especially among the poorest strata; and this enhanced sense of security 
lessens the need for the reassurance religion provides.” In their view, religion acts as a 
compensator for existential security, defined as the “extent to which survival is secure enough 
that it can be taken for granted” (ibid.:4). In contrast, “the process of secularization—a 
systematic erosion of religious practices, values, and beliefs—has occurred most clearly among 
the most prosperous social sectors living in affluent and secure postindustrial nations” (ibid.: 5). 
Both Solt, Habel, and Grant and Ballarino and Vezzoni identify the approach taken by Norris 
and Inglehart as including their respective definitions of deprivation theory and opium of the 
people theory. The basic prediction that higher religiosity exists among poorer people has solid 
empirical backing, which lends credence to the conceptualization of religion as a compensator 
(Clark and Lelkes 2005, Scheve and Stasavage 2006, Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009, Hirschle 
2010, Barber 2012, Elgin et al. 2013). 
Alternatively, Ballarino and Vezzoni (2012) contrast the opium of the people approach 
taken by Norris and Inghlehart with the instrumentum regni theory of German Marxist 
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philosopher Ernst Bloch. Rather than acting as a compensator, religion in this view serves as an 
“instrument of rule” wielded by the upper classes. This approach anticipates higher religiosity 
among upper—not lower—classes because religion functions as an “essential component of their 
power” and a means “to legitimate social inequality ideologically and to repress rightful 
conflicted waged by the ruled classes” (Ballarino and Vezzoni 2012:315). In their study of 
weekly Mass attendance from 1968 to 2006 among Roman Catholics in Italy, Ballarino and 
Vezzoni find that the upper class “exhibits consistently more religious behavior than the 
intermediate and lower ones,” which they interpret as evidence for the instrumentum regni 
hypothesis that “religion supports and legitimates existing patterns of social inequality, so that it 
is in the interest of the higher social strata to be more religious” (idid.: 332). Solt, Habel, and 
Grant arrive at much the same conclusion, contrasting what they call deprivation theory with 
relative power theory. While acknowledging the basic logic of Norris and Inghlehart’s 
deprivation theory, the authors claim that it does not provide a complete explanation for their 
analysis of twelve religious indicators in populations around the world. Instead, they advance the 
relative power theory: “Religion’s ability to serve as a mechanism of social control for the rich… 
is considerably more important. For the wealthy, greater inequality both increases their attraction 
to religion and enhances their power to disseminate religious beliefs among the rest of the 
population” (2011:447).   
The empirical evidence for the instrumentum regni hypothesis presented by Balllarino 
and Vezzoni and the relative power theory proposed by Solt, Habel, and Grant appear to  
demonstrate higher rates of religious belief, behavior, and belonging among the upper classes 
and the wealthy in their samples. At the same time, the crucial claim in their basic argument is 
that such findings constitute evidence that these groups use religion as a means of power. 
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However, it cannot be stressed too strongly that nothing in their statistical methodology actually 
tests this claim. Neither the church attendance figures in the Ballarino and Vezzoni article nor the 
religious factors in the Solt, Habel, and Grant paper address the issue of religion as an instrument 
of power. Rather, these researchers simply demonstrate correlations between wealth and factors 
such as self-identifying as religious, rating religion and God as important, gaining comfort from 
religion, attending religious services, praying, and believing in God, an afterlife, heaven, hell, 
sin, and the soul. This failure to demonstrate a connection between higher income and the use of 
religion as a mechanism of power creates an opportunity to expand this particular debate on 
religion and stratification. What is required is a theory of secularization that focuses directly on 
the issue of power. 
In his widely cited article, Chaves (1994) provides just such a theory: “Secularization is 
best understood not as the decline of religion, but as the declining scope of religious authority” 
(ibid.: 750). In this view, “Secularization at the societal level may be understood as the declining 
capacity of religious elites to exercise authority over other institutional spheres” (ibid.:757). 
Crucially for this argument, this declining capacity involves laicization, a “process of 
differentiation whereby political, educational, scientific, and other institutions gain autonomy 
from the religious institutions of a society. The result of this process is that religion becomes just 
one institutional sphere among others, enjoying no necessary primary status” (ibid.:757). 
Integrating the quotes above, the differentiation of religious and political spheres provides a 
specific example of the decline of religious authority. This approach to secularization presents a 
framework to test the application of both deprivation theory and relative power theory. 
According to deprivation theory, increasing secularization among the wealthy would be signaled 
by the desire for greater differentiation of the religious and the political spheres. In this view, 
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having a higher income would correlate with less support for involving religion in politics. 
Conversely, relative power theory predicts decreasing secularization among the wealthy as 
signaled by the desire for greater integration of the religious and political spheres. In this view, 
having a higher income and being highly religious correlates would correlate with more support 
for involving religion in politics.  
This paper presents ordered logistic regression models based on the World Values 
Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS) to adjudicate this debate by asking the question, 
“What are the effects of income and religiosity on support for involving religion in politics?” 
The dependent variables for this study measure opinions about three different but related facets 
of religious and political autonomy. They include opinions about 1) minimum levels of 
religiosity among public office holders, 2) strong levels of religiosity among public office 
holders, and 3) the influence of religious leaders on how people vote. Providing three different 
dependent variables allows this analysis to address several different ways that the religious and 
political spheres might be either integrated or differentiated. The two independent variables for 
this study, religiosity and income, speak directly to the theoretical issues surfaced in both 
deprivation theory and relative power theory. Furthermore, the models discussed below include 
interaction terms between religiosity and income, making it possible to isolate the association of 
income and support for involving religion in politics among those who are very religious. 
Demonstrating that higher income does indeed correlate with greater support for involving 
religion in politics among those who are highly religious would constitute evidence of religion 
being viewed as an instrumentum regini.  
Unlike other recent studies advocating relative power theory, this paper directly tests the 
connections between between religiosity and income in a specific realm of power, namely 
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politics. To frame this discussion properly, the literature review below unpacks three basic ideas: 
1) Deprivation theory predicts increasing secularization among the wealthy; 2) Relative power 
theory predicts decreasing secularization among the wealthy; and 3) Defining secularization in 
terms of power provides a way to test both deprivation theory and relative power theory. This 
discussion prompts two competing hypotheses: 1) Having a higher income correlates with less 
support for involving religion in politics; and 2) Having a higher income and being highly 
religious correlates with more support for involving religion in politics. The models presented 
below provides solid evidence for the first hypothesis and minimal evidence for the second. In 
the main, deprivation theory provides more accurate predictions of the relationship between 
income and support for involving religion in politics when defining secularization as declining 
religious authority.  
 
Theory 
Generations of sociologists have demonstrated that religion is both stratified and 
stratifying: “Religion, despite the close association of its institutions with the class structure, is 
neither simply a product nor a cause, a sanction nor an enemy, of social stratification. It may be 
either or both, as it has been in various societies at various times” (Pope 1948:91). Evidence for 
this interdependence of religion and stratification ranges from religious preferences (Weber 
1978) and sacred values (Weber 1958) to the composition of religious institutions (Pope, 
Peterson, and Demerath 1942). Religious congregations (Burdick 1996), movements (Hatch 
1989), and traditions (Lindsay 2007) that resist such stratified segregation can benefit from social 
diversity, at time achieving goals more effectively than their more stratified competitors. 
However, the durability of the social divisions among religious groups generally remains intact. 
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For example, a study of privilege, power, and prestige among adherents of U.S. denominations 
finds very little mobility among religious groups (Davidson and Pyle 2011), an arrangement 
which appears to be calcifying rather than relaxing (Smith and Faris 2005). One mapping of 
religious stratification in the U.S. sorts denominations into four categories: 1) Upper (i.e., 
Episcopal, Jewish, Presbyterian, and Unitarian Universalist), 2) Upper Middle (i.e., Hindu, 
United Church of Christ, Methodist, Mormon, Catholic, Lutheran), 3) Lower Middle (i.e., None, 
Church of Christ, Seventh-day Adventist, Assembly of God, Baptist, and Buddhist), and 4) 
Lower (i.e., Muslim, Church of God, and Jehovah’s Witnesses) (Pyle and Davidson 2011). 
Importantly, nearly identical patterns of stratification among religious groups appear around the 
world (Heaton, James, and Oheneba-Sakyi 2009).  
Explanations for this stratification of religious institutions range from material accounts, 
such as differentials in the ownership of the means of production along religious lines Ireland 
(Cohen 1994), to more ideological approaches, such as the role played by Pentecostal prosperity 
teachings in displays of wealth in Zambia (Haynes 2012). Regardless of the causes, patterns that 
become ingrained can emerge as self-perpetuating systems, with religion reproducing 
stratification both directly (by shaping asset accumulation, social network expansion, and 
opportunity structures) and indirectly (by influencing educational attainment, fertility rates, and 
female labor force participation) (Keister 2003, 2008, 2011). Even congregations that attempt to 
address directly the social consequences of intensifying economic differentials often perpetuate 
the very patterns they intend to remedy. For example, higher-income members of U.S. Christian 
churches receive a disproportionate share of civic-skill training and practice—even in churches 
with programs specifically designed to teach civic skills to lower-income members (Schwadel 
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2002). Such congregational socioeconomic reproduction begins early in the life course, including 
socialization practices that particularly disadvantage low-income youth (Snell 2011).  
Given these durable connections between religion and stratification, one may wonder 
how levels of religiosity vary across the spectrum of socioeconomic status. It could be that those 
who are poorer exhibit more religious belief, belonging, and behavior. Alternatively, those who 
are wealthier may express more religious commitment, participation, and engagement. Papers by 
Solt, Habel, and Grant (2011) and Ballarino and Vezzoni (2012) provide a framework for testing 
these two basic predictions. Whereas Solt, Habel, and Grant focus mainly on wealth, Ballarino 
and Vezzoni focus mainly on class. Nonetheless, the two projects identify the same hypotheses, 
using different terms to discuss them. The prediction that poorer people will express higher 
religiosity derives from what Solt, Habel, and Grant call deprivation theory and what Ballarino 
and Vezzoni name opium of the people theory. The prediction that wealthier people will express 
higher religiosity derives from what Solt, Habel, and Grant call relative power theory and what 
Ballarino and Vezzoni name instrumentum regni theory.  
Tracing back to Karl Marx’s conception of religion as the opium of the people, 
deprivation theory anticipates higher religiosity among poorer people because of their greater 
need for comfort in the face of limited opportunities and greater uncertainties. According to 
Marx (1978:54), “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless 
world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.” In this approach, 
alienated workers unable to escape the the historical churn of class struggle dull the pain of 
existence through recourse to supernatural stories and ritualistic behaviors. The higher religiosity 
of the lower classes acts as a spiritual compensator for material inequality. In contrast, relative 
power theory anticipates higher religiosity among the wealthy, who use religion as a mechanism 
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of social control. This approach echoes Ernst Bloch’s view of religion as an instrumentum regni 
wielded by the upper classes, who use it as an “essential component of their power” and a means 
“to legitimate social inequality ideologically and to repress rightful conflicted waged by the ruled 
classes” (Ballarino and Vezzoni 2012: 315). Accordingly, “religion supports and legitimates 
existing patterns of social inequality, so that it is in the interest of the higher social strata to be 
more religious” (ibid.: 332). In the first theory, religion acts as a compensator, prompting higher 
religiosity among poorer people who use faith as a substitute for security. In the second theory, 
religion acts as a mechanism, prompting higher religiosity among wealthier people who use faith 
as an extension of power. The following sections of this literature review unpack these two 
predictions of religiosity in the stratification system and suggest a framework for testing their 
relative merits.  
Deprivation theory predicts increasing secularization among the wealthy.     
The main stream of sociological theory predicting higher religiosity among poorer people 
centers on the process of secularization. The traditional secularization thesis anticipates the 
retreat of religion from public life as an inevitable consequence of Modernity’s expansion 
(Berger 1969, Martin 1978, Bell 1996). In an updated version of this basic theory, Norris and 
Inglehart (2011:53) attempt to identify the actual mechanism behind this “inevitable” 
consequence. Utilizing four waves of the World Values Survey, they link secularization directly 
to national development and social stratification:   
“[T]he erosion of religious values, beliefs, and practices is shaped by long-term changes 
in existential security, a process linked with human development and socioeconomic 
equality, and with each society’s cultural legacy and religious traditions… The 
modernization process reduces the threats to survival that are common in developing 
societies, especially among the poorest strata; and this enhanced sense of security lessens 
the need for the reassurance religion provides.”   
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Both Solt, Habel, and Grant and Ballarino and Vezzoni identify the approach taken by Norris 
and Inglehart as including their respective definitions of deprivation theory and opium of the 
people theory. According to Norris and Inglehart, religion acts as a compensator for existential 
security, defined as the “extent to which survival is secure enough that it can be taken for 
granted” (ibid.:4). In contrast, existential insecurity involves “feelings of vulnerability to 
physical, societal, and personal risks,” which “are a key factor driving religiosity” (ibid.: 4-5). 
Norris and Inglehart argue that people who come of age in societies that provide fewer resources 
and opportunities to meet the wide range of human needs lack existential security. As a result, 
such people are purportedly attracted more strongly to religion than those living in more 
developed, more egalitarian nations. Specifically religion persists “most strongly among 
vulnerable populations, especially in poorer nations and failed states” (Norris and Inglehart 
2011:i). In contrast, “the process of secularization—a systematic erosion of religious practices, 
values, and beliefs—has occurred most clearly among the most prosperous social sectors living 
in affluent and secure postindustrial nations” (ibid.: 5). Thus, this approach to secularization 
accurately predicts differences in religiosity both within and between societies. Within societies, 
higher religiosity is predicted among poorer people, who have less access to existential security. 
Between societies, higher religiosity is predicted among less developed nations, which provide 
less existential security.  
One of the main evidences recommending Norris and Inglehart’s theory is its ability to 
account for exceptions to the predictions made by other theories of secularization. For example, 
secularization theories that link decreasing religiosity to the general process of modernization 
have a difficult time explaining the high levels of religiosity reported in the United States, a 
highly developed Western nation. Similarly, secularization theories that link decreasing 
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religiosity to low levels of competition between religious groups have a difficult time explaining 
the high levels of religiosity reported in Poland, where the Roman Catholic Church has a virtual 
monopoly on the religious market (Chaves and Gorski 2001). Norris and Inglehart suggest that 
the answer lies with the levels of inequality within these societies. According to them, religion 
persists in more developed nations that also exhibit high levels of inequality. High levels of 
inequality result in low levels of existential security across the board—even among the wealthy, 
who remain aware of how far they have to fall. Thus, the preponderance of religious belief and 
practice in a society links to the level of stratification within that society. Those societies that 
exhibit smaller gaps in inequality will simultaneously exhibit lower levels of religiosity. And 
empirically, this turns out to be the case (Zuckerman 2008, Gaskings, Golder, and Siegel 2011, 
Norris and Inglehart 2011).  
Other studies back up this focus on existential security, demonstrating that religiosity in 
general (Barber 2012) and religious attendance in particular (Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009) link 
to both personal and societal insecurities. This leads some theorists to describe religion as a type 
of insurance that acts as a buffer against stressful life events, such as unemployment and marital 
separation (Clark and Lelkes 2005). This may explain why nations with higher levels of 
religiosity also exhibit lower levels of welfare spending by the state (Scheve and Stasavage 
2006). Perhaps religion and welfare state spending act as substitute mechanisms of social 
insurance against adverse life events (ibid). In this view, societies with higher levels of 
religiosity will simultaneously exhibit higher levels of income inequality because of the 
decreased demand by the populous for government services (Elgin et al. 2013). People in more 
religious societies prefer to address social needs through voluntary charitable giving rather than 
through state spending, leading to lower taxes, lower public spending, lower economic 
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redistribution, and in the end higher inequality levels (ibid). In contrast, the high rates of 
consumption among people living in more affluent but equal societies have been shown to erode 
the significance of religious activities, contexts, and symbols for mediating social action 
(Hirschle 2010). In this view, secularization results from the material consumption practices of 
those with higher existential security. Thus, the approach taken by Norris and Inglehart receives 
empirical support both in their own models predicting religiosity with measures of existential 
security and in other research projects on similar topics. The basic prediction that higher 
religiosity exists among poorer people has solid empirical backing, which lends credence to the 
conceptualization of religion as a compensator.  
Relative power theory predicts decreasing secularization among the wealthy.    
While it is difficult to dispute the correlation between high levels of religiosity and high 
levels of inequality within societies, not everyone remains convinced that existential security 
provides the causal mechanism linking the two (Smith 2006). Evidence pointing away from the 
Norris and Inglehart view of existential security as a compensator includes the faster rates of 
secularization occurring among the extremely poor than among other income brackets in the 
U.S.(Putnam and Campbell 2010). In this modern society with relatively high levels of both 
religiosity and income inequality, those with the least access to existential security should exhibit 
the highest levels of religiosity, not the fastest rates of secularization. In another example, having 
a lower income predicts lower rates of church attendance among white U.S. Catholics 
(Schwadel, McCarthy, and Nelsen 2009). Conversely, even in highly secularized Great Britain, 
Davie (1990) finds that groups higher on the social ladder demonstrate more inclination toward 
religious belief and practice than lower ones. These results are precisely the opposite of what 
would be expected if religion acts mainly as a form of existential insurance in the face of 
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minimal welfare state spending. The evidence that religion acts as a compensator producing 
higher religiosity among poorer people is not without exceptions. Religion may at times serve as 
the opium of the people, but not always.  
Ballarino and Vezzoni (2012) contrast the opium of the people approach taken by Norris 
and Inghlehart with the instrumentum regni theory of German Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. 
Rather than acting as a compensator, religion in this view serves as an “instrument of rule” 
wielded by the upper classes.     
“Being doped is a pleasure you pay for. There was always opium there for the people…. 
If the Church had not always stood so watchfully behind the ruling powers, there would 
not have been such attacks against everything it stood for…. Whenever it was a question 
of keeping the serfs, and then the paid slaves down, the dope-dealers came unfailingly to 
the help of the oppressors” (Bloch 2009:47)  
 
This instrumentum regni theory anticipates higher persistence of religious belief and 
participation among upper—not lower—classes because religion functions as an “essential 
component of their power” and a means “to legitimate social inequality ideologically and to 
repress rightful conflicted waged by the ruled classes” (Ballarino and Vezzoni 2012:315). In 
their study of weekly Mass attendance from 1968 to 2006 among Roman Catholics in Italy, 
Ballarino and Vezzoni find evidence for an overall process of secularization in the declining 
religious observance among all classes. However, they also find that the upper class “exhibits 
consistently more religious behavior than the intermediate and lower ones,” which they interpret 
as evidence for the instrumentum regni hypothesis that “religion supports and legitimates 
existing patterns of social inequality, so that it is in the interest of the higher social strata to be 
more religious” (idid.: 332).  
Using data from the World Values Survey, Solt, Habel, and Grant (2011:447) arrive at 
much the same conclusion based on their “multilevel analysis of countries around the world over 
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two decades and a time-series analysis of the United states over a half-century” looking at 
religiosity and inequality. These researchers contrast the opium of the people and instrumentum 
regni hypotheses, calling them deprivation theory and relative power theory. In their view of 
deprivation theory, “religion should be seen primarily as a comfort to those suffering economic 
deprivation and social marginality. Religion provides reassurance that despite current or future 
hardships, a higher power will provide, if not in this life, then in the next” (ibid.:448). With 
specific reference to the work of Norris and Inglehart, this team explains that deprivation theory 
predicts greater religiosity among the poorer members of society because greater economic 
inequality increases their vulnerability. While acknowledging the logic of this theory, the authors 
claim that it does not provide a complete explanation for their data analysis. Instead, they 
advance the relative power theory:  
“Religion’s ability to serve as a mechanism of social control for the rich, we contend, is 
considerably more important. For the wealthy, greater inequality both increases their 
attraction to religion and enhances their power to disseminate religious beliefs among the 
rest of the population” (ibid.).   
 
To demonstrate this approach, Solt, Habel, and Grant present hierarchical models predicting 
religiosity, as measured by the following twelve indicators: self-identifying as religious, rating 
religion and God as important, gaining comfort from religion, attending religious services, 
praying, and believing in God, an afterlife, heaven, hell, sin, and the soul. They find that 
“Economic inequality is estimated to powerfully increase religiosity and to do so regardless of 
income. The competing hypothesis provided by deprivation theory that inequality increases 
religiosity among the poor but decreases it among the rich is not supported for any aspect of 
religiosity considered” (ibid.: 457).  
At first glance, the instrumentum regni hypothesis identified by Balllarino and Vezzoni 
and the relative power theory proposed by Solt, Habel, and Grant appear to have some merit. 
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Their empirical evidence demonstrates higher rates of religious belief, behavior, and belonging 
among the upper classes and the wealthy in their samples. At the same time, the crucial claim in 
their basic argument is that such findings constitute evidence that these groups use religion as a 
means of power. However, it cannot be stressed too strongly that nothing in their statistical 
methodology actually tests this claim. Neither the church attendance figures in the Ballarino and 
Vezzoni article nor the twelve religious factors in the Solt, Habel, and Grant paper address the 
issue of religion as an instrument of power. Rather, these researchers simply demonstrate 
correlations between higher religiosity and higher class and wealth.  
Of course, it is possible that this observed relationship does not involve power at all. One 
alternative involves the widespread attraction of “good fortune” theology, which links religious 
observance with material wellbeing (Davidson and Pyle 1999). According to this teaching, 
material success indicates a special relationship with the divine. While admitting that 
nonreligious people can be rich, “good fortune” teachers assert or imply that devout adherents 
should expect material wealth as a sign of God’s sovereign choice or their own faithfulness. It is 
possible that the attraction of religion among the wealthy results from ideological agreement 
with doctrines that characterize their position in the stratification system as being providentially 
endorsed. In this scenario, religion may ideologically legitimize the stratification system without 
necessarily being an instrument of power.  
Even if power does play a role explaining religiosity among the wealthy, it could be that 
the causality runs in the opposite direction from the one proposed by deprivation theory. If 
religious factors such as congregational participation provide a means for poorer people to 
experience mobility, then one might expect an influx of religious persons into the ranks of the 
wealthy. For example, Wuthnow (2002) finds that “membership in a religious congregation is 
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generally associated quite strongly and positively with status-bridging social capital, as measured 
by questions about having friends who represent various kinds of elite power or influence.” 
Poorer people who develop weak ties (Granovetter 1973) with elites through congregational 
participation may increase their opportunity for mobility. For example, a study of Evangelical 
elites in the U.S. demonstrates how a group that once occupied the “disadvantaged ranks of the 
stratification system” now includes a sizable number of elites who “have gained access to 
powerful social institutions” and express their political agendas through voting (Lindsay 
2007:208). Crucially, the papers by Solt, Habel, and Grant and Ballarino and Vezzoni discussed 
above do not test these possibilities. In fact, they do not directly address the issue of power at all.  
Defining secularization in terms of power provides a way to test both deprivation theory and 
relative power theory.  
To summarize the argument so far, deprivation theory and relative power theory predict 
opposite findings concerning religiosity and stratification. Deprivation theory predicts lower 
rates of religiosity among the wealthy, who experience little attraction to compensators for 
material wellbeing. A widely cited version of this approach links lower religiosity among the 
wealthy specifically to secularization. Alternatively, relative power theory predicts higher rates 
of religiosity among the wealthy, who utilize religion as a means of power. However, the 
research on relative power theory does not actually test issues of power, only correlations 
between religiosity and class or wealth. The first approach is rooted in theories of secularization; 
the second in discussions of power. One way to address these contradictions is to adopt an 
analytical framework that involves both secularization and power.  
In an article cited over five hundred times (Google Scholar), Chaves (1994) provides just 
such a framework with his reformulation of secularization theory: “Secularization is best 
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understood not as the decline of religion, but as the declining scope of religious authority” (ibid.: 
750). In this view, a religious authority “attempts to enforce its order and reach its ends by 
controlling the access of individuals to some desired goods, where the legitimation of that 
control includes some supernatural component, however weak” (ibid.: 755-756). Crucially for 
this application, “Secularization at the societal level may be understood as the declining capacity 
of religious elites to exercise authority over other institutional spheres” (ibid.:757). And what 
causes their capacity to decline? Chaves argues that secularization involves laicization, a 
“process of differentiation whereby political, educational, scientific, and other institutions gain 
autonomy from the religious institutions of a society. The result of this process is that religion 
becomes just one institutional sphere among others, enjoying no necessary primary status” 
(ibid.:757). According to this view, the differentiation of religious and political spheres signals 
the decline of religious authority and thus secularization. To rephrase the statement above, 
secularization at the societal level includes the declining capacity of religious elites to exercise 
authority over political spheres. This approach to secularization provides a framework to test the 
application of both deprivation theory and relative power theory. Doing so first requires asking 
what is known about the current levels of differentiation between religious and political spheres.   
Some evidence suggests that secularization at the societal level—defined as the declining 
capacity of religious elites to exercise authority over political spheres—is proceeding apace. 
Even in the United States, with its exceptionally high rates of religiosity for being a Western 
democracy, both cultural values and social structures can hinder the influence of religion on 
politics. According to one study, “American political religion plays a ‘prophetic’ role of social 
critic in the United States,” but a culture of individualism, the fragmentation of religious 
organizations, and the separation of governmental powers “make the translation of religious 
  150 
belief unlikely to result in major changes in public policy” (Jelen 2006). A study of U.S. 
presidential elections comes to a similar conclusion, thwarting the conventional wisdom 
predicting increased political mobilization among conservative Protestants in the U.S. between 
1960 and 1992—the heyday of religious right groups such as the Moral Majority (Manza and 
Brooks 1997). Beyond the borders of the U.S., a study of Indonesian politics provides evidence 
contradicting the assumption that religion plays an important role in explaining voting behavior 
in the predominantly Muslim nation (Liddle and Mujani 2007). Such findings would be expected 
where religious authority was declining and secularization was increasing, a situation predicted 
by deprivation theory.  
At the same time, a host of researchers continue to find strong empirical support for the 
notion that the religious and political spheres are not fully differentiated (Wuthnow 1991, 
Turmudi 1995, Williams 1996, Philpott 2009). For example, religious beliefs continue to exert 
influence over political actions (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001, Froese and Bader 2008, Starks and 
Robinson 2009). Even in rapidly secularizing Europe, evidence suggests that such religion plays 
an important role in shaping voting behavior (Kottler-Berkowitz 2001, Botterman and Hooghe 
2012). In its “double function,” religion may act either as a “world-maintaining” force that 
legitimates injustice or a “world-shaking” force that challenges power and privilege (Berger 
1967, Solle 1984, Billings and Scott 1994). Importantly, this “world-shaking” function often 
plays out in the political sphere: “While religion often has integrating functions within social 
groups, in pluralistic societies the political impact of religion is often divisive and contentious” 
(Williams 1996). It might be that religion operates as such an effective threat to social and 
political order precisely because it appeals to a higher authority than the state (Bruce 2003). 
Translating religious commitments into effective political action requires that religious 
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organizations “provide an adequate cultural foundation for motivating and sustaining political 
participation” by engaging participant commitment, offering resources for interpreting the 
political world, and balancing conflict with compromise and negotiation (Wood 1999). At the 
same time, it is not only the “world-shaking” aspect of religion that seeps into the political 
sphere. Bellah’s (1988:104) exploration of civil religion in the U.S. provides a classic case of the 
“world-maintaining” overlap between the religious and political spheres in the Western World: 
“What we have, then, from the earliest years of the republic is a collection of beliefs, symbols, 
and rituals with respect to sacred things and institutionalized in a collectivity. This religion—
there seems no other word for it—while not antithetical to and indeed sharing much in common 
with Christianity, was neither sectarian nor in any specific sense Christian.” Indeed, research 
updating Bellah’s original conception demonstrates how the state can use civil religion to quell 
political dissent (Cristi 2001).  
Given such evidence for the uneven and incomplete differentiation of religious and 
political spheres, one may wonder if the pace of secularization around the world increasing or 
decreasing. Toft, Philipott, and Shah (2011:9) argue that “a dramatic and worldwide increase in 
the political influence of religion has occurred in roughly the past forty years” which is “driven 
by religious people’s desire for freedom.” Accounting for the “wildly different politics of 
religious actors” involves two distinct factors: 1) “the set of ideas that a religious community 
holds about political authority and justice” and 2) “the mutual independence of religious 
authority and political authority” (ibid.: 9-10). This second factor, which roughly corresponds to 
the view of secularization proposed by Chaves, varies around the world. Specifically, as income 
inequality increases within societies, so does the preference for more involvement by religious 
leaders in politics (Muller 2009). This trend can form a feedback loop whereby economic 
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inequality drives the integration of religion and politics, which in turn fuels the expansion of 
economic inequality:  
“[R]eligion in and of itself does not appear to be capable of creating a lasting foundation 
for persistent inequality. This foundation can only be created by a combination of 
religious authority and leadership and some form of secular power. Religion enables 
aggrandizers in their pursuits, but does not guarantee their success. Wealth and other 
forms of social power still matter” (Aldenderfer 2010, emphasis added).  
 
The overall story is that “religion’s influence on politics has a history: three centuries of decline, 
then a comeback” (Toft, Philipott, and Shah:11). This resurgence appears even in the limited 
context of U.S. presidential election history. For example, religious factors appear to exert little 
influence over U.S. presidential elections in the 1980s, but both religious and moral factors 
“outweighed all other ideological components” in the 1992 election (Hammond, Shibley, and 
Solow 1994:277).  
In the midst of this global resurgence, religion can serve as a powerful resource for high 
status people wishing to express their values and preferences through political action (Swartz 
1996). Of course, the voting behaviors of people with high religiosity and high socioeconomic 
status do not always legitimate governmental power (Cheal 1978, Morgan and Meier 1980). In 
fact, the dimension of class can outweigh the influence of religiosity on support for particular 
forms of government, with low socioeconomic status prompting low support for democracy over 
authoritarianism (Patterson 2004). That being said, religion does often play a role in convincing 
people with low socioeconomic status to vote against their self-interest. For example, a study of 
international voting behavior notes how the issue of “moral values” disrupts the anticipated 
relationship between earning lower incomes and supporting left candidates by prompting the 
religious poor to vote in ways that reflect their moral commitments rather than—and often in 
contradiction to—their economic self-interest (De La O and Rodden 2008). Furthermore, a study 
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of voting behavior during the 2000 U.S. presidential election notes how both theologically 
conservative and theologically liberal groups in lower-SES regions supported the candidate on 
the right, thwarting the notion that only conservative Protestants vote against their own economic 
self-interests (Zullo 2010). At times, religion provides an opportunity for both rich and poor 
voters to form political coalitions favoring low taxes and limited redistribution—an arrangement 
that works against the economic interests of the secular poor (Huber and Stranig 2011). Such 
findings would be expected where religious authority was increasing and secularization was 
decreasing, a situation predicted by deprivation theory.  
Hypotheses  
To summarize the argument so far, deprivation theory and relative power theory predict 
opposite levels of religiosity among those at the top of the stratification system. Deprivation 
theory predicts increasing secularization among the wealthy, who experience little attraction to 
compensators for material wellbeing. Alternatively, relative power theory predicts decreasing 
secularization among the wealthy, who utilize religion as a means of power. However, the 
research on relative power theory does not actually test issues of power, only correlations 
between class and religiosity. Defining secularization as declining religious authority provides a 
framework to test both deprivation theory and relative power theory. In this framework, 
secularization includes the differentiation of the religious and political spheres. Some evidence 
suggests that these spheres continue to differentiate, which supports deprivation theory. Other 
evidence suggests that this process is reversing—and that people with high status continue to use 
religion as a means of power—which supports relative power theory. If relative deprivation 
theory is correct, it is expected that having a higher income would associate with less support for 
involving religion in politics. And if relative power theory is correct, it is expected that having a 
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higher income and being highly religious would associate with more support for involving 
religion in politics. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Having a higher income correlates with less support for involving religion 
in politics.  
Hypothesis 2: Having a higher income and being highly religious correlates with more 
support for involving religion in politics.  
 
Methods 
Data 
In order to test these hypotheses, this study utilizes the the World Values 
Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS), the only ongoing research project designed to 
capture the values and beliefs of a majority of the world’s population (Inglehart 2008). Collected 
on all six continents by leading social scientists from each of the 97 societies studied, the 
WVS/EVS includes representational national samples of at least 1,000 people from each society, 
reflecting the opinions of 88 percent of the globe’s inhabitants. Using random probability 
samples (where possible), local field organizations conduct face-to-face interviews through 
standardized questionnaires translated into the local language under the supervision of academic 
researchers and a principal investigator at the behest of the Stockholm-based non-profit World 
Values Survey Association (WVSA). In total, the five waves of the WVS/EVS constitutes 
334,000 unique respondents (25,000 from 20 countries during Wave 1 in 1981-1984; 61,000 
from 42 countries during Wave 2 in 1989-1993; 75,000 from 52 countries during Wave 3 in 
1994-1998; 96,000 from 67 countries during Wave 4 in 1999-2004; and 77,000 from 54 
countries during Wave 5 in 2005-2008). This paper employs the last two waves of the combined 
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WVS/EVS, as these waves include measures of the dependent variables and other theoretically 
important factors. 
In addition to the WVS/EVS dataset, this study utilizes three additional sources of 
information. First, the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) provides Gini 
indexes compiled using a custom missing-data algorithm to standardize the U.N. University 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID) with reference to the Luxembourg Income Study. 
The SWIID “provides comparable Gini indices of gross and net income inequality for 153 
countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the present, along with estimates of 
uncertainty in these statistics” (Solt 2009). Second, the World Bank International Comparison 
Program Database (WBICPD) database provides measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2013 international dollars calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates based on data 
files from the World Bank National Accounts and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) National Accounts. The World Bank International Comparison Program 
also provides measures of Government Expenses as a Percentage of GDP based on information 
from International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, World Bank 
estimates, and OECD estimates. Third, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life provides 
“comprehensive demographic estimates of the size and distribution of eight major religious 
groups in the 232 countries and territories for which the United Nations Population Division 
provides general population estimates as of 2010” based on the analysis of 2,500 data sources, 
“including censuses, demographic surveys, general population surveys and other studies” 
(Hackett and Grim 2012:51).    
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Measures 
The dependent variables for this study comprise three categorical measures capturing 
opinions about the involvement of religion in politics. The WVS/EVS survey question for each 
item reads: “How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?” Forced 
responses to each of these three measures fall into the following categories: Agree strongly, 
Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Disagree strongly. The three statements include 1) 
Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office; 2) It would be better for [this 
country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office; and 3) Religious leaders 
should not influence how people vote in elections. Indicating support for the involvement of 
religion in politics involves agreeing with the first two statements and disagreeing with the third. 
To make comparisons easier, the third item is reversed coded and changed from a negative to a 
positive statement. Thus, disagreement with the statement “Religious leaders should not 
influence how people vote in elections” now indicates agreement with the statement “Religious 
leaders should influence how people vote in elections.” This change makes it easier to compare 
results in the regression models that follow.  
Overall, these ordinal indicators serve as appropriate dependent variables for this study 
because they capture three different but related facets of supporting the increased influence of 
religion in politics. The first variable measures opinions about the unfitness of atheists for public 
office. This variable addresses a baseline for involving religion in politics. Agreeing that atheists 
are unfit for public office registers the desire for elected and appointed officials to have at least a 
minimum commitment to religious faith. At the same time, this variable does not directly address 
opinions about highly religious people holding political office. Thankfully, the second 
independent variable does just that. The wording of this item provides a step beyond public 
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officials maintaining minimum religious commitments to their holding strong religious beliefs. 
While the first two dependent variables address the religious commitments of public officials—at 
the lowest and highest degrees—the third registers support for the influence of religious leaders 
on the political process. With this measure, the discussion turns directly to the issue of 
laicization—the secular autonomy of the political sphere and its differentiation from the religious 
sphere. Desiring greater influence from religious leaders on the voting process registers support 
for increasing the overlap of these realms. Noticeably, the intensity and specificity of these 
variables heighten from the first to the third. The set begins by measuring minimum support for 
involving religion in politics and ends with a direct measure of support for a concrete example of 
laicization. Thus, it will be important to notice the strength of the coefficients from one variable 
to the next. Agreement with the third variable registers stronger support for involving religion in 
politics than the second, which registers stronger support than the first.  
The independent variables for this study include an indicator of income, an indicator of 
religiosity, and an interaction term of the two. The WVS/EVS measure of  income consists of a 
categorical variable reflecting the wage gradient within nations measured on a ten-point scale 
from lowest to highest. To make quantitative comparisons possible, respondents were asked to 
indicate their household wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes using country-specific 
scales based on local currencies. In the models that follow, income is treated as continuous. The 
WVS/EVS measure of religiosity derives from asking respondents to rate the importance of 
religion in their life using the following categorical scale: very important, rather important, not 
very important, and not at all important. In this study, religiosity appears as a dichotomous 
measure, contrasting those from the “very important” category with all other respondents from 
the three remaining categories (reference).  
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The interaction term between income and religiosity derives simply from multiplying the 
two independent variables together. Including this interaction term proves vital to the arguments 
being addressed in this paper because it isolates the association between income and support for 
involving religion in politics among those who are highly religious. Simply testing religiosity 
and income separately does not demonstrate that the highly religious view religion as a means of 
power, the claim presented by relative power theory. Only by including the interaction term can 
the comparison between those who are very religious and those who are not be made. Even if 
deprivation theory is correct in predicting a negative association between higher income and 
lower support for involving religion in politics in the general population, it might still be the case 
that higher income does associate with greater support for involving religion in politics among 
those who are highly religious. This would constitute evidence that those who are both wealthy 
and highly religious view religion as a means of power.  
The control variables for this study include both religious, demographic, and structural 
factors that may influence support for involving politics in religion. Control variables measuring 
religion include minority status, attendance, and tradition. Based on data from the Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life, the first religious control variable indicates whether or not each 
respondent is in a religious minority. This dichotomous variable, which is based on the following 
six religious traditions, signals that respondents identify with a minority religious group in their 
societies. Controlling for minority status addresses the possibility that adherents who do not 
practice the majority religion may wish to limit its influence in politics. Based on the WVS/EVS, 
the second religious control variable indicates religious tradition, including the nominal 
categories of Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Other religion, and No 
religion (reference). Controlling for religious tradition accounts for the fact that such groups can 
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themselves be highly stratified, as discussed above. Furthermore, the teachings and values of 
different traditions may include varying approaches to involving religion in politics, regardless 
of wealth boundaries.  Also based on the WVS/EVS, the third religious control variable indicates 
the frequency of attendance at religious services based on the following scale: Never, Monthly, 
More than monthly, Weekly, and More than weekly. Controlling for attendance acknowledges 
that greater participation in a local religious community may increase one’s desire to see 
religious faith influence the broader public community.  
In addition to these religious control variables, the models discussed below also include 
both demographic and structural controls. The demographic control variables from the 
WVS/EVS include 1) sex, a dichotomous variable measured as female and male (reference); 2) 
age, a continuous variable measured in years; 3) marital status, a nominal variable treated 
dichotomously with the categories of always single or ever married (i.e., married, divorced, and 
widowed) (reference); 4) education, a categorical variable measured on an an eight-point scale 
(including incomplete and complete training at the elementary, technical/vocational, university 
preparatory and university levels), which is treated as continuous in the following models. 
Including controls for demographic variables such as sex, age, marital status, and education 
address the possibility that one’s position in the stratification system may influence opinions on 
involving religion in politics. For example, according to deprivation theory, being highly 
educated should decrease one’s desire for involving religion in politics; relative power theory 
predicts the opposite. Finally, the structural control variables include 1) income inequality, a 
continuous variable from the SWIID measured by a Gini index ranging from 0 (complete 
equality) to 100 (complete inequality); 2) economic development, a continuous variable from the 
WBIPCD measured by GDP per capita PPP (purchasing power parity) in thousands of current 
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international dollars; and 3) government expenses, a continuous variable from the WBIPCD 
measuring regime spending as a percentage of GDP. These three structural control variables 
were assigned to respondents by country in the year nearest to each wave of the WVS/EVS. 
Including structural control variables for income inequality, economic development, government 
expenses, and post-Soviet status acknowledges the influence of social milieu on political 
opinions. For example, deprivation theory predicts greater support for involving religion in 
politics in nations with high inequality, low development, and low government spending. In such 
situations, religion purportedly acts as a strong spiritual compensator for weak material 
conditions. As religion was totally absent from political life in former Soviet states, it also 
becomes important to control for post-Soviet status. The influence of this history may continue 
to exert influence over contemporary opinions about involving religion in politics.  
Analysis 
To address the relationship between religion and beliefs about income inequality, this 
paper presents six multilevel mixed effects ordered logistic regression models derived using the 
meologit command in Stata. Utilizing multilevel models accounts for the possibility that being 
nested in a particular milieu might influence the outcome of the model. The theoretical 
assumption behind this choice acknowledges the importance of accounting for regional and 
cultural differences in how people express beliefs about including religion in politics. Using the 
mixed effects model allows for theoretically important variation across countries without the 
unwieldiness of such a large number of the dummy variables. The models’ effects are “mixed” 
because the intercept is allowed to vary (or be random) across groups, in this case country. 
Utilizing ordered logistic regression methods accounts for the ordinal nature of all three 
dependent variables. Each of these dependent variables is modeled twice, once partially and once 
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fully with interaction terms. Including interaction terms between religiosity and income isolates 
the influence of income specifically among those who are highly religious and those who are not.  
 
Findings 
Sample  
This study’s sample of 184,164 respondents from 93 countries derives from the fourth 
and fifth waves of the WVS/EVS (see Appendix 3). As it turns out, only the final two waves 
contain measures of this study’s dependent variables. Once variables from the SWIID, WBICPD, 
and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life were added to these waves of the WVS/EVS, it 
became necessary to address the issue of missing data. While 65 percent of cases have no 
missing values, 81 percent have only one missing value, and 94 percent have only two missing 
values. Imputation by chained equations (ICE) provides the solution to this issue (Royston and 
White 2011). In this technique, “imputed values are generated from a series of univariate models, 
in which a single variable is imputed based on a group of variables” (Institute of Digital 
Education and Research). Using the ice command in Stata, values were generated using chained 
equations appropriate for the type of variable (e.g., linear regression for continuous variables). 
The resulting dataset contains five iterations for all respondents in the final two waves of the 
WVS/EVS, providing a solid basis for the following analysis of support for religion in politics.  
TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE 
Descriptives 
Table 3.1 presents simple descriptive statistics for this study’s dependent, independent, 
and control variables. It is helpful to conceptualize the dependent variables as registering support 
for involving religion in politics. Thus, higher scores on each five-point scale—and positive 
  162 
coefficients in the regression models—indicates the desire for more integration of these spheres. 
The mean of 3.02 on the five-point scale for the first dependent variable indicates that on average 
people harbor prejudice against nonbelievers as proper candidates for public office. The similar 
mean of 3.08 on the same scale for the second dependent variable indicates the same level of 
support for having strongly religious people hold public office. The mean of 2.15 on the same 
scale for the third dependent variable indicates a lower average level of support for having 
religious leaders become influential in the voting process. Decreasing standard deviations of 
1.40, 1.28, and 1.11 show a narrowing of the variation around the average responses to these 
items. The independent variables for this paper include both religiosity and income. The measure 
of religiosity indicates that 46 percent of respondents rate religion as very important, 22 percent 
as rather important, 17 percent as not very important, and 11 percent as not at all important. 
Having such a large “Very Important” category anchoring a highly skewed distribution of 
religiosity makes it possible to use the other three categories as a single reference group in the 
regressions that follow. The second independent variable of income divides into 10 steps, 
reflecting a standardized scale of incomes based on measurements in local currencies. About 
two-thirds of the sample fall into the bottom half of the 10-point scale of incomes, and about 
one-third fall into the top half.  
TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE 
The remainder of Table 3.1 provides information on the religious, demographics, and 
structural controls. When it comes to religious status, about a three quarters of the sample are 
religious majorities who observe the majority faith in their countries. The sample divides into six 
religious traditions. While just less than half of respondents identify as Christians, about a 
quarter Muslims, and another fifth are religious “nones.” Hindus, Buddhists, and people of other 
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religions each represent between two and four percent of the sample. About a quarter of 
respondents never attend religious gatherings, about a third attend less than monthly, about a 
tenth attend monthly, about a fifth attend weekly, and about a seventh attend more than weekly. 
Demographically, the list of control variables demonstrates that a little over half the sample is 
male and the average age is 42 (with a range of 15 to 101). Combining those who have 
incomplete and complete training at each of the eight educational levels divides the sample into 
elementary at 30 percent, vocational at 24 percent, university prep at 26 percent, and university 
training at 20 percent. Income inequality measured by the Gini Indexes ranges from 9.05 to 
64.80 with a mean of 22.39. Economic development measured by GDP per capita PPP 
(purchasing power parity) in thousands of current international dollars ranges from .72 to 55.81 
with a mean of 12.00. Finally, only 8 percent of the respondents reside in a post-Soviet.  
TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE  
Table 3.2 presents the cross tabulation of the independent variables, religiosity and 
income, with cells containing the frequencies and percentages of respondents falling into each 
category. The N of 156,605 represents the number of respondents in the sample having both 
variables. Reading across the rows from left to right, the trend within each income level shows 
an increase in frequency from not at all religious to very religious. The only exception to this 
trend occurs in the ninth and tenth income levels, in which the not very religious outweigh the 
rather religious. However, even at these income levels, the largest category remains very 
religious.  
Models  
TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 3.3 presents six multilevel mixed effects ordered logistic models predicting support 
for involving religion in politics. Because the final dataset contains five iterations of imputed 
data, the six models derive from running statistical analyses on each of the five iterations. Thus 
the coefficients reported in Table 3.3 derive from averaging the coefficients from the five 
iterations, and the standard errors derive from averaging the variances and adding the variance of 
the means (Rubin 1987, Mouw et al 2014). Under each dependent variable heading appear two 
columns, one reporting a partial model and one reporting a full model with an interaction term 
between religiosity and income. While each positive coefficient indicates the increased log odds 
of being in the next higher category in the five-step ordinal scales measuring support for 
involving religion in politics, negative coefficients indicate the decreased log odds of being in 
the next higher category. The final coefficient reported in each column reports the estimated 
variance of the random effect for the nested category of country. 
Across all six models the control variables operate mainly as expected. Lower support for 
involving religion in politics correlates with being in a religious minority and attending religious 
gatherings less frequently. Being in any religious tradition correlates with more support for 
involving religion in politics as compared with the nonreligious. The only exceptions to this 
trend involve a handful of nonsignificant coefficients. As compared with the nonreligious, the 
highest support for involving religion in politics occurs among Muslims in the first four models 
and among Hindus in the last two. In general, less support for involving religion in politics 
correlates with being female, younger, less educated, and living in a nation with higher economic 
inequality and lower economic development. Residing in a post-Soviet nation associates with 
higher support for involving religion in politics in the single model with a significant relationship 
for this variable (e.g., the partial model for the second dependent variable).  
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Turning to the independent variables, the interpretation of the coefficients for religiosity 
requires comparing the “very” religious to the other three categories of “rather,” “not very,” “and 
not at all.” As compared to these three categories, the correlation between high religiosity and 
support for involving religion in politics is positive and strong in the first four models. Again the 
first two models register such support at the minimum level of wanting public office holders to 
express at least a minimum religious commitment. When the question changes to include support 
for strongly religious people holding public office, the coefficients remain positive and increase 
somewhat in intensity. In the final two models, the correlation between religiosity and support 
for having religious leaders influence voting weakens considerably, with the sign changing to 
negative in the final model. Thus, the association between religiosity and support for involving 
religion in politics moves from strong and positive in the first four models to weak and positive 
in the penultimate model and negative in the final model. As the type of support shifts from 
wanting public officials to express a minimum religious commitment to wanting religious leaders 
to influence voting, support decreases notably.  
The interpretation of income in the partial models remains quite straightforward. In the 
first and third models, an increase of one step on the ten-point scale of incomes associates with a 
lower chance of being in the next higher category in support of involving religion in politics. In 
the fifth model, the relationship is not significant. Thus having a higher income associates with 
less support for wanting public office holders to express a minimum and even strong religious 
commitment. However, the relationship between income and desiring that religious leaders 
influence voting is not significant. Adding the interaction terms in the full models for each of the 
three dependent variables adds a level of complexity to the analysis. With the inclusion of these 
interactions, the coefficients for income represent the association of income and support for 
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involving religion in politics for those who are not very religious. In all three of the full models, 
having a higher income associates with less support for involving religion in politics among 
those who are not very religious. In contrast, the interaction terms indicate the change in log odds 
of the association between having a higher income and support for involving religion in politics 
among those who are highly religious as compared to those who are not.  
TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE 
To make interpretation simpler, Table 3.4 presents the combined coefficients for the 
interaction between religiosity and income found in Table 3.3. These combined coefficients 
derive from adding the baseline log odds for income among those who are not highly religious to 
the interaction term between high religiosity and income. The statistical significance of each 
combined coefficient reported in Table 3.4 is calculated using a t-test, in which t equals the sum 
of the coefficients divided by the square root of the sum of the variances and covariance of the 
coefficients. According to the combined coefficients reported in Table 3.4, the increase in the 
association between income and support for involving religion in politics for those who are very 
religious as compared to those who are not is small and negative in the first two cases but small 
and positive in the third. Thus, in the first two models with interaction terms, being both both 
richer and more religious associates with less support for involving religion in politics. However, 
this relationship reverses in the third model with interaction terms, demonstrating that beign both 
richer and more religious associates with more support for religion in politics.  
Discussion 
This paper investigates the question, “What are the effects of income and religiosity on 
support for involving religion in politics?” Two separate theories in the sociological literature on 
religion and stratification make divergent predictions in answer to this question. In general, 
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deprivation theory and relative power theory predict opposite levels of religiosity among those at 
the top of the stratification system. Deprivation theory predicts increasing secularization among 
the wealthy, who experience little attraction to compensators for material wellbeing. 
Alternatively, relative power theory predicts decreasing secularization among the wealthy, who 
utilize religion as a means of power. One problem with recent research used as evidence for 
relative power theory is that it does not actually test issues of power, only correlations between 
religiosity and class or wealth.  
One way to address this issue is to adopt a framework that defines secularization as 
declining religious authority. In this approach, a specific example of secularization involves the 
differentiation of the religious and political spheres. Some evidence suggests that these spheres 
continue to differentiate, which supports deprivation theory. Other evidence suggests that this 
process is reversing—and that people with high status continue to use religion as a means of 
power—which supports relative power theory. If relative deprivation theory is correct, it is 
expected that having a higher income would associate with less support for involving religion in 
politics. And if relative power theory is correct, it is expected that having a higher income and 
being highly religious would associate with more support for involving religion in politics. The 
ordered logistic models presented in Table 3.3 provide evidence that can adjudicate between 
these two approaches.  
The three dependent variables modeled in Table 3.3 provide increasingly specific ways to 
gauge support for involving religion in politics. The first dependent variable, which addresses the 
fitness of those who do not believe in God for public office, identifies a baseline for this 
discussion. How do people feel about their office holders having at least a minimum 
commitment to religious faith? The widespread bias against atheists holding public office 
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apparent in the first two models—which are based on worldwide data—aligns with similar 
findings from the United States (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006). The second dependent 
variable moves the discussion to the other end of the spectrum: How much support do people 
express for having candidates with strong religious beliefs serving in public office? The final 
item provides the most direct measure of opinions about the differentiation of religious and 
political spheres. It asks whether or not religious leaders should influence voting, a central 
activity of the democratic process. This question provides a direct test of Chaves’s definition of 
secularization at the societal level, namely “the declining capacity of religious elites to exercise 
authority over other institutional spheres” (Chaves 1994:757).  
Whereas Chaves defines secularization more narrowly as declining religious authority, 
Norris and Inglehart (2011:53) define secularization more broadly as the “erosion of religious 
values, beliefs, and practices.” This approach updates traditional approaches to secularization by 
focusing on the causal mechanism of existential security. In this view, those with less access to 
the goods and opportunities that provide personal and social wellbeing are expected to exhibit 
higher levels of religiosity. The predictions made by the deprivation theory of Norris and 
Inglehart receive support in the models discussed above—even using the narrower definition of 
secularization as declining religious authority. In all six models, the larger structural issues of 
lower inequality and higher development associate with decreased support for involving religion 
in politics. And in general, having higher income and educational levels associates with less 
support. The only exceptions to this trend appear in the second and third sets of models, which 
indicate no significant relationship between support for involving religion in politics and 1) both 
having a higher income and being very religious in the full model for the second dependent 
variable and 2) having a higher income in the partial model for the third dependent variable.   
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Even when secularization is defined more narrowly as the declining of religious 
authority, the prediction of deprivation theory concerning the relationship between income and 
support for involving religion in politics holds among both those who are not very religious and 
those who are. In the main, the models discussed above present evidence for the first hypothesis 
of this paper, that having a higher income correlates with less support for involving religion in 
politics.  
In contrast to deprivation theory, relative power theory predicts that having a higher 
income will correlate with more support for involving religion in politics. Recent research on this 
topic claims that wealthier people are attracted to religion as a means of power (Solt, Habel, and 
Grant 2011; Ballarino and Vezzoni 2012). Whereas these analyses do not test this claim directly, 
this paper does so at three different levels of intensity: 1) opinions about minimum levels of 
religiosity among public office holders, 2) opinions about strong levels of religiosity among 
public office holders, and 3) opinions about the influence of religious leaders on how people 
vote.  
The basic claim that having a higher income correlates with more support for involving 
religion in politics is not supported. However, by introducing interaction terms into the analysis, 
this paper makes it possible to discern differences in the relationship between income and 
support for involving religion in politics among those who are highly religious and those who are 
not. It might be that the basic prediction of deprivation theory holds among those who are not 
highly religious—but the predictions of relative power theory hold among those who are highly 
religious. That is to say, the secularization predicted by deprivation theory may be proceeding 
among people with higher incomes. At the same, it might also be true that people who are both 
wealthy and highly religious view religion as an instrumentum regni, a means of rule. That might 
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explain why some wealthy people are still highly religious and why secularization has not 
proceeded faster among those who are wealthy. Thus, demonstrating that being both wealthier 
and more religious associates with greater support for involving religion in politics would 
constitute empirical evidence for relative power theory.  
Whereas consistent confirmation for deprivation theory appears in all six models, only a 
single interaction term constitutes evidence for relative power theory. While all three interaction 
terms in Table 3.4 are small, the first two are negative, and the third is positive. Thus the second 
hypothesis of this paper—that having a higher income and being highly religious correlates with 
more support for involving religion in politics—finds corroboration in only one of three full 
models. While this paper demonstrates evidence for both deprivation theory and relative power 
theory, evidence for the former is consistent and strong while evidence for the latter is scant and 
weak. That being said, the evidence for relative power theory appears in the full model 
measuring support for the influence of religious leaders on voting. As discussed earlier, the 
intensity and specificity of the dependent variables measuring support for involving religion in 
politics heighten from the first to the third. Agreement with the third dependent variable registers 
stronger support for involving religion in politics than the second, which registers stronger 
support than the first. Among the three dependent variables, wanting religious leaders to 
influence voting constitutes the clearest possibility of wielding religion as an instrument of rule. 
And only in this specific situation does any evidence for relative power theory appear. The rest 
of the evidence consistently supports the alternative, deprivation theory.  
 
Conclusion 
Review 
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Deprivation theory and relative power theory predict opposite levels of religiosity among 
those at the top of the stratification system. Deprivation theory predicts increasing secularization 
among the wealthy, who experience little attraction to compensators for material wellbeing. 
Alternatively, relative power theory predicts decreasing secularization among the wealthy, who 
utilize religion as a means of power. However, the research on relative power theory does not 
actually test issues of power, only correlations between class and religiosity. Defining 
secularization as declining religious authority provides a framework to test both deprivation 
theory and relative power theory. In this framework, secularization includes the differentiation of 
the religious and political spheres. If relative deprivation theory is correct, it is expected that 
having a higher income would associate with less support for involving religion in politics. And 
if relative power theory is correct, it is expected that having a higher income and being highly 
religious would associate with more support for involving religion in politics. This paper 
presents multilevel mixed effects ordered logistic regression models based on the World Values 
Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS) to adjudicate this debate by asking the question, 
“What are the effects of income and religiosity on support for involving religion in politics?” 
While this paper demonstrates evidence for both deprivation theory and relative power theory, 
evidence for the former is consistent and strong while evidence for the latter is scant and weak. 
In the main, deprivation theory provides more accurate predictions of the relationship between 
income and support for involving religion in politics—even in the more limited case of defining 
secularization as declining religious authority.  
Limitations 
Any study using cross-sectional data invites criticisms of causal claims. That being said, 
the core of this paper does not include making causal arguments. In this particular case, it is 
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sufficient to demonstrate correlations, associations, and relationships. This paper does not 
attempt to prove that being highly religious or highly compensated causes people to support the 
involvement of religion in politics. Rather, the theoretical argument between deprivation theory 
and relative power theory simply predict different levels of such support among people with 
varying levels of religiosity and wealth. Using cross-sectional data certainly limits the scope of 
this paper to weighing in on that argument.  
Recommendations 
 As appropriate as the dependent variables for this study are, other research might 
discover even better measures and methods for testing the relative merits of deprivation theory 
and relative power theory. For example, survey questions could be designed to capture opinions 
about the use of religion as a means of rule. Furthermore, the evidence for higher levels of 
religious belief and activity presented by Solt, Habel, and Grant (2011) and Ballarino and 
Vezzoni (2012) still stand. Future research might uncover a better explanation for it—an 
explanation that does not simply assume that the rich use religion as a means of rule.  
 
  173 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables (N = 184,164) 
  Freq. Mean/Prop. SD Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables       
Atheists Are Unfit for Public Office  150,808 3.02 1.40 1 5 
Disagree Strongly  24,460 16.2%    
Disagree 40,443 26.8%    
Neither Disagree nor Agree 25,791 17.1%    
Agree 27,652 18.3%    
Agree Strongly 32,462 21.5%    
Strongly Religious Should Hold Public Office 146,818 3.08 1.28 1 5 
Disagree Strongly 18,391 12.5%    
Disagree 35,686 24.3%    
Neither Disagree nor Agree 32,813 22.3%    
Agree 36,209 24.7%    
Agree Strongly 23,719 16.2%    
Religious Leaders Should Influence Voting 150,481 2.15 1.11 1 5 
Disagree Strongly  48,682 32.4%    
Disagree 58,538 38.9%    
Neither Disagree nor Sisagree 20,372 13.5%    
Agree 17,445 11.6%    
Agree Strongly  5,444 3.6%    
Independent Variables       
Religiosity 177,051 3.07 1.06 1 4 
Not at All Important (Ref.)  20,457 11.6%    
Not Very Important (Ref.) 31,223 17.6%    
Rather Important (Ref.)  40,216 22.7%    
Very Important (Ref.)  85,155 48.10%    
Income 162,713 4.59 2.36 1 10 
Lowest Income (Ref.)  15,788 9.7%    
Second Step 19,657 12.1%    
Third Step  23,501 14.4%    
Fourth Step 23,422 14.4%    
Fifth Step  26,060 16.0%    
Sixth Step  18,707 11.5%    
Seventh Step  14,859 9.1%    
Eighth Step  9,835 6.0%    
Ninth Step  5,776 3.5%    
Highest Income 5,108 3.1%    
Control Variables       
Religious Status  150,481 .27 .44 0 1 
Majority (Ref.)  134,183 72.9%    
Minority  49,981 27.1%    
(continued) 
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Table 3.1. (continued)  
  Freq. Mean/Prop. SD Min. Max. 
Religious Tradition  180,766 3.81 2.51 1 8 
Catholic  44,599 24.7%    
Protestant 25,698 14.2%    
Orthodox   18,217 10.1%    
Muslim  42,915 23.7%    
Hindu  3,885 2.1%    
Buddhist  4,583 2.5%    
Other  6,979 3.9%    
None (Ref.) 33,890 18.7%    
Religious Attendance   176,400 2.70 1.39 1 5 
Never (Ref.)  40,603 23.0%    
Less than Monthly  57,707 32.7%    
Monthly  18,974 10.8%    
Weekly  32,944 18.7%    
More than Weekly  26,172 14.8%    
Sex  184,020 .50  0 1 
Female 88,288 48.0%    
Male (Ref.)  95,732 52.0%    
Age  183,664 41.26 16.40 15 101 
Education  182,700 4.36 2.32 1 8 
Incomplete Elementary (Ref.)  26,110 14.3%    
Complete Elementary  28,512 15.6%    
Incomplete Vocational  14,536 8.0%    
Complete Vocational  28,347 15.5%    
Incomplete University Prep 16,713 9.1%    
Complete University Prep  31,468 17.2%    
Incomplete University  12,768 7.0%    
Complete University  24,246 13.3%    
GINI Index  182,662 36.77 9.05 22.39 64.80 
GDP (in Thousands) 180,212 13.46 12.00 .72 55.81 
Postsoviet State  184,164 .08 .27 0 1 
Yes 169,498 92.0%    
No (Ref.)  14,666 8.0%    
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 2005-2008); Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); World Bank International Comparison Program Database (WBICPD); 
The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life  
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Table 3.2. Cross Tabulation of Income by Religiosity (N = 156,605) 
 Not at All Religious  
Not Very 
Religious 
Rather 
Religious 
Very 
Religious Total 
Lowest Income 1,467 2,006 3,165 7,938 14,576 
 10.06% 13.76% 21.71% 54.46% 100.00% 
Second Income 1,793 2,546 4,072 9,828 18,239 
 9.83% 13.96% 22.33% 53.88% 100.00% 
Third Income 2,396 3,638 5,056 11,484 22,574 
 10.61% 16.12% 22.40% 50.87% 100.00% 
Fourth Income 2,518 3,872 5,096 11,293 22,779 
 11.05% 17.00% 22.37% 49.58% 100.00% 
Fifth Income 2,744 4,493 5,719 12,495 25,451 
 10.78% 17.65% 22.47% 49.09% 100.00% 
Sixth Income 2,110 3,440 4,163 8,520 18,233 
 11.57% 18.87% 22.83% 46.73% 100.00% 
Seventh Income 1,816 2,848 3,311 6,571 14,546 
 12.48% 19.58% 22.76% 45.17% 100.00% 
Eighth Income 1,247 1,949 2,308 4,111 9,615 
 12.97% 20.27% 24.00% 42.76% 100.00% 
Ninth Income 899 1,320 1,310 2,092 5,621 
 15.99% 23.48% 23.31% 37.22% 100.00% 
Highest Income 891 1,353 1,218 1,509 4,971 
 17.92% 27.22% 24.50% 30.36% 100.00% 
Total 17,881 27,465 35,418 75,841 156,605 
 11.42% 17.54% 22.62% 48.43% 100.00% 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 2005-2008) 
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Table 3.3. Coefficients from Ordered Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Involving Religion in Politics  
(N = 184,164) 
  
Atheists  
Are Unfit for  
Public Office 
 
Strongly  
Religious Should  
Hold Public Office 
 
Religious  
Leaders Should  
Influence Voting 
 
Religiosity: Very vs. Rather/ 
Not Very/Not at All (Ref.) .711*** .683*** .783*** .776*** .093*** -.021*** 
  (.018) (.014) (.004) (.008) (.005) (.019) 
Income (10 pt. Scale)  -.037*** -.039*** -.029*** -.029*** .000 -.009*** 
  (.002) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Income x Very Religious    .007**   .004   .022*** 
    (.003)   (.003)   (.003) 
Religious Minority vs.  
Majority (Ref.)  -.039 -.067** -.108***  -.127*** -.101* -.101*** 
 (.048) (.023) (.027) (.033) (.041) (.011) 
Religious Attendance:  
Never (Ref.)        
Less than Monthly .377*** .392*** .462*** .469*** .234*** .230*** 
 (.021) (.016) (.012) (.018) (.005) (.005) 
Less than Weekly  .619*** .644*** .829*** .842*** .382*** .372*** 
 (.017) (.016) (.015) (.027) (.007) (.013) 
Weekly .688*** .711*** .964*** .969*** .447*** .437*** 
 (.012) (.017) (.013) (.026) (.007) (.008) 
More than Weekly .799*** .821*** 1.095*** 1.110*** .477*** .473*** 
 (.017) (.022) (.014) (.033) (.014) (.017) 
Religious Tradition:  
None (Ref.)        
Catholic .241*** .202*** .396*** .337*** .139** .137*** 
 (.062) (.051) (.018) (.040) (.043) (.012) 
Protestant .415*** .378*** .551*** .533*** .150** .165*** 
 (.036) (.037) (.048) (.051) (.046) (.018) 
Orthodox .563*** .506*** .550*** .541*** .057 .010 
 (.075) (.042) (.109) (.090) (.036) (.083) 
Muslim .905*** .894*** .579*** .627*** .216*** .188*** 
 (.186) (.179) (.048) (.036) (.051) (.021) 
Hindu .329*** .311*** .051 .142 .249*** .242*** 
 (.067) (.046) (.131) (.135) (.055) (.042) 
Buddhist .493** .616*** .327*** .405*** .199*** .236*** 
 (.153) (.038) (.092) (.077) (.026) (.062) 
Other .475*** .489*** .422*** .409*** .149*** .142*** 
 (.056) (.046) (.015) (.028) (.019) (.023) 
Female vs. Male (Ref.) -.080*** -.080*** -.106*** -.105*** -.063*** -.064*** 
 (.005) (.005) (.002) (.001) (.003) (.003) 
Age (in Years)  .003*** .003*** .002*** .002*** -.002*** -.002*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Education (8-pt. Scale) -.058*** -.056*** -.075*** -.076*** -.053*** -.054*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
(continued) 
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Table 3.3. (continued)       
  
Atheists  
Are Unfit for  
Public Office 
 
Strongly  
Religious Should  
Hold Public Office 
 
Religious  
Leaders Should  
Influence Voting 
 
GINI Index (100 Pt. Scale)  .017** .018*** .023*** .025*** .013*** .014*** 
 (.006) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003) 
GDP (in Thousands) -.031*** -.030*** -.024*** -.030*** -.002 -.001 
 (.007) (.002) (.006) (.007) (.002) (.002) 
Post-Soviet vs.  
Non-Soviet (Ref.)  -.266 .122 .336*** -.112 .091 .291 
 (.431) (.182) (.084) (.426) (.230) (.433) 
Cut 1 -1.089*** -.981*** -1.026*** -.986*** -.264** -.271* 
 (.266) (.281) (.111) (.231) (.091) (.106) 
Cut 2 .684** .789** .753*** .794*** 1.474*** 1.466*** 
 (.265) (.277) (.112) (.230) (.091) (.106) 
Cut 3 1.650*** 1.755*** 1.984*** 2.026*** 2.308*** 2.300*** 
 (.262) (.274) (.113) (.229) (.093) (.106) 
Cut 4  2.893*** 2.999*** 3.623*** 3.663*** 3.890*** 3.883*** 
 (.262) (.278) (.113) (.228) (.096) (.112) 
Random Effects       
Country (N = 93) .225*** .242*** .170* .201*** .056*** .075*** 
 (.049) (.036) (.075) (.049) (.010) (.013) 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 5: 2005-2008); Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); World Bank International Comparison Program Database 
(WBICPD); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   * p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 3.4. Combined Coefficients from Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Support for Involving 
Religion in Politics for the Very Religious (N = 184,164)  
 Baseline Income + 
Religiosity x 
Income = 
Combined  
Coefficients 
Atheists Are Unfit for Public Office -.039*** + .007*** = -.032*** 
Strongly Religious Should Hold Public Office -.029*** + .004 = -.025*** 
Religious Leaders Should Influence Voting -.009** + .022*** = .013*** 
Source: World Values Survey/European Values Survey (Wave 3: 1994-1998, Wave 4: 1999- 2004, Wave 
5: 2005-2008); Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID); World Bank International 
Comparison Program Database (WBICPD); The Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life Note: * p < .05   ** 
p < .01   *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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APPENDIX 3  
Country-Years: Albania (2002), Algeria (2002), Andorra (2005), Argentina (1999), 
Argentina (2006), Australia (2005), Austria (1999), Bangladesh (2002), Belarus (2000), Belgium 
(1999), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2001), Brazil (2006), Bulgaria (1999), Bulgaria (2006), 
Burkina Faso (2007), Canada (2000), Canada (2006), Chile (2000), Chile (2006), China (2001), 
China (2007), Colombia (2005), Croatia (1999), Cyprus (2006), Czech Republic (1999), 
Denmark (1999), Egypt (2000), Egypt (2008), Estonia (1999), Ethiopia (2007), Finland (2000), 
Finland (2005), France (1999), France (2006), Georgia (2009), Germany (1999), Germany 
(2006), Ghana (2007), Great Britain (1999), Greece (1999), Guatemala (2004), Hong Kong 
(2005), Hungary (1999), Iceland (1999), India (2001), India (2006), Indonesia (2001), Indonesia 
(2006), Iran (2000), Iran (2007), Iraq (2004), Iraq (2006), Ireland (1999), Israel (2001), Italy 
(1999), Italy (2005), Japan (2000), Japan (2005), Jordan (2001), Jordan (2007), Kyrgyzstan 
(2003), Latvia (1999), Lithuania (1999), Luxembourg (1999), Macedonia (2001), Malaysia 
(2006), Mali (2007), Malta (1999), Mexico (2000), Mexico (2005), Moldova (2002), Moldova 
(2006), Morocco (2001), Morocco (2007), Netherlands (1999), Netherlands (2006), New 
Zealand (2004), Nigeria (2000), Northern Ireland (1999), Norway (2007), Pakistan (2001), Peru 
(2001), Peru (2006), Philippines (2001),, Poland (1999), Poland (2005), Portugal (1999), Puerto 
Rico (2001), Romania (1999), Romania (2005), Russian Federation (1999), Russian Federation 
(2006), Rwanda (2007), Saudi Arabia (2003), Serbia (2006), Serbia and Montenegro (2001), 
Singapore (2002), Slovakia (1999), Slovenia (1999), Slovenia (2005), South Africa (2001), 
South Africa (2006), South Korea (2001), South Korea (2005), Spain (1999), Spain (2000), 
Spain (2007), Sweden (1999), Sweden (2006), Switzerland (2007), Taiwan (2006), Tanzania 
(2001), Thailand (2007), Trinidad and Tobago (2006), Turkey (2001), Turkey (2007), Uganda 
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(2001), Ukraine (1999), Ukraine (2006), Uruguay (2006), United Kingdom (2005), United States 
(1999), United States (2006), Venezuela (2000), Viet Nam (2001), Viet Nam (2006), Zambia 
(2007), Zimbabwe (2001)  
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